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Abstract of Thesis
This thesis studies the impact of behavioural biases and limited cognition in the
domain of household finance, in particular financial preparation for retirement. A
special focus is placed on the resulting implications for policy-making. These ques-
tions are of particular importance in the current policy environment, which endows
individuals with much responsibility for their economic decisions. Appropriate reg-
ulation and consumer protection appear to be an essential objective, and for two
important reasons. First, the available financial products have become very complex
and difficult to compare. Second, there is strong evidence for low levels of financial
sophistication as well as for the impact of behavioural biases on financial decisions.
Thus a helpful design of choice environments and regulatory policies requires a thor-
ough understanding of the mechanisms underlying consumers’ decision-making in a
marketplace.
In Chapter 1, I modify the two-system model of self-control by introducing cog-
nitive costs of decision-making in order to account for the difficulty of planning for
retirement. The resulting possibility of (rational) inaction allows to generate a range
of predictions supported by empirical evidence. Non-savers are characterised by poor
financial self-control, high cognitive costs, and/or low incomes. Automatic enrolment
into pension schemes has a substantial effect on participation (the ‘default option
effect’), but its impact on aggregate saving remains ambiguous as some individu-
v
als are ‘forced’ to save while others become ‘discouraged’ and adhere to potentially
low default contribution rates. As a result, automatic enrolment reduces cross-agent
variation in wealth accumulation. A stylised numerical application of the model pro-
duces substantial default effects and generates a U-shaped relationship between the
default contribution rate and aggregate saving.
Savings behaviour may also be adversely affected by the presence of behavioural
biases. In Chapter 2, I model a market for pension products in which a pension
provider interacts with a present-biased individual. Agents who are aware of their
future present bias (’sophisticates’) are offered efficient savings contracts indepen-
dent of the magnitude of the bias, while contracts offered to agents who are not fully
aware of their future present bias (’naifs’) are distorted in a way that exacerbates
their forecasting errors. Importantly, such exploitative contracts can be either ’inef-
ficiently cheap’ (low-yield, low-fee) or ’inefficiently expensive’ (high-yield, high-fee),
depending on whether the income or the substitution effect of an interest rate change
dominates in the agent’s utility function.
Chapter 3 constitutes a numerical extension of Chapter 2. To examine the quan-
titative importance of contractual design and choice, I introduce the interaction with
a pension provider into a numerical life-cycle framework with hyperbolic discount-
ing. A sizeable forecasting errors of a näıve agent affect the savings contract offered
in market equilibrium in the predicted way. Under the benchmark calibration, the
equilibrium contract is Pareto inefficient, lowers agent’s wealth at retirement by 10%,
and generates a consumption-equivalent welfare loss of 0.17%.
vi
Lay Summary
Ongoing policy changes make private pension arrangements increasingly important,
relative to the traditional state-funded benefits (social security). As a result, indi-
viduals become more responsible for their financial security in retirement. However,
complex financial decisions can be hindered by behavioural biases (systematic de-
viations from ‘rational’ decision-making) and limited cognition (limits to acquiring
and processing information). In my thesis, I use economic theory to study how such
imperfect decision-making translates into adverse outcomes. I subsequently explore
a range of plausible policy interventions.
In Chapter 1, I introduce cognitive costs of decision-making into a model of finan-
cial self-control in order to account for the difficulty of planning for retirement. The
resulting possibility of inaction allows to generate a range of predictions supported by
empirical evidence. Non-savers are characterised by poor financial self-control, high
cognitive costs, and/or low incomes. Automatic enrolment into pension schemes,
whereby individuals need to take active action in order to opt-out rather than opt-
in, has a substantial effect on participation (the so-called ‘default option effect’),
but its impact on total saving remains ambiguous. That is because some individu-
als are ‘forced’ to save, while others become ‘discouraged’ and adhere to potentially
low default contribution rates. As a result, automatic enrolment reduces variation
in wealth accumulation across individuals. A stylised numerical application of the
vii
model produces substantial default option effects and generates a U-shaped relation-
ship between the default contribution rate and aggregate saving.
In Chapter 2, I model a market for pension products in which a financial provider
interacts with a present-biased individual, i.e. an agent who is subject to temptation
to overspend rather than save. Agents who are aware of their present bias (called
‘sophisticated’) are offered socially optimal savings contracts, while contracts offered
to agents who are not fully aware of their present bias (‘näıve’) are distorted in a
way that exacerbates their errors. Importantly, such exploitative contracts can be
either ‘inefficiently cheap’ (low-yield, low-fee) or ‘inefficiently expensive’ (high-yield,
high-fee), depending on the curvature of the agent’s utility function.
Chapter 3 constitutes a numerical extension of Chapter 2. To examine the quan-
titative importance of contractual design and choice, I introduce the interaction with
a pension provider into a numerical life-cycle framework with present bias. A size-
able forecasting errors of a näıve agent affect the savings contract offered in market
equilibrium in the predicted way. Under the benchmark calibration, the equilibrium
contract is inefficient, lowers agent’s wealth at retirement by 10%, and generates a
welfare loss corresponding to 0.17% of annual consumption.
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Chapter 1. Cognitive Costs and
Corner Solutions in Retirement
Planning
To account for the difficulty of planning for retirement, I introduce cognitive costs of
decision making into the two-system model of self-control. The resulting possibility
of rational inaction allows to generate a range of predictions supported by empirical
evidence. Non-savers are characterised by poor financial self-control, high cognitive
costs, and/or low incomes. Automatic enrolment into pension schemes has a sub-
stantial effect on participation (the ‘default option effect’), but its impact on aggregate
saving remains ambiguous as some individuals are ‘forced’ to save while others be-
come ‘discouraged’ and adhere to potentially low default contribution rates. Due to
this mechanism, automatic enrolment reduces cross-agent variation in wealth accu-
mulation. A stylised numerical application of the model produces substantial default




Financial preparation for retirement appears to be a difficult task for an average in-
dividual. This is especially true given the ongoing pension reforms which reduce the
generosity of state-funded benefits and increase the importance of private pension
arrangements, predominantly of the defined-contribution type (Lusardi et al. 2017;
OECD 2016, 2017). The underlying challenges can be separated into two distinct
categories. First, an individual must be sufficiently financially literate in order to
come up with an appropriate savings plan. Such a plan needs to indicate suitable
savings vehicle, investment strategy, and desired contributions, for example. Sec-
ond, an individual must exert enough financial self-control to be able to execute the
plan. Both requirements are potentially problematic and therefore failures to save
adequately emerged as an important policy issue (Benartzi, Thaler 2004, 2007). Im-
portantly, these two stages of financial preparation for retirement are conceptually
distinct. For instance, one can imagine that the individual’s ability to follow through
with a devised saving schedule should inform his decision whether or not to invest
the effort into the necessary planning.
The intuitive notion that planning for retirement is challenging, but essential for
wealth accumulation, is supported by the empirical evidence. In particular, Lusardi
and Mitchell (2007), Binswanger and Carman (2012), and Van Rooij et al. (2012)
document a large impact of planning on wealth holdings. In the sample of Lusardi
and Mitchell (2007), for example, a median ‘planner’ has accumulated twice as much
wealth as a median ‘non-planner’. This positive impact of planning on wealth remains
highly significant even after including a rich set of conventional controls. Moreover,
the individual’s planning behaviour is partially explained by his level of financial
2
knowledge.1 A related strand of the literature studies the impact of various mea-
sures of cognitive ability on financial decision-making and saving outcomes (Banks
et al. 2010; Banks, Oldfield 2007; Smith et al. 2010; Willis et al. 2014). One might
bridge these findings by hypothesising that cognitive ability is simply an input into
a decision to accumulate financial knowledge and plan for retirement, in the spirit
of the model of costly financial knowledge accumulation by Lusardi et al. (2017).
Simultaneously controlling for cognitive ability as well as for financial literacy pro-
vides a partial support for this mechanism (Lusardi, Mitchell 2014; Van Rooij et al.
2012; Willis et al. 2014).
Empirical evidence indicates also that the saving behaviour is significantly af-
fected by self-control problems (Ameriks et al. 2007; Ashraf et al. 2006; Benartzi,
Thaler 2004; John 2018). However, little is known about the interplay between plan-
ning for retirement and exerting financial self-control to follow the plan, in particular
how these two inputs jointly determine the economic outcomes of interest.2 In order
to theoretically analyse the interplay between (costly) planning for retirement and
self-control, in this chapter I modify the established two-system model of self-control
(Benhabib, Bisin 2005; Brocas, Carillo 2008; Fudenberg, Levine 2006, 2012) by in-
troducing the ‘cognitive costs of decision making’. The label ‘cognitive costs’ refers
to any broadly defined psychological or mental costs associated with planning for
retirement, such as investing in financial knowledge or processing information about
the design of the pension system and the available savings vehicles. The idea to
model difficult decisions as cognitively costly is not new, or particularly controver-
sial (Kimball 2015).
1See Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) for an overview of the literature that examines the role of
financial literacy in determining economic outcomes.
2In a recent paper, Goda et al. (2018) show that exponential growth bias (a measure of financial
illiteracy) and present bias (a measure of self-control) are uncorrelated and thus affect wealth
accumulation through different channels.
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In the model, an agent decides whether or not to bear the cognitive cost and
plan for retirement, based on the expected utility gains from saving.3 As a direct
result, the introduction of cognitive costs of decision-making allows for the possibil-
ity of corner solutions in the agent’s savings decisions or, in other words, inaction.
This generates a range of predictions that are consistent with the observed sav-
ing behaviours. Specifically, the model implies that non-savers are characterised by
poor financial self-control, high cognitive costs, and/or low incomes. I subsequently
analyse the effects of introducing the automatic enrolment into pension schemes.
The model predicts substantial impact on participation (the ‘default option effect’).
That is because non-savers are likely to perceive automatic enrolment as welfare-
improving and remain opted-in, even if the underlying pension scheme is ‘imperfect’
- actuarially unfair or inconsistent with their time preferences. However, the impact
of automatic enrolment on aggregate saving remains ambiguous. While some indi-
viduals are ‘forced’ to save, others may become ‘discouraged’. The latter cease to
save privately and rely on possibly low default contribution rates. Importantly, this
implies that automatic enrolment into pension schemes reduces cross-agent variation
in wealth accumulation. All three effects, i.e. the default option effect, ambigu-
ous impact of automatic enrolment on aggregate saving, and equalisation of saving
outcomes, have been robustly observed in the field (e.g. Benartzi and Thaler 2004,
2007; Choi et al. 2004; Madrian and Shea 2001). Nonetheless, I am not aware of
alternative models that capture these effects simultaneously.
If the possibility of inaction is key to realistic predictions in the domain of retire-
ment preparation, why not simply refer to an established model of procrastination
by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001)? In the simplest terms, their model pro-
3Such cost-benefit approach seems natural, but poses some serious conceptual challenges, such
as the infinite regress problem (Kimball 2015). Alaoui and Penta (2016) provide conditions under
which the reasoning process can be represented by the cost-benefit analysis. They argue that these
conditions are ‘weak and intuitive’, but also discuss the limitations of this approach.
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duces procrastination due to the agent’s naiveté about his self-control problem. At
time t, the agent postpones an unpleasant (costly) activity, because he overestimates
his willingness to carry out the task in the following period. However, when period
t + 1 comes, the activity seems just as unpleasant and the agent postpones again.
This mechanism is fundamentally different from the model of rational inaction pro-
posed here. There is a conceptual distinction between procrastinating on a known
best action (as in O’Donoghue and Rabin) and inaction due to the inability to in-
fer the best option (as in the present chapter). Arguably, the latter mechanism is
more suitable for thinking about retirement preparation, while the model based on
naiveté about the self-control is more applicable to situations such as (not) going
to the gym, unhealthy eating, or compulsive spending. In particular, Lusardi et al.
(2017) discuss the emergence of ‘rational financial ignorance’ in their model of costly
accumulation of financial knowledge. Importantly, the two models also yield differ-
ent policy recommendations. For example, while forbidding delays in action-taking
would improve the outcomes under the model of procrastination due to naiveté about
one’s self-control problem, it could be detrimental to welfare in the model of rational
inaction. Finally, separating the cognitive costs from the self-control problems allows
to study the interplay between the two channels in determining economic outcomes.
Some anecdotal evidence for rational inaction comes from the UK’s ‘Attitudes
to Pensions’ survey, which is conducted by the Department for Work and Pensions
and used for policy advice. According to the 2012 edition of the survey, 19% of
respondents had no private savings of any kind. Having no accumulated wealth was
found to be positively correlated with reporting difficulties with financial decisions.
As many as 71% of women (56% of men) agreed with the statement that ‘sometimes
pensions seem so complicated that I cannot really understand the best thing to do,’
while 28% (13%) said that ‘dealing with pensions scares them.’ These findings are
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paired with poor knowledge of the state pension system (MacLeod et al. 2012).
I subsequently present a stylised numerical application of the model in order to
provide some additional intuition. The model produces large default option effects
under reasonable parameter values. Moreover, the relationship between default con-
tribution rates and aggregate saving is U-shaped, which highlights that automatic
enrolment increases saving only when it is paired with high enough contribution
rates. For automatic enrolment with default contribution rates proportional to the
individual’s earnings, the rate corresponding to a prospective minimum requirement
under the UK law turns out to be welfare-maximising.
Based on the intuitive ideas underpinning the theory of mental accounting, I
model self-control as exerted via a particular internal commitment device - ‘savings
targets’ (Heath and Soll 1996; Levin 1998; Shefrin, Thaler 1988; Thaler 1985, 1990,
1999). These savings targets are meant to capture financial goals that an economic
agent sets for himself in order to control his spending. From a perspective of that
literature, the contribution of this chapter is to provide simple micro-foundations for
the two building blocks of the mental accounting theory, namely non-fungibility of
wealth and existence of category-specific financial goals. Discretionary saving and
public pension wealth are ex ante only imperfect substitutes, but would be perfectly
fungible in absence of cognitive costs and self-control problems. The model incorpo-
rates an endogenous decision whether or not to set a savings target, and what the
target should be. Regarding the two-system literature (Benhabib, Bisin 2005; Bro-
cas, Carillo 2008; Fudenberg, Levine 2006, 2012), this chapter introduces cognitive
costs of decision making and the resulting possibility of inaction. It also constitutes
a particular application of the two-system model of self-control to the domain of
retirement-related decisions. Assuming that self-control is exerted via the savings
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targets is only a framing modification.4
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines a two-
period version of the model, derives its behavioural predictions, and briefly discusses
an extension to a multi-period version. Section 3 focuses on the model’s implica-
tions regarding automatic enrolment into pension schemes. Section 4 presents a




There are two periods indexed by t ∈ {1, 2}. The first period corresponds to a
working life of an agent, while the second period illustrates retirement. Economic
agent’s disposable income is deterministic and equal to w (wage) and b (pension
benefits) in periods 1 and 2, respectively.5 Income is the only source of wealth and it
is further assumed that w  b. In order to simplify the analysis and focus attention
on saving decisions motivated solely by an intention to smooth one’s consumption
over the life cycle, and not by precautionary motives, there is no uncertainty in
the model. Accumulated savings earn real interest rate r and the model abstracts
from the possibility of borrowing against one’s pension income. There are no labour
supply decisions.
4Arguably, the two-system model is more consistent with the findings from neuroscience than
the popular alternatives - the model of present bias (Laibson 1997) and the temptation model
(Gul, Pesendorfer 2001). The two-system model also does away with the issue of time-inconsistent
preferences.
5Pension benefits are assumed to be funded with the agent’s social security contributions, which
alongside his gross wage determine w.
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1.2.2 Preferences
The model assumes a dual structure of preferences, as in Benhabib, Bisin (2005),
Brocas, Carillo (2008), and Fudenberg, Levine (2006, 2012). In period 1, a doer (the
economic agent’s impatient, myopic self) would like to maximise his instantaneous
utility, while a planner (the economic agent’s far-sighted, smoothing-oriented self)
has an objective of maximising the lifetime utility, which is a discounted sum of
instantaneous utilities in periods 1 and 2.
A doer has complete control over the available resources. However, a planner can
exert some influence on a doer by using an internal commitment device in a form of
a savings target. A savings target α is chosen exclusively by the planner, i.e. the
doer treats the target as exogenously given. The actual level of savings chosen by the
doer is denoted by a. Note that the intuitive ideas underpinning the theory of mental
accounting are incorporated into the model by assuming the existence of (mental)
savings targets - financial goals that are set by an economic agent for himself in order
to control his spending.
The instantaneous utility in period 1 takes the following form:




ψ(α− a)2 for a ≤ α
0 for a > α
where ψ > 0 and C1 denotes current consumption. For simplicity, the instanta-
neous utility of consumption has a logarithmic form.
The savings target serves as an internal commitment device because a doer ‘feels
bad’ (i.e. obtains negative utility) if he misses the target. This can be interpreted
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as guilt that one feels when one fails to follow well-intended plans. Suppose that the
intensity of this negative sensation is increasing in the amount by which the target
was missed. The self-control parameter ψ determines the intensity of the sensation
for a given (a, α) pair.
Nonetheless, it must be stated clearly that the above functional form is assumed
purely for analytical convenience and therefore illustrates the trade-off between util-
ity from current consumption and disutility from missing a target only in qualitative
terms.6
The doer maximises U1 subject to the budget constraint C1 ≤ w − a. The plan-
ner’s aim, on the other hand, is to maximise the lifetime utility. However, setting
the savings target is (cognitively) costly. Denote the cognitive cost of selecting the
savings target by Φ. The planner’s objective function is:




φ if α > 0
0 if α = 0
and φ > 0 denotes the one-off cognitive cost of decision-making that is borne when
the savings target is set. It is therefore implicitly assumed that the cognitive cost
arises before one starts saving for retirement. This is consistent with interpreting
φ as either effort of financial planning or the cognitive cost of acquiring relevant
knowledge. The cognitive cost does not depend on the particular savings target - the
effort required to come up with an appropriate saving schedule is independent of the
6In particular, the above function Ψ may enter the optimisation problem of the doer in a case-
independent form without affecting the solution.
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resulting plan itself. Potential real-life determinants of the level of cognitive costs
may include baseline financial education, clarity of the pension system design, or
stress-related cognitive load. Parameter δ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the intertemporal discount
factor. In what follows, the lifetime utility function U is interpreted as a measure of
the agent’s welfare. This approach is consistent with the standard stand taken by
the literature (for a related discussion, see Spiegler 2014).
The description of the model is completed by outlining the timing. First, the
planner chooses the savings target. Subsequently, disposable income w becomes
available to the doer and he decides how much to spend and how much to save given
the target.
1.2.3 Characterisation of behaviour
Decision-making of the doer
The doer selects the actual level of savings a so as to maximise U1 subject to the







The derivation can be found in Appendix A. In case there is no savings target (α = 0),
the borrowing constraint binds and the doer does not save (a∗ = 0). For a positive
savings target, on the other hand, the larger ψ, which measures the magnitude of
disutility for deviating from the target, the closer the actual savings made by the
doer to the selected target. As ψ increases, a∗ converges to α. It is thus clear why
ψ can be interpreted as a self-control parameter. Economic agents characterised by
greater ψ are able to exert more self-control in the sense that their actual saving
levels are closer to the selected targets. Furthermore, even though the negative
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sensation resulting from missing the savings target is increasing in ψ for a fixed
deviation from the target, it is no longer the case once the actual saving behaviour
of the doer a∗ is taken into account. Because the actual saving is converging to the
savings target as the self-control parameter increases, the total negative sensation is
in fact decreasing in ψ for a given target α. Using terminology the of the two-system
literature, parameter ψ is inversely related to the cost of exerting self-control, i.e.
the higher ψ, the less costly it is to control the doer’s behaviour and induce a given
level of saving.
There is no optimisation problem to solve in period 2. A retired doer simply
consumes whatever wealth is available and obtains the utility of:
U2 = log(b+ (1 + r)a)
Decision-making of the planner
Given the doer’s decision rule, a planner has two options to choose from. He can
either set a specific savings target for period 1, or set no target and allow the doer
to consume his entire income. Which action leads to a higher level of lifetime utility
depends on how large the benefits from consumption smoothing are relative to the
cognitive costs. First, consider how levels of lifetime utility obtained at the optimum
change with parameters ψ and φ at the optimum. Derivations of Lemmas 1 - 3 are
relegated to Appendix B.
Lemma 1 (impact of self-control and cognitive costs on utility) At the
optimum, the lifetime utility obtained by an agent is:
1. weakly increasing in ψ,
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2. weakly decreasing in φ.
The above result formalises the statement that economic agents characterised by
higher ψ are able to smooth their consumption to a greater extent without bearing
overly high costs of self-control. That is because the total negative sensation related
to inducing a given level of saving is decreasing in ψ. The impact of cognitive costs
on welfare is straightforward. They either directly decrease the lifetime utility of
individuals who save, or prevent the remaining agents from smoothing their con-
sumption.
Lemma 2 (possibility of inaction) There exists non-negative and increasing A(ψ)
such that an agent does not engage in saving when φ ≥ A(ψ).
The above observation states that an individual will not save for retirement if
the cognitive costs of planning are higher than the utility gains from consumption
smoothing, represented by A(ψ). As implied by Lemma 1, those gains are lower for
individuals with low degrees of self-control and therefore the agents that are most
likely not to save are the agents characterised by either high φ or low ψ. In other
words, for any given level of cognitive costs, the poorer the self-control, the less
likely it is that an agent will smooth his consumption over the life cycle. Further-
more, with high cognitive costs, small self-control problems might suffice to prevent
an economic agent from saving. Cognitive costs and poor self-control can thus be
seen as substitutes when considered as factors that prevent an individual from saving
for retirement. One can also show that the utility gains from consumption smooth-
ing are lower for economic agents with low incomes. To be more specific, for any
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ε > 1 and for any ψ, A(ψ) is greater for an agent with an income profile (εw, εb)
than (w, b).7
The ‘Attitudes to Pensions’ survey classified 19% of respondents as non-savers.
Compared to the rest of the sample, these individuals were more likely to come
from a low-income household and to exhibit symptoms of poor financial self-control
and high cognitive costs of decision-making.8 These results are consistent with the
prediction of the model. Lemma 2 highlights that the condition for not saving is
more likely to be satisfied for low values of ψ, high values of φ, and a low income
profile. Importantly, the resulting possibility of rational inaction is linked to poor
financial self-control combined with the awareness thereof. This is in contrast to the
established model of procrastination, which relies on naivete about one’s self-control
(O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999a, 1999b, 2001).
The economic agent whose behaviour is described by standard theories is nested
within the model as an agent with zero cognitive costs (φ = 0) and perfect self-
control (ψ → +∞). Call this individual the ‘classical’ agent. In case of the classical
agent, the doer is completely obedient (i.e. a = α) and therefore the savings targets
devised by the planner are implemented without any disutility from missing the tar-
gets. The next lemma states how the optimal choices of an agent with self-control
issues or non-zero cognitive costs compare with the choices of the classical agent.
7Although no assumptions are made regarding the correlations between parameters ψ, φ and in-
come, one could easily imagine these characteristics as being interdependent. That is due to several
empirical regularities. Some researchers suggest that cognitive abilities are positively correlated
with self-control (e.g. Benjamin et al. 2013; Camerer 2013; Gathergood 2012). Moreover, indi-
viduals from low-income households experience more stress-related cognitive load (Mullainathan
and Shafir 2013). Finally, incomes of highly-educated, and presumably characterised by higher
cognitive abilities, tend to be high (e.g. Borjas 2010; Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004).
8More specifically, 29% of those individuals (compared to 59% in the rest of the sample) said
that they were keeping up with their bills and credit commitments without any difficulties; 35%
(58%) reported that they were putting some money aside for emergency situations; 41% (12%) said
that ‘they would have no idea about what they needed to do when making important financial
decisions, such as taking out a mortgage, loan, or pension’; 37% (16 %) reported their financial
knowledge to be poor; 84% (51 %) stated that they had no idea what their retirement income would
be (MacLeod et al. 2012).
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Lemma 3 (upper bound for optimal saving) Let aC denote the optimal level of
savings, as well as the savings target, of the classical agent. For the optimal choice
of an otherwise identical agent with ψ < +∞ or φ > 0, it must be the case that
a∗(α∗) ≤ aC. Moreover, a∗(α∗) is increasing in ψ.
In the above, a∗(α∗) denotes the level of savings optimal induced by the planner.
Lemma 3 states that the savings made by any agent cannot exceed the savings of
the classical agent at the optimum. In other words, aC constitutes an upper bound
for optimal savings, because agents with self-control problems cannot achieve the
same extent of consumption smoothing as the classical agent without bearing an
excessive cost of self-control. The planner considers the trade-off between consump-
tion smoothing and disutility for missing high savings targets and therefore she finds
it optimal to induce lower savings. Similar remarks apply when one compares two
agents with imperfect self-control - an individual characterised by higher ψ opti-
mally saves more. Furthermore, high cognitive costs may prevent an agent from
saving altogether. As a result, the optimal saving a∗(α∗) is (weakly) decreasing in
both self-control problems and cognitive costs.
The presence of cognitive costs and self-control problems results in public pension
wealth and private savings being only imperfect substitutes ex ante. The following
proposition formalises the notion of non-fungibility of these two kinds of wealth.
What is important, in the setting of the current model, the result of non-fungibility
does not rely on differences in liquidity across the two kinds of wealth.
Proposition 1 (non-fungibility of discretionary saving and public pension
wealth) If an agent is characterised by either positive cognitive costs or imperfect
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self-control, private saving and public pension wealth are not perfect substitutes, i.e.
a∗(α∗) is not linear in b. More precisely:
1. For φ = 0 and ψ → +∞, a∗(α∗) is linear in b.
2. For φ > 0 and ψ → +∞, a∗(α∗) is discontinuous, but piecewise linear in b.
3. For φ = 0 and ψ < +∞, a∗(α∗) is continuous, but non-linear in b.
4. For φ > 0 and ψ < +∞, a∗(α∗) is discontinuous and non-linear in b.
See Appendix C for derivation. Under positive cognitive costs, the optimal level
of private saving is changing discontinuously with b. As the public pension bene-
fits become more generous, the utility gains from consumption smoothing decrease.
Eventually, above a certain threshold for b, the utility gains become smaller than
the cognitive costs of decision-making, preventing an economic agent from saving
privately. At this threshold a∗(α∗) is discontinuous in b. The introduction of self-
control problems results in the optimal level of saving being non-linear in the pension
benefits (up to the threshold). That is due to the fact that when inducing the op-
timal a∗(α∗), the planner takes into account the negative sensation from setting the
savings target, and not only the consumption-smoothing aspect of saving. Note that
both self-control issues and cognitive costs would imply non-fungibility in isolation,
but, as in case of Lemma 3, the impact of ψ and φ is exerted via separate channels.
1.2.4 Relation to the theory of mental accounting
Modelling internal commitment in a particular form of savings targets is motivated by
the intuitive ideas behind the theory of mental accounting, according to which indi-
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viduals simplify their spending-saving decisions by devising category-specific budget
constraints.9 What is important, the current model provides some simple micro-
foundations for the two building blocks of the mental accounting theory. First, the
savings targets arise (or do not arise) endogenously. And second, the model generates
non-fungibility of different kinds of wealth of the same liquidity.
1.2.5 Extension to a multi-period model
Extending the model to a version with T > 2 periods, where the last period cor-
responds to exogenously timed retirement, would be straightforward because the
planner’s preferences are time-consistent. The main results regarding the possibility
of inaction, upper bound for optimal savings, and non-fungibility would be preserved
by such extension. For example, Section 4 presents a stylised numerical application
that employs a three-period version of the model.
A multi-period version of the model could be further extended in future work
to provide some additional insight. As there would be an issue of potential early
depletion of retirement wealth, one may consider the impact of liquidity of accumu-
lated savings on the decision-making. If withdrawals were optimal in some periods,
or in certain states of the world, this would give rise to the trade-off between com-
mitment and flexibility (Amador et al. 2006; Galperti 2015). In such a setting, the
interplay between internal and external commitment devices could also be analysed.
Furthermore, assuming that cognitive costs evolve over time would allow to study
the decisions about the optimal timing of retirement saving.
9Violations of these constraints carry penalties that are purely psychological.
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1.3 Automatic enrolment into pension schemes
Automatic enrolment into pension schemes is introduced when undersaving for retire-
ment emerges as a policy issue (OECD 2016, 2017). The richest empirical evidence
on the impact of automatic enrolment on participation, contribution rates, and asset
allocation comes from firm-level implementations in the US (e.g. Benartzi, Thaler
2004, 2007; Choi et al. 2004; Madrian, Shea 2001). Across studies, several regu-
larities are robustly observed. First, automatic enrolment has a substantial positive
impact on participation rates. Second, many of those automatically enrolled tend
to passively accept default contribution rates and asset allocations. As a result, the
impact of default coverage on aggregate saving is ambiguous. For instance, auto-
matic enrolment paired with a low default contribution rate might have a negative
impact on wealth accumulation for an average worker. Third, because individuals
refrain from making active choices, automatic enrolment reduces variation in wealth
accumulation across individuals. This section discusses the implications of intro-
ducing automatic enrolment using the model that accounts for cognitive costs of
decision-making and self-control problems. The model can generate all the observed
regularities, thus highlighting the importance of accounting for corner solutions (ra-
tional inaction) in individual retirement-related decision-making.
To consider a particular instance of an automatic enrolment reform as an example,
refer to the introduction of automatic enrolment into workplace pension schemes in
the UK by the Pensions Act 2008. As stated in the official report by the Department
for Work and Pensions, “automatic enrolment is designed to harness the natural ten-
dency towards inertia that people display in pension behaviour, by making people
opt out, rather than opt in to a workplace pension” (MacLeod et al. 2012). Impor-
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tantly, the reform also specifies minimum contribution rates and eligibility criteria.10
Among other, in order to be eligible for automatic enrolment, a worker cannot be
a member of another qualifying pension scheme. It can thus be said that the au-
tomatic enrolment reform explicitly focuses on current non-savers. Moreover, even
though employees can opt out of their workplace pension schemes, they must be
automatically enrolled again every 3 years.
In case of the UK reform, during the first three years after implementation 5.5
million workers have been automatically enrolled into workplace pension schemes.
The total number of participants increased by over 3 million, with the highest im-
pact observed for low-earning and young workers. Opt-out rates were low at around
10%. Although the total amount saved into workplace pensions has been steadily
increasing, the annual contribution per eligible saver fell by almost 27% (Department
for Work and Pensions 2015). These observations match the regularities reported
for the US.
The following discussion focuses on welfare and saving implications of the in-
troduction of automatic enrolment. It must be noted that pension schemes are
introduced into the model solely as a policy device which helps individuals smooth
their consumption across the life cycle by collecting contributions in period 1 and
providing pension benefits in period 2. In particular, any redistributive properties of
the schemes are disregarded in the analysis. That is partly because most employers
enrol their workers into individual-account, defined-contribution schemes (Clarke,
Norris 2016).
Let Ĉ1 = w − aC and Ĉ2 = b+ (1 + r)aC denote the optimal consumption path
10Automatic enrolment duties have been introduced sequentially between 2012 and 2018 based
on employer size. Those employees who are at least 22 years old, but below State Pension Age, earn
over £10,000 per year, and are not already members of a qualifying pension scheme are eligible for
automatic enrolment. Currently, the total minimum contribution rate is equal to 5% of worker’s
earning, out of which at least 2% must be the employer’s contribution. These rates will be raised
to 8% (3%) in 2019.
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of the classical agent. Note that any agent with the same income would maximise
his lifetime utility if he could commit costlessly to consuming Ĉ1 and Ĉ2, irrespective
of the level of self-control or cognitive costs. The following, in contrast, defines an
imperfect pension scheme.
Definition 1 (imperfect pension scheme) Consider a pension scheme that col-
lects a contribution of τ = (1− z)w + zaC in period 1 and provides an additional
benefit of β = z(1 + r)aC− −(1− z)b in period 2, for some z ∈ (0, 1]. Such a scheme
effectively allows an agent to consume zĈ1 in period 1 and zĈ2 in period 2.
The above definition of an imperfect pension scheme significantly simplifies the
analysis, while allowing for useful interpretation. First, note that for z = 1, the
scheme enables an agent to maximise the lifetime utility without bearing any self-
control or cognitive costs. The scheme is not only welfare-maximising, but it also
maximises aggregate saving and equalises outcomes across the agent-types differing
in their ability to exert self-control and their cognitive costs. For a more interest-
ing case of z < 1, a scheme can be interpreted as being actuarially unfair. That
is because β < (1 + r)τ , which means that the future value of provided benefits is
strictly less than the future value of collected contributions. When interpreted in
this way, parameter z can be said to capture any administrative costs of operating a
pension scheme which lead to a discrepancy between the value of contributions and
the value of associated benefits. However, the above definition allows for a broader
interpretation. Note that by changing z continuously, one can replicate all levels of
lifetime utility that are attainable to an agent with a given income profile. Thus z
may be interpreted as illustrating any imperfections of a pension scheme into which
an individual is automatically enrolled, from low investment returns to distributing
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income across the life cycle inconsistently with the agent’s time preferences.
Assume that an agent is automatically enrolled into an imperfect pension scheme,
with possibility to opt out prior to period 1. The following proposition characterises
when the agent finds the automatic enrolment welfare-improving and thus does not
opt-out.
Proposition 2 (stay-in condition) There exists non-negative B(ψ, φ), decreasing
in ψ and increasing in φ, such that an agent finds automatic enrolment into an im-
perfect scheme welfare improving if B(ψ, φ) ≥ (1 + δ)log(1
z
).
The derivation is provided in Appendix D. In the above, B denotes a difference
between the laissez-faire level of lifetime utility of the classical agent and the one of
an agent characterised by ψ and φ. As such, it may be interpreted as illustrating
the extent of the agent’s self-control problems and the level of cognitive costs.
The positive impact of automatic enrolment on the agent’s welfare is twofold.
First, an individual does not need to bear the cognitive costs of decision-making.
And second, he does not need to exert any self-control in order to save privately.
In case of a ‘perfect’ pension scheme (z = 1), the total impact on the individual’s
welfare is unambiguous - for economic agents with any degree of self-control prob-
lems or cognitive costs, the scheme strictly improves welfare. In case of an imperfect
pension scheme (i.e. actuarially unfair or inconsistent with the individual’s time
preferences), parameter z measures the extent of ‘imperfections’. The lower z, the
more flawed the scheme. Such a scheme, however, might still be welfare-improving if
the positive effects outweigh the scheme’s imperfections. For a given value of z, the
scheme is more likely to be welfare-improving for the agents characterised by either
high φ or low ψ.
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Suppose that the introduction of automatic enrolment into an imperfect pension
scheme affects only the (potential) non-savers, as it is the case with the recent reform
in the UK.11 Proposition 2 suggests that the same qualitative features that prevent
agents from saving privately (i.e. poor self-control and high cognitive costs) make
them more likely to perceive the scheme as welfare-improving and not opt-out. In
other words, Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 jointly suggest a potential explanation for
the default option effect - the agents who are most likely to be affected by the change
of the default are at the same time least likely to opt-out.
Under an alternative interpretation, Proposition 2 provides a theoretical justifi-
cation for the introduction of automatic enrolment. That is because the individuals
who are targeted by the reform (non-savers) are at the same time most likely to be
made better off.
Regularities consistent with such default option effects are reflected in the ‘Atti-
tudes to Pensions’ survey. Among those eligible for automatic enrolment, as many
as 64% had never heard about the reform. However, 68% agreed that it was a good
idea, while 70% reported that they were likely to stay in the scheme once enrolled
(MacLeod et al. 2012).
Proposition 2 establishes a condition under which automatic enrolment into a
pension scheme improves welfare. In addition, one may be interested in the impact
of automatic enrolment on total saving, here defined as the sum of discretionary
saving and automatically collected contributions. In standard models with no cog-
nitive costs or self-control problems, the two sources of pension wealth are perfectly
substitutable, provided that the pension scheme is actuarially fair and does not force
an agent to save ‘too much’ (i.e. more than aC). In this case, the total saving would
be invariant to the level of automatically collected contributions. However, this is
11These are the agents for whom φ ≥ A(ψ), as given in Lemma 2.
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no longer true in the setting of the presented model, where the introduction of au-
tomatic enrolment might either increase or decrease total saving. In order to focus
exclusively on saving implications of automatic enrolment, the following proposition
restricts attention to actuarially fair pension schemes.
Proposition 3 (‘discouraged’ saving and ‘forced’ saving) Consider an agent
whose optimal level of discretionary saving in absence of automatic enrolment and
any cognitive costs is given by a∗. Suppose that the agent is automatically enrolled
into an actuarially fair pension scheme that collects a contribution of τ ∈ (0, a∗).
Then there exist increasing C(ψ) and D(ψ), where C > D for any ψ, such that
1. For φ ≥ C > D, the total saving under automatic enrolment is strictly greater
(‘forced’ saving).
2. For C > φ ≥ D, the total saving under automatic enrolment is strictly smaller
(‘discouraged’ saving).
3. For C > D > φ, the total saving is unaffected by automatic enrolment.
Moreover, D is strictly decreasing in τ .
The derivation is provided in Appendix E. In the above, C and D correspond to
potential utility gains from engaging in discretionary saving without and with auto-
matic enrolment, respectively. In the first case, an agent would not save privately
and thus automatic enrolment ‘forces’ him to save at least the default contribution
τ . In the second case, an agent would save more without automatic enrolment as its
introduction decreases potential utility gains from discretionary saving. The agent
becomes ‘discouraged’ and saves at a low default of τ , foregoing any private saving.
In the third case, an agent saves privately irrespective of the presence of automatic
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enrolment and his total saving remains unaffected. The possibilities outlined in
Proposition 3 might explain why empirical studies report that the impact of intro-
ducing automatic enrolment on aggregate saving is often indeterminate (e.g. Choi
et al. 2004; Madrian and Shea 2001).
Note that Proposition 3 does not only imply that the impact of automatic en-
rolment on total saving is ambiguous in general, as an individual may be ‘forced’ to
save, but might also become ‘discouraged’ and rely on low default contributions. It
additionally suggests that the impact of the default contribution τ itself is ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, greater τ increases automatic saving. On the other hand,
greater τ makes the instance of ‘discouraged’ saving more likely.
As highlighted by the literature, introducing automatic enrolment into pension
schemes usually has another crucial effect. Namely, it equalises outcomes, such as
wealth accumulation and plan participation, across individuals. A corresponding
effect is an implication of Proposition 3.
Corollary 1 (variation in saving levels) Consider a population of agents with dis-
tributions of self-control and cognitive costs given by ψ ∼ [ψ, ψ] and φ ∼ [φ, φ] respec-
tively, such that discretionary savings are given by a∗(ψ, φ) = 0 and a∗(ψ, φ) ≡ a∗ > 0
in absence of automatic enrolment. Suppose that all agents are automatically enrolled
into an actuarially fair pension scheme that collects a contribution of τ ∈ [0, a∗].
Then, the cross-agent variation in saving levels, as measured by the ratio of maxi-
mum to minimum total savings
τ+a∗(ψ,φ,τ)
τ+a∗(ψ,φ,τ)
is monotonically decreasing in τ and converging to 1.
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Corollary 1 is a direct consequence of Proposition 3 and illustrates a potential
mechanisms through which the introduction of automatic enrolment equates savings
outcomes across self-control and cognitive-cost types. Intuition behind this result
is as follows. As the default contribution rate τ increases, agents from the top of
the savings distribution either become ‘discouraged’, or maintain their total saving.
Agents from the bottom of the distribution, on the other hand, become ‘forced’
to save more, and thus the disparity in wealth accumulation becomes reduced. It
disappears altogether when the default contribution rate is equal to the maximum
level of discretionary saving observed in the population in absence of automatic
enrolment.
1.4 A numerical illustration
This section presents a stylised numerical application of the model. The purpose is
to illustrate the above theoretical results in a specific context, and to provide some
additional intuition. The numerical exercise is performed as follows. For three in-
come profiles (w1, w2, b), corresponding to 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the
earnings distribution in the UK, I assume a distribution of values of the self-control
parameter ψ to illustrate the self-control problems of various magnitudes and to
match some stylised facts about the impact of self-control problems on wealth accu-
mulation. The parameter φ is then selected to match the proportions of non-savers
within the particular income categories.12
First, I derive and discuss the optimal behaviour for each combination of income
12Naturally, there are alternative ways of performing such a numerical exercise. One could, for
example, use the existing estimates of measures of self-control or cognitive costs that could be
mapped into parameters ψ and φ. Alternatively, one may consider using costs of financial advice as
an estimate of φ. However, I am not aware of any numerical estimates from the existing literature
that would correspond reasonably well to the set of parameters employed in the model, its context,
and its assumptions regarding the economic environment and functional forms.
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and self-control parameter. Subsequently, I analyse three hypothetical reforms of a
pension system. Reform 1 introduces automatic enrolment into an imperfect pension
scheme. The numerical results suggest that a non-saver with median income would
be willing to forego an equivalent of almost 10% of lifetime earnings in order to par-
ticipate in the scheme. Among those who save, low-income individuals would accept
larger losses associated with participation in the scheme. However, the reverse is
true for non-savers. Reform 2 introduces automatic enrolment into a fair pension
scheme with age-dependent contributions in order to examine the impact of auto-
matic enrolment on aggregate saving. The resulting relationship between aggregate
saving and the default contribution rate is approximately U-shaped. This suggests
that automatic enrolment paired with low contribution rates may lead to a reduction
in aggregate saving, while automatic enrolment with high enough contribution rates
increases aggregate saving. Finally, Reform 3 introduces automatic enrolment into a
fair scheme with constant contribution rates, expressed as a percentage of agents’ in-
come. Because contributions are not tailored to the individual time preferences, such
a scheme may decrease welfare. The results indicate that the maximum aggregate
welfare is achieved for a contribution rate corresponding to the minimum default
required under the UK law. Another stylised fact, namely that the introduction of
automatic enrolment reduces variation in accumulated savings, is also replicated.
Consider a three-period version of the model. For t ∈ {1, 2}, the instantaneous
utility function at t is given by:




ψ(αt − at)2 for at ≤ αt
0 for at > αt
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and the budget constraint is Ct ≤ wt − at, as an individual cannot borrow or with-
draw his retirement savings. In the last period, U3 = log(C3), where C3 = b+
+(1 + r)2a1 + (1 + r)a2. As in the baseline model, I assume a dual structure of pref-
erences (Benhabib, Bisin 2005; Brocas, Carillo 2008; Fudenberg, Levine 2006, 2012).
For t ∈ {1, 2}, a doer maximises Ut subject to the budget constraint, while a plan-
ner decides whether or not to set the savings targets αt, which induces some saving
by the doer but is (cognitively) costly. The planner’s objective is to maximise the
lifetime utility function net of the cognitive costs:
U = U1 + δU2 + δ




φ if α1 > 0
δφ if α1 = 0, α2 > 0
0 if α1 = α2 = 0
Suppose that an individual is 25 years old in period 1, 45 years old in period 2,
and 65 years old when he retires in period 3. Consider three income profiles:
• a ‘low’ income profile with wL1 = 16, 750, wL2 = 21, 881, and b = 8, 048,
• a ‘median’ income profile with wM1 = 21, 962, wM2 = 31, 193, and b = 8, 048,
• and a ‘high’ income profile with wH1 = 28, 809, wH2 = 43, 592, and b = 8, 048.
In case of the median income profile, wages wM1 and w
M
2 are equal to median
annual earnings of full-time employees in the UK economy within the age categories
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of 22-29 and 40-49, respectively (measured in pounds).13 Similarly, the low income
profile corresponds to the 25th percentile of the earnings distribution, and the high
income profile to the 75th percentile, within the corresponding age categories. The
earnings data comes from the Office for National Statistics. Pension benefit b corre-
sponds to a flat-rate New State Pension that was introduced in the UK in 2016. Its
value is adjusted to account for the fact that life expectancy at the age of 65 is not
exactly 20 years. Moreover, as it is the case with New State Pension, public pension
benefit b is independent of the income profile. For a more detailed outline of data
sources and remaining assumptions see Appendix G.14
In the remaining part of this section, assume that economic agents with median
income profile constitute 50% of a whole population, while those with low and those
with high income profile constitute 25% each.
In line with the standard parameter values used in the literature, set r equal to
0.04 per year and set δ equal to 0.97 per year (e.g. Scholz et al. 2006). For these
parameter values, consumption smoothing is achieved by saving in both periods 1
and 2, independently of the income profile.
Assuming away the impact of cognitive costs for the moment, five values of ψ are
selected so as to illustrate self-control problems of various magnitudes. Suppose that
the distribution of self-control types is uniform and common for all income categories.
That is, independent of his income, an individual is equally likely to be characterised
by each of five values of ψ ∈ {+∞, 3× 10−8, 1.25× 10−8, 6× 10−9, 4.3× 10−9}. For
13It is implicitly assumed that the ranking of earnings remains unchanged over the life cycle, i.e.
the second-period income of an employee with median income in period 1 is equal to the median
income in period 2.
14Note that the high income profile (as compared to the median) and the median income profile
(as compared to the low) are characterised not only by higher levels of earnings, but also by higher
growth rates of earnings between periods 1 and 2. While the earnings growth rate is equal to 51%
for the high income profile, it is equal to 42% for the median, and 31% for the low profile. This is
consistent with a stylised fact in labour economics stating that incomes of high-earnings individuals
are increasing at higher rates.
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this distribution and the median income profile, the average deviation from the ‘clas-
sical’ levels of saving (averaged across periods and self-control levels) is equal to 28%.
For the low income profile, the average deviation due to self-control problems is 67%,
while for the high income profile it is 21%. This suggests that the self-control prob-
lems distort savings behaviour of low-income individuals to a greater extent. Only
a few studies estimate the quantitative impact of self-control problems on wealth
accumulation (in the field). This varies from 20% to 37% (Ameriks et al. 2007;
Schlafmann 2013), which suggests that an average impact of 28%, as in the case of
a median earner, can be interpreted as plausible.
Of course, there exists a single value of ψ such that the deviation from the ‘classi-
cal’ levels of saving is exactly equal to 28% for a median earner. However, assuming
a range of values for ψ allows for populations of economic agents within each income
category to consist of both savers and non-savers (see below). Such a distinction
would not be possible if all individuals with a given income profile were charac-
terised by a single value of the self-control parameter and the same cognitive cost.
Recall that an economic agent does not save privately when the cognitive costs
exceed utility gains from consumption smoothing. Although a large body of ev-
idence is consistent with the notion that the cognitive costs of retirement-related
decision-making are indeed non-trivial and have a significant impact on behaviour
(e.g. Agnew 2006; Benartzi, Thaler 2004; Binswanger 2010; Choi et al. 2011; Lusardi
et al. 2017; Lusardi, Mitchell 2007; Madrian, Shea 2001; Poterba et al. 1996), these
studies do not indicate what might be considered a plausible value for φ. For that
reason, I refer to the ‘Attitudes to Pensions’ survey. The survey reports that as many
as 19% of all individuals do not accumulate any resources for retirement. While this
proportion is equal to 37% for the respondents with the lowest income, it is only
3% for those from the highest income category. Suppose that the cognitive costs
28
are independent of the income profile. Then, for any φ ∈ (0.0034, 0.0080), 20% of
median-earners would not save, 40% low-earners would not save, and all high-earners
would save. Therefore assume φ = 0.005, which allows not only to nearly match the
percentage of non-savers in the whole population, but also within the income cate-
gories. Moreover, for φ equal to 0.005, the resulting cognitive costs are not excessive
- they correspond in magnitude to a loss of 0.27% of lifetime income by either of the
agent-types.15
Table 1.4.1 reports the optimal levels of saving and resulting utility gains from
consumption smoothing, before a deduction of the cognitive costs (measured in utils
and denoted GCS).
Table 1.4.1: Saving levels and gains from consumption smoothing
Low Median High
ψ a1 a2 GCS a1 a2 GCS a1 a2 GCS
+∞ 1,304 6,335 0.1212 1,373 9,668 0.1863 1,421 14,073 0.2577
3× 10−8 1,065 5,845 0.0735 1,184 9,289 0.1593 1,276 13,783 0.2424
1.25× 10−8 798 5,259 0.0080 956 8,807 0.1219 1,089 13,399 0.2212
6× 10−9 0 0 0 608 8,025 0.0540 783 12,744 0.1822
4.3× 10−9 0 0 0 0 0 0 579 12,289 0.1529
Non-savers are the agents for whom the utility gains from consumption smoothing
are smaller than the assumed cognitive costs, i.e. GCS ≤ φ = 0.005. For those
individuals the reported levels of saving are equal to zero. The above table illustrates
the following regularities. First, for any given level of self-control, individuals with
higher incomes do not only save more, but also attain larger utility gains from
consumption smoothing. As a consequence, higher cognitive costs would have to be
assumed in order to prevent a high-income individual from saving, conditional on ψ.
Second, within each income category, better self-control implies higher optimal levels
15Other parameter values for φ, that is 0.0034, 0.0065, and 0.008, correspond to lifetime income
losses of 0.18%, 0.35% and, 0.43%, respectively.
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of saving and resulting lifetime utility. That is because economic agents characterised
by better self-control are capable of smoothing their consumption to a fuller extent
without bearing an excessive cost of self-control. This is a direct consequence of
Lemmas 1 and 3.
1.4.1 Reform 1 - An imperfect pension scheme
In order to analyse the corresponding welfare effects, consider the introduction of
automatic enrolment into an imperfect pension scheme. In this case, the variable of
interest is the threshold value of z (scheme’s ‘fairness’), for which an agent would be
indifferent between participating in a scheme and saving privately.
A full set of numerical results is reported in Table 1.5.1, Appendix G. Consistent
with the theoretical prediction, in case of individuals with perfect self-control, the
threshold level of fairness of a pension scheme reflects only the cognitive costs asso-
ciated with discretionary saving. Second, for any given income profile, the threshold
z is (weakly) increasing in ψ. This is due to the fact that economic agents with
poorer self-control accept greater imperfections of a scheme, precisely because it en-
ables them to overcome the sizeable self-control problems, as stated in Proposition 2.
Among savers, high-earners are less willing to accept scheme’s imperfections, because
self-control problems distort their savings behaviour to a lesser extent. However, the
opposite is true for non-savers as those with lower incomes are less willing to accept
unfair schemes. This reversal is due to the fact that economic agents with higher
incomes obtain larger utility gains from saving.
In terms of the numerical values, economic agents with perfect self-control require
the highest level of fairness of a scheme, their threshold z being equal to 0.997. A
median non-saver is willing to accept imperfections corresponding to a loss of almost
10% of his lifetime earnings (z = 0.904), while a non-saver with low income is willing
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to accept a loss of about 6% (z = 0.936). Among savers with imperfect self-control,
the marginal z varies across income categories and self-control levels, ranging from
0.928 to 0.989. Arguably, these values indicate that even pension schemes with low
levels of fairness, which effectively deprive individuals of between 2% and 10% of
their lifetime income, are potentially welfare-improving for a large fraction of agents.
These results also highlight why non-savers, who have the lowest threshold z within
each income category, are most likely to perceive automatic enrolment as welfare-
improving or, in other words, why is there the default option effect.
1.4.2 Reform 2 - Automatic enrolment with age-dependent
contribution rates
Consider an introduction of automatic enrolment into an actuarially fair pension
scheme with contributions tailored to individual time preferences. Under different
scenarios, a given percentage of the ‘classical’ saving levels is collected automatically,
relieving the agents from bearing the cognitive costs and exerting self-control.16 Such
construction implies that Reform 2 is unambiguously welfare-improving. For that
reason, the emphasis is put on its implications for savings behaviour.
Figure 1.4.1 plots aggregate savings as a function of the contribution level in-
duced by automatic enrolment. Parameter σ denotes a fraction of the ‘classical’
levels of saving that are automatically collected from a participating individual. Ag-
gregate saving is defined as a sum of discretionary saving and automatically collected
contributions, averaged over income categories, self-control types, and periods.
As implied by Proposition 3, automatic enrolment has an ambiguous effect on
aggregate saving in general. On the one hand, automatic enrolment can increase
16Recall that irrespective of the level of self-control, all economic agents with given income are
characterised by the same levels of saving that maximise lifetime utility.
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Figure 1.4.1: Default contributions and aggregate saving
aggregate saving by ‘forcing’ non-savers (or savers with poor self-control) to save
(save more than before). On the other hand, automatic enrolment reduces gains from
smoothing consumption further, which may lead to some economic agents becoming
‘discouraged’ and not saving privately. Figure 1.4.1 illustrates that the aggregate
saving is initially decreasing in the level of default contributions, suggesting that the
second effect dominates in that region. In other words, automatic enrolment with
low default contribution rates decreases aggregate saving. For high enough default
contributions, however, the first effect dominates and aggregate saving is increasing
until it reaches its maximum at σ = 1. Automatic enrolment with high default
contributions increases aggregate saving by not only compelling non-savers to save,
but also, and more importantly, by compelling them to save enough. This results in
a U-shaped relationship between the measure of aggregate saving and σ.
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1.4.3 Reform 3 - Automatic enrolment with constant con-
tribution rates
As a final numerical application, consider an introduction of automatic enrolment
into an actuarially fair pension scheme with constant contribution rates, expressed
as a percentage of agents’ earnings. This intervention is more realistic than Reform
2, as policymakers are rarely able to infer individual time preferences and cater to
them exactly. Suppose that every period a given percentage of earnings, denoted τ , is
automatically contributed towards a future pension benefit. As opposed to Reform
2, such an intervention allows for levels of contributions to be inconsistent with
the individual time preferences, but it is more in line with the actual regulations
of workplace pensions. Table 1.4.2 reports the measures of aggregate welfare and
aggregate saving for a range of values for τ , assuming that economic agents do not
opt out of the scheme. The measures are normalised to 1 at τ = 0% and averaged
over income and self-control type.
Table 1.4.2: Automatic enrolment with constant contribution rates
τ 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14%
Welfare 1.00000 1.00090 1.00198 1.00269 1.00274 1.00266 1.00241 1.00195
Saving 1.000 0.827 0.712 0.806 0.786 0.754 0.802 0.885
Automatic enrolment into pension schemes may make economic agents better off
by allowing them to overcome their self-control issues and counteract high cognitive
costs. At the same time, a pension scheme with imperfectly tailored contribution
rates may decrease welfare if it compels the agents to save ‘too much’ or ‘at wrong
times’. In the current example, the measure of aggregate welfare follows an inverted
U-shaped pattern, which indicates that the positive welfare effects prevail for lower
values of τ , while the negative effects dominate for higher values. Interestingly, the
maximum aggregate welfare is achieved for τ = 8%, which is equal to the minimum
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default contribution rate into workplace pension schemes required under the UK
law.17
Moreover, even for the welfare-improving contribution rates (τ ≤ 8%), one can
observe heterogeneous effects across self-control types. While individuals charac-
terised by good self-control are made worse off by the scheme, those with poor
self-control are made better off. This illustrates that the welfare implications of in-
troducing automatic enrolment into pension schemes depend not only on the selected
default, but also on the distribution of self-control types in the population.
Aggregate saving is non-monotonous in the default contribution. For instance,
for contribution rates of 6% and higher, the borrowing constraint in period 1 binds
for almost all agent-types and there is no discretionary saving taking place on an
early stage of the working life.
The numerical results highlight another important consequence of automatic en-
rolment. Within all income categories, higher values of τ unambiguously lead to
lower variation in saving and lifetime utility across the self-control types. As the
contribution rate increases, ratios of saving and lifetime utility obtained by agents
with good and poor self-control decrease monotonically and converge to 1, as implied
by Corollary 1. The corresponding numerical values are reported in Appendix G.
1.5 Conclusion
The primary goal of this chapter was to advocate the relevance of accounting for
cognitive costs in retirement-related decision-making. The resulting possibility of
corner solutions (‘rational inaction’) may explain the observed patterns of savings
17Following the full implementation of the automatic enrolment reform, from April 2019, the
default contribution rate cannot be lower than 8% of employee’s wage, out of which at least 3%
has to be the employer’s contribution.
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behaviour, in particular consequences of introducing automatic enrolment into pen-
sion schemes. As such, this study might be seen as an initial step towards incor-
porating cognitive costs into more advanced theoretical and quantitative models of
saving.
Certainly, the scope of the above analysis is limited in a few important ways.
First, the assumed functional forms were introduced for simplicity and tractability.
Predictions of the model were therefore stated mainly in qualitative terms, and the
simple numerical application of Section 4 was performed in order to provide addi-
tional intuition behind the mechanics of the model. Second, the analysis focused
exclusively on a case of a ‘sophisticated’ individual, who is perfectly aware of the
degree of his financial self-control. A version of the model that does not assume full
sophistication about the ability to exercise self-control, akin the model of procras-
tination by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001), would yield different predictions
and policy recommendations. For example, while forbidding delays in action-taking
or simplifying the decision environment would improve the outcomes under the model
of procrastination due to naiveté about one’s self-control problem, it could be detri-
mental to welfare in the model of rational inaction. Third, the presented model
abstracts from an array of factors that have a significant impact on retirement plan-
ning, such as uncertainty, possibility to borrow during one’s working life, or timing
of retirement. This list is by no means exhaustive. Extending the analysis and
improving our understanding of the impact of cognitive costs on financial decisions
should be the objectives of future work.
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Appendix
Appendix A - Decision-making of a doer
In period 1, the doer’s optimisation problem is:
maxC1,a log(C1)− ψ(α− a)2
subject to C1 ≤ w − a. Equivalently:
maxa log(w − a)− ψ(α− a)2





























≥ 0, limψ→∞ a∗ = α,

















Appendix B - Decision-making of a planner
When the planner does not set a savings target, she attains the lifetime utility of
U ≡ log(w)+ +δlog(b). If, on the other hand, she sets the target, she attains:
V − φ ≡ maxα {log(w − a∗)− ψ(α− a∗)2 + δlog(b+ (1 + r)a∗)} − φ
At the optimum, the lifetime utility given by max {U ,V − φ} is (weakly) decreasing











[log(w − a∗)− 1
4ψ(w−a∗)2 + δlog(b+ (1 + r)a
∗)] ≥ 0
Naturally, V − U ≥ 0 due to the fact that a lack of a savings target imposes α =
0. Define A ≡ V − U . The planner optimally sets no saving target when φ ≥ A.
Following from the same property for V , A is increasing in ψ.
Now consider the derivation of Lemma 3. Assume that incomes w and b are such
that the classical agent would save in period 1. The classical agent chooses his level
of savings aC by solving:
maxa log(w − a) + δlog(b+ (1 + r)a)





An agent with ψ < +∞, on the other hand, solves:
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maxα log(w − a∗)− ψ(α− a∗)2 + δlog(b+ (1 + r)a∗)








The last term on the right-hand side is positive because ∂a
∗
∂α
≤ 1. Thus a∗(α∗) ≤ aC .
It is also straightforward to show that this last term is decreasing in ψ and
converges to zero as ψ increases. This implies that a∗(α∗) is increasing in ψ and
converges to aC .

Appendix C - Proposition 1
In case of the classical agent, aC solves:
maxa log(w − a) + δlog(b+ (1 + r)a)






At the optimum, the relationship between aC and b is linear and therefore discre-
tionary saving and public pension wealth are perfect substitutes.
Now assume positive cognitive costs φ > 0, but no self-control problem. If an
agent saves privately, the optimal level of savings is again aC . Let:
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U ≡ log(w) + δlog(b)
V ≡ log(w − aC) + δlog(b+ (1 + r)aC)














Thus for high enough b, V − U ≤ φ, in which case the agent does not save, a∗ = 0.
Denote the parameter value at which V − U = φ by b̂. Introduction of positive







b for b < b̂
0 for b ≥ b̂









and the resulting a∗(α∗) is non-linear in b.
Consequently, self-control problems paired with non-zero cognitive costs result in
a∗(α∗) being non-linear and discontinuous in b.

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Appendix D - Proposition 2
Let UC ≡ log(w − aC) + δlog(b+ (1 + r)aC). Then automatic enrolment into an im-
perfect pension scheme allows an agent achieve lifetime utility of UC + (1 + δ)log(z),
whereas without automatic enrolment, she attains max {U ,V − φ}, where:
U ≡ log(w) + δlog(b)
V − φ ≡ maxα {log(w − a∗)− ψ(α− a∗)2 + δlog(b+ (1 + r)a∗)} − φ
The agent finds automatic enrolment welfare improving whenB(ψ, φ) > (1 + δ)log(1
z
),
where B(ψ, φ) ≡ UC −max {U ,V − φ} is non-negative, (weakly) decreasing in ψ,
and (weakly) increasing in φ.

Appendix E - Proposition 3
Without automatic enrolment, an agent saves if C > φ, where C(ψ) = V − U repre-
sent the utility gain from saving privately, as defined in Appendix B. In this case,
discretionary (total) saving is equal to a∗(α∗). Otherwise it equals 0.
Under automatic enrolment, the agent saves if D > φ, where D(ψ) represents
the utility gain from saving privately after a contribution of τ ∈ (0, a∗) has been
collected. In this case, the total saving is given by â∗(α̂∗) + τ = a∗(α∗). Otherwise
it equals τ .
Note that both C and D are increasing in ψ, but because τ > 0, C > D for any




Appendix F - Numerical illustration
Currently, the State Pension Age in the UK is equal to 65 for men and women.
According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), the life expectancy of a 65
year old woman is 20.88 and that of a 65 year old man is 18.32.18 Assuming equal
weights, an average individual is expected to live for 19.6 more years at the age of
65. For that reason assume that periods 1 and 2 correspond to 20-year-long time
intervals. An economic agent is then 25 years old in period 1, 45 years old in period
2, and retires at the age of 65 in period 3.
According to the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings conducted by ONS, in
2015 median annual pay of all full-time employees was equal to £21,962 within the
age category of 22-29, and £31,193 within the age category of 40-49. In case of the
25th percentile of the earnings distribution, these incomes are equal to £16,750 and
£21,881, within the respective age categories. In case of the 75th percentile, these
incomes are equal to £28,809 and £43,592, within the respective age categories.19
The New State Pension (a single-tier benefit) provides future retirees with a pen-
sion benefit equal to £151.25 per week or £7887 per year.20 Scaling this number
in order to account for the fact that retirement period is expected to last slightly
shorter than 20 years results in b = 8048.
The interest rate corresponding to a real rate of return of 0.04 per annum can
be seen as a standard value used in the literature (e.g. Binswanger 2012; Caliendo,
Gahramanov 2013; Scholz et al. 2006). Thus I set (1 + r) = (1.04)20 = 2.19112.
In general, there is no consensus in the empirical literature about the ‘correct’





20Source: https://www.gov.uk/new-state-pension/overview. Accessed: 16/09/2015.
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0.96 per year as a standard value (e.g. Binswanger 2012; Scholz et al. 2006; Win-
ter et al. 2012), the empirical estimates of the discount factor vary from values as
low as 0 to values significantly above 1, depending on the context and methodology
(Frederick et al. 2002). Keeping these caveats in mind, I set δ = (0.97)20 = 0.54379.
Table 1.5.1 reports values for variable z for which an agent would be indifferent
between participating in a scheme and saving privately. Note that the underlying
parameter values span savers as well as non-savers. These threshold values for z for
the subgroup of non-savers are reported in italics.
Table 1.5.1: Threshold z
Low Median High
ψ Marginal z Marginal z Marginal z
+∞ 0.997 0.997 0.997
3× 10−8 0.972 0.983 0.989
1.25× 10−8 0.938 0.963 0.978
6× 10−9 0.936 0.928 0.957
4.3× 10−9 0.936 0.904 0.942
Regarding Reform 3, Table 1.5.2 reports the ratios of average savings and lifetime
utility attained by an agent with median income and perfect self-control (ψ = +∞)
to those obtained by an agent with poor self-control (ψ = 4.3× 10−9), as a function
of τ .
Table 1.5.2: Automatic enrolment and variation in welfare and savings
τ 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14%
Welfare 1.00973 1.00585 1.00342 1.00189 1.00093 1.00032 1.00000 1.00000
Saving +∞ 9.504 4.353 2.645 1.929 1.543 1.000 1.000
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Chapter 2. Savings Contracts for
Näıve Agents: The baseline model
Recent pension reforms in OECD countries endow individuals with more responsi-
bility for their financial security in retirement, raising concerns about their ability
to select appropriate pension arrangements and save adequately. Chapters 2 and 3
analyse the interaction between a present-biased individual and a financial provider
in order to examine the properties of equilibrium savings contracts and the impact
of common policy interventions. Using a tractable model, in Chapter 2 I find that
näıve present-biased agents are offered exploitative contracts that are either ‘ineffi-
ciently cheap’ (low-yield, low-fee) or ‘inefficiently expensive’ (high-yield, high-fee),
depending on whether the income or the substitution effect of an interest rate change
dominates in the agent’s utility function.
2.1 Introduction
Recent pension reforms in the OECD countries tend to reduce the generosity of
public benefits and increase the importance of private pensions. Half of the coun-
tries had introduced mandatory (or quasi-mandatory) private pensions and achieved
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nearly universal coverage of the working-age population.1 While private pension ar-
rangements are voluntary in the US and the UK, they nonetheless cover over 40%
of the population. The growing importance of private pensions as determinants of
future retirement incomes is also reflected in the fact that private pension assets,
expressed as a percentage of GDP, have been increasing over the last 20 years in all
OECD countries. By the end of 2016, private pension assets were worth over $38
trillion and the US alone accounted for two thirds of that amount. What is especially
important is the fact that these private pension arrangements are predominantly of
the defined-contribution (DC) type, under which assets accumulated by the time
of retirement directly determine the amount of pension benefit. That implies that
individuals bear most of the risks associated with accumulation (e.g. investment
performance, employment) and decumulation (e.g. longevity) stages of retirement
saving (OECD 2016, 2017).
Given the changing policy environment, a natural question arises of whether in-
dividuals are capable of selecting an appropriate pension arrangement and preparing
themselves financially for retirement. Note that these choices, characterised by high
degrees of complexity, intertemporal nature of trade-offs, long planning horizons
and infrequent feedback, provide little opportunity for learning by doing. Indeed,
rich empirical evidence suggests that wealth accumulation is significantly affected
by self-control problems (Ameriks et al. 2007; Ashraf et al. 2006) and procrasti-
nation or inattention (Benartzi, Thaler 2004, 2007; Chetty et al. 2014; Choi et al.
2004, 2011; Madrian, Shea 2001). These behaviours can be explained by a model of
present-biased preferences (or: hyperbolic discounting), which has been used to gen-
erate undersaving (Laibson 1994, 1997; Diamond, Kőszegi 2003) and procrastination
1Quasi-mandatory pensions are established via industry- or nation-wide collective bargaining
agreements and employees are obliged to participate in such schemes. The coverage of quasi-
mandatory pensions has reached 90% of the working-age population in Sweden, 88% in the Nether-
lands, and 63% in Denmark, for example (OECD 2017).
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(O’Donoghue, Rabin 1999a, 1999b, 2001), as well as to analyse a socially optimal
choice of commitment and default options in pension systems (Beshears et al. 2014;
Choi et al. 2003).2
Market interactions between an individual and a providing firm are nonetheless
relatively understudied. The prevailing approach is to analyse the biased consumption-
saving decisions without considering the supply side of the market for financial prod-
ucts, and thus to treat the alternatives available to an agent as exogenously given,
or provided by a social planner. It appears important, however, to account for the
incentives of private providers as well as predict the response of the market to vari-
ous policy interventions. Numerous policy reports highlight the need for appropriate
regulation of markets for pension products (e.g. OECD 2016, 2017; Office of Fair
Trading 2014). In order to analyse the properties of endogenously determined sav-
ings contracts, I model the market interaction between a financial provider and a
present-biased individual. In Chapter 2, I analyse a simplified model, which allows
for analytical tractability and provides helpful intuition. When the rate of return on
accumulated savings determines the agent’s valuation of a contract, the exploitative
contracts aimed at näıve present-biased individuals are either ‘inefficiently cheap’
(low-yield, low-fee) or ‘inefficiently expensive’ (high-yield, high-fee), depending on
whether the income or the substitution effect of an interest rate change dominates
in the utility function. In Chapter 3, I present a multiperiod model and embed the
interaction with a pension provider in a rich life-cycle framework with hyperbolic dis-
counting. This approach allows to assess the quantitative importance of contractual
design and choice in a more realistic environment, which extends the scope of the
exploitative contracting literature. The results indicate the prevalence of inefficient
contracts in the market, which generates a small, but non-trivial loss of consumer
2Goda et al. (2018) provide evidence for an empirical link between a direct measure of present
bias and retirement savings.
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welfare of 0.17% per annum.
In the simple model, the individual first decides whether or not to sign a contract
proposed by the provider, and subsequently chooses his level of saving. In the base-
line case, a monopolistic provider offers contracts that specify a rate of return on
the agent’s savings and a flat-rate fee charged for the service.3 When the provider
can observe the individual’s type and tailor the contract terms accordingly, contracts
offered to those agents who are aware of their future present bias (‘sophisticates’) are
efficient in the sense that they maximise the consumer-firm surplus. On the other
hand, contracts offered to those agents who are not fully aware of their future present
bias (‘naifs’) are designed to exploit their naiveté and thereby increase the provider’s
profits.4 Importantly, these exploitative contracts are inefficiently cheap when the
income effect of an interest rate change dominates in the agent’s utility function,
but inefficiently expensive when the substitution effect dominates.5 Empirically, the
income effect appears to be stronger for an average consumer, which implies the
prevalence of low-yielding exploitative contracts (Attanasio, Weber 2010).
To provide intuition for this result, note that näıve present-biased agents are
overly optimistic about their future saving behaviour and thus their willingness to
pay for any given contract exceeds the willingness to pay of a sophisticated agent.
This could lead to the hasty conclusion that naifs, relative to sophisticates, will be
3Investment performance and associated charges are arguably the most important features of a
private pension arrangement (Office of Fair Trading 2014). As the model abstracts from financial
risk, ‘offering a higher interest rate’ is interpreted as illustrating the provider’s decision to offer
active portfolio management or a wider range of investment options.
4‘Naifs’ are not only agents who are completely unaware of their present bias, but also those who
underestimate the magnitude of the bias, i.e. ‘partially näıve’ individuals as defined by O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2001).
5In general, the response of optimal savings to changes in the interest rate is ambiguous. On the
one hand, a higher interest rate makes future consumption cheaper relative to current consumption.
This generates the substitution effect, according to which optimal savings would increase in the
interest rate. On the other hand, under a higher interest rate a lower level of saving is required
in order to achieve any given level of future consumption. This gives rise to the income effect,
according to which optimal savings would decrease in the interest rate. Whichever of these two
effects is stronger is determined by the curvature of the utility function.
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offered more expensive savings products with generous rates of return. It turns out
that the distortion is more subtle than that. Rather, the profit-maximising provider
exploits the naiveté about the present bias by offering contract terms that appear
attractive as long as the individual saves a lot. This is achieved by distorting the
interest rate downwards when the income effect dominates and upwards when the
substitution effect dominates.6 This novel result highlights the importance of in-
teractions between ‘behavioural’ and ‘classical’ preference parameters in generating
predictions.
Näıve agents who sign exploitative contracts suffer welfare losses, as compared to
their sophisticated counterparts. These welfare losses can be decomposed into the
‘distributional effect’, according to which naifs would overpay for any given contract,
and the ‘efficiency effect’, arising from the fact that the offered contract terms are
inefficiently distorted. A providing firm generates higher profits when interacting
with naifs. However, the agent’s present bias leads to consumer welfare losses, inef-
ficiency, and higher profits only when coupled with naiveté.
Given the consumer exploitation, I consider three policy interventions in the
market for pension products which have already been implemented in some OECD
countries. First, imposing restrictions on fees charged by the provider, results in
(weakly) lower rates of return being offered to all agent-types. An effective cap
on fees thus distorts otherwise efficient contracts designed for sophisticated agents
and might further reduce both efficiency and consumer welfare for naifs if their ex-
ploitative contracts were ‘too cheap’ in the first place. Second, increasing the degree
of competition raises consumer welfare while reducing the provider’s profits. How-
6To be more explicit about the underlying mechanism, a provider chooses contract terms which
magnify the overvaluation of a savings contract by a naif, that is the difference between the agent’s
willingness to pay and the contract’s actual worth, which will determine the firm’s cost. The naifs’
tendency to overpay for their contracts is therefore exploited by distorting the interest rate in the
direction which induces higher expected savings.
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ever, the exploitative features and efficiency properties of savings contracts remain
unaffected.7 Third, introducing a minimum-savings rule has an ambiguous impact
on efficiency and consumer welfare in general. However, close to the case of com-
plete naiveté, the minimum-savings requirement only exacerbates the exploitative
contract design, reducing efficiency and consumer welfare. This result follows from
the fact that the laissez faire exploitative contracts already induce the näıve agents
to over-save, relative to sophisticated, present-biased individuals. Taken together,
these results emphasize the challenges to policy-making in this domain.
Key implications of the model regarding the exploitative contract design are ro-
bust, in qualitative sense, to the degree of competition, variable fees, and financial
illiteracy. Another important extension relaxes the assumption of perfect observabil-
ity of the agent’s characteristics. I consider two specific populations of two indistin-
guishable agent-types. First, a population of agents differing in their present bias,
but holding identical beliefs about the magnitude of the bias. Second, a population
of agents holding heterogeneous beliefs about their present bias, but characterised by
the same magnitude of the bias. In the first case, näıve agents might be either better
off or worse off relative to the baseline case where their type is observed. In the
second case, naifs are always (weakly) better off relative to the baseline. In general,
the efficiency of sophisticates’ contracts deteriorates relative to perfect observability,
but this is not necessarily compensated for with an improvement in the efficiency of
naifs’ contracts.
Chapters 2 and 3 contribute to the expanding literature on exploitative con-
tracting (or: behavioural industrial organisation). In a seminal paper, DellaVigna
and Malmendier (2004) show that a provider serving individuals with self-control
7Analogous remarks can be made for an alternative case of discouraging competition - insofar as
these interventions reduce the value of the agent’s outside option, they increase provider’s profits
and decrease consumer welfare, but the efficiency of outcomes remains unaffected.
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problems prices investment goods (such as gym entrance) below their marginal cost,
and leisure goods (such as credit card debt) above their marginal cost. While such
design helps sophisticated agents overcome their self-control problems, it also ex-
ploits mispredictions of future usage by naifs. Subsequently, exploitative contracting
framework has been applied to study contracts for products with shrouded attributes
(Gabaix, Laibson 2006), mobile phone services (Grubb 2009), and credit card debt
(Heidhues, Kőszegi 2010).8 The current chapter constitutes the first application
of the exploitative contracting framework to markets for savings products. Impor-
tantly, while DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) already noted that the direction
of exploitative distortions to naifs’ contracts is ambiguous, this chapter provides a
meaningful condition that determines whether such contracts are ‘inefficiently cheap’
or ‘inefficiently expensive’. This novel theoretical finding highlights the importance
of interactions between parameters traditionally seen as ‘classical’ and ‘behavioural’
and such considerations have so far received little attention from the behavioural
economics literature (Kőszegi 2014). To my knowledge, the numerical application
presented in Chapter 3 is the first attempt to explicitly assess the quantitative impli-
cations of exploitative contracting. The current approach combines numerical tools
from macroeconomics with a theoretical microeconomic work on contract design.
Accounting for the supply side of the market for financial products is also novel
in the context of the life-cycle literature, both theoretical and applied, as well as
‘classical’ and behavioural (see e.g. Angeletos et al. 2001; Attanasio, Weber 2010;
Gourinchas, Parker 2002; Laibson et al. 2000, 2017).
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the base-
line version of the simple model and presents the main results. Section 3 discusses
the three government interventions. Section 4 outlines a range of extensions to the
8Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) present a more general model of contracting with diversely näıve
agents.
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baseline model. Section 5 concludes. Derivation of the results and a fuller treat-
ment of the extensions and alternative modelling assumptions are provided in the
appendix.
2.2 The baseline model
As a baseline case, consider a market for savings products in which an individual
interacts with a monopolistic provider (‘the firm’) who can perfectly observe agent’s
characteristics and tailor the contract terms accordingly. A savings contract P is
characterised by two unconditional parameters - an interest rate r that the provider
offers on agent’s savings and a flat-rate (‘per-period’) fee f that is charged for the
service.9 There are two stages in the model. In period 0 the contract is proposed
by the firm and evaluated by an individual, who then saves in period 1 taking the
contract parameters as given. Such decoupling of contract evaluation and saving
is supposed to illustrate delays that occur between choosing one’s pension provider
and accumulating pension wealth, mainly due to a long horizon of repeated savings
decisions.
The agent’s preferences as in period 0 are given by the following quasilinear utility
function:
U0 = u(c1) + δu(c2)− f ,
where c1 = Y − s, c2 = (1 + r)s, s denotes agent’s savings, Y > 0 is exogenous pre-
9Investment performance and associated charges are arguably the most important features of
a private pension arrangement (Office of Fair Trading 2014). Conditioning those parameters, for
instance on the realised level of saving, is discussed in section 2.2.3. Moreover, it must be noted
that in reality pension providers or portfolio managers typically do not guarantee a specific rate
of return as most investment strategies are inherently risky. In terms of interpretation, one can
view the decision to ‘offer higher interest’ as illustrating the provider’s offer of active portfolio
management or a wider range of investment options.
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retirement income, and δ ≤ 1 is the discount factor.10
In period 1, when saving takes place, an agent is potentially present-biased and
acts so as to maximise the following utility function:
U1 = u(c1) + βδu(c2)− f ,
where β ∈ [0, 1] represents the magnitude of the present bias. Typically, present bias
reflects the impact of non-normative factors that make an agent seemingly over-value
his current consumption relative to future consumption, such as temptation, inatten-
tion or procrastination. The lower β, the larger the self-control problem. Conversely,
for β = 1, the behaviour is not affected by present bias.
Under present bias, the agent’s preferences become time-inconsistent. Clearly,
a consumption bundle that maximises utility function U1 for β < 1 differs from a
consumption bundle that maximises U0. Following the standard approach in the
literature, allow U0 to be interpreted as a normative benchmark (e.g. O’Donoghue,
Rabin 1999a, 2001; Heidhues, Kőszegi 2010; see the related discussion in Spiegler
2014).
Furthermore, note that the beliefs about savings behaviour in period 1 are crucial
when evaluating the contract in period 0. Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001),
denote period-0 singleton beliefs regarding agent’s present bias by β̂ ∈ [β, 1]. That
is, in period 0 an individual believes that his period-1 self will act so as to maximise
10There are several reasons why the utility function is linear in the transfer between the agents
and the firm. First, I am implicitly assuming that the intertemporal decision-making remains
unaffected by the fee. In the context of life-cycle wealth accumulation, where Y  f , this is not an
overly restrictive assumption. Consequently, the interest rate is the only contract parameter that
affects the intertemportal trade-off. Second, the efficiency criterion, which is introduced later, is
constant in the transfer if the firm is risk-neutral. In particular, efficiency is invariant to ‘money
changing hands.’ Third, the analysis is simplified without a significant loss of insight. As long as the
impact of fees on the intertemporal trade-off is ‘small’, the interest rate is the contract parameter
that determines (perceived) consumer surplus, while the fee is used by the provider to extract the
surplus. Then, the main implications of the baseline model remain valid. The appendix relaxes the
assumption of quasi-linearity.
59
U1 parametrised by β̂. Agents with beliefs β̂ > β are called ‘näıve’ because they un-
derestimate the magnitude of their present bias. The greater β̂, the more severe the
underestimation. On the other hand, agents with beliefs β̂ = β are ‘sophisticated’
in the sense that they are fully aware of their present bias.
For notational simplicity, but without loss of insight, the baseline model sets
δ = 1.
Naifs’ overly optimistic beliefs about their future savings behaviour make them
overvalue a savings contract P for any given parameters r and f .
Lemma 1 For a concave u(·), näıve agents overestimate their future saving and thus
overvalue any savings contract.
The short proof is relegated to the appendix. Naturally, more severe naiveté results
in greater misprediction of future savings behaviour and overvaluation of a contract.




where θ > 0 is the CRRA parameter.11 The CRRA utility function features promi-
nently in the literature on intertemporal choice, especially in the context of a life
cycle (see e.g. Attanasio, Weber 2010; Browning, Lusardi 1996; Gourinchas, Parker
2002).
In general, the response of optimal savings to changes in the interest rate is am-
biguous. On the one hand, a higher interest rate makes future consumption cheaper
relative to current consumption. This generates the substitution effect, according
11CRRA stands for ‘constant relative risk aversion’. Moreover, this utility function is also char-
acterised by a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution, given by the inverse of θ. A single
parameter capturing both risk preferences and elasticity of intertemporal substitution is a strength
as well as a limitation of the parsimonious CRRA utility formulation.
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to which optimal savings would increase in the interest rate. On the other hand,
under a higher interest rate a lower level of saving is required in order to achieve any
given level of future consumption. This gives rise to the income effect, according to
which optimal savings would decrease in the interest rate. From this perspective, a
CRRA utility formulation is particularly useful, as the size of parameter θ determines
whether the substitution or the income effect dominates. For θ < 1 the substitution
effect is stronger and optimal savings increase in the interest rate. For θ > 1, the
income effect dominates and optimal savings decrease in the interest rate. For the
special case of θ = 1, the CRRA utility function takes a logarithmic form. Then,
the optimal saving is invariant to the interest rate.
To introduce concise notation, let the agent’s valuation of a savings contract given
his belief β̂ be represented by Û0:




1−θ − f ,
where ŝ ≡ s(β̂, r) is the forecasted savings given the contract parameters.12 Denote
the contract valuation net of fees by V̂0 ≡ V0(s(β̂, r), r), so that Û0 = V̂0 − f .
If an agent does not sign a savings contract, he obtains reservation utility of u.
Under the assumption of monopoly, u is interpreted as a level of utility associated
with reliance on an exogenously given system of public pension benefits. That is,
the more generous (or comprehensive) the state pensions, the greater u. Because
the reservation utility does not depend on the agent’s actions, the baseline model
supposes that u is constant across agent-types.
Suppose that a savings contract is offered by a financial provider implicitly inter-
preted to be a pension fund. Most private pension assets are managed by pension
12Since Y > 0 and u(·) is concave, the maximisation problem of U1 (or Û1) has an interior
solution. Thus the borrowing constraint is omitted. Under the assumption of quasi-linearity in
fees, the actual and forecasted savings are not affected by f .
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funds in the OECD countries (OECD 2017).13 Moreover, pension funds are able
to offer tailor-made products, both via a retail market and workplace arrangements.
Thus the issues of contract design and appropriate regulatory policies are particularly
relevant when applied to pension funds. The literature analysing the determinants of
associated costs of provision (Basu, Andrews 2014; Bateman, Mitchell 2004; Bikker,
de Dreu 2009; Bikker et al. 2012) divides the total cost of a pension fund into
administrative and investment costs. There is consistent evidence that the adminis-
trative costs are increasing in the size of an individual pension pot, controlling for
the number of pension plan participants, and that there is a substantial fixed cost
component at the individual level. The available results additionally suggest that
the investment costs are increasing in the (expected) rate of return.14 Consequently,
suppose that a savings contract is offered by a provider who maximises the following
profit function:
π = f − c(r, s)
where the total cost of the service c(r, s) is a function of the interest rate and agent’s
savings.
In the market where a monopolistic provider can perfectly observe the agent’s
characteristics and tailor the contract terms accordingly, the optimal (profit-maximising)
savings contract solves the following problem:
maxr,f π = f − c(r, s), s.t.:
1. s = s(β, r)
13This proportion equals 59% in the US, 54% in Canada, 100% in the UK, 97% in Australia,
61% in Japan, and 100% in the Netherlands.
14The model abstracts from financial risk and treats the interest rate as deterministic, but the
citied studies find evidence for a significant impact of factors typically associated with higher
expected returns, such as the portfolio share of stocks or the ‘quality and complexity’ of a plan, on
the investment costs.
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2. V̂0 − f ≥ u
provided that the above results in non-negative profits. The first constraint says that
a provider correctly forecasts agent’s future savings behaviour given the parameters
of the contract.15 The second constraint is a version of the ‘individual rationality
constraint’, which says that in period 0 the agent’s perceived utility from signing a
contract P cannot be lower than the utility of his outside option. Crucially, note
that while the firm’s costs of service are a function of β, the agent’s valuation of the
contract is a function of β̂.16
The solution to the contract design problem is derived under Assumption 1, which
states that conditional on agent’s savings behaviour, the total cost function is convex
in the offered rate of return.17
Assumption 1 The cost function c(r, s(β, r)) is convex in r.
In what follows, the efficiency criterion is given by a social surplus function de-
fined as an equally-weighted sum of utility attained by an agent (as measured by U0)
and firm’s profits. Under the assumption of quasi-linearity, this measure of efficiency
is a function of the interest rate only. Moreover, it coincides with an objective of a
time-consistent individual who has access to firm’s technology of converting savings
15It is standard in the exploitative contracting literature to assume that the firm is able to predict
individual’s behaviour more accurately than the individual himself. This is primarily due to the
firm’s superior knowledge of the market and its customers, achieved through expertise, reliance on
statistical data, and experience in market interactions (Spiegler 2014).
16The above formulation of a problem of contract design embeds a couple of important implicit
assumptions. First, both the firm and an agent commit to the contract terms. Second, while an
agent might hold incorrect beliefs regarding his own future savings behaviour, he understands the
contract terms perfectly. Third, there is no uncertainty regarding the rate of return on agent’s
savings. The second and the third assumption are relaxed in one of the extensions of the model,
which does not change the main conclusions of this section.
17A more specific form of the firm’s cost function will be presented in Chapter 3.
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into future wealth.
Proposition 1 characterises the main qualitative characteristics of the savings
contracts offered in equilibrium, denoted P ∗ = (r∗, f ∗).
Proposition 1 In a monopolistic market with perfect observability:
1. For any r, the fee f ∗ is increasing in β̂. For any β̂, the fee f ∗ is increasing in
r.
2. Sophisticates obtain efficient contracts, conditional on β. Due to the monopo-
listic power of the provider, sophisticated agents obtain utility of u.





> 0 for θ < 1,
= 0 for θ = 1,
< 0 for θ > 1
4. The agent’s utility as well as efficiency are decreasing in the degree of his
naiveté, while the firm’s profits are increasing in the degree of naiveté.
The derivation is relegated to the appendix. Following from the second constraint
in the optimisation problem, the firm may charge different agent-types different fees
for the same rate of return. More specifically, since näıve agents overestimate their
future saving, they are willing to accept higher fees for any given interest rate. In
addition, the willingness to pay for a savings contract is increasing in the offered rate
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of return.
The main efficiency implications of Proposition 1 arise from the fact that the
equilibrium contracts maximise the perceived consumer-firm surplus. In case of so-
phisticated individuals, β̂ = β and the perceived surplus coincides exactly with the
actual surplus. Then, the equilibrium contracts are efficient. Under the assumption
of monopoly, sophisticated agents obtain utility equal to the utility of their outside
option, because the firm is able to charge a fee which extracts the entire surplus.
On the other hand, the provider exploits the agent’s naiveté about the present
bias by offering contract terms that appear attractive provided that an individual
saves a lot. The objective of a profit-maximising firm is to exacerbate the agent’s
forecasting error regarding his future saving and thus his willingness to pay for the
contract, relative to the contract’s actual worth. This is achieved by distorting the
interest rate downwards for θ > 1 when the income effect dominates, and upwards
for θ < 1 when the substitution effect dominates, because these distortions raise the
näıve agent’s forecasted savings. Clearly, the actual savings increase as well, but not
as strongly due to the impact of the present bias.
Which of these two cases appears empirically more relevant? Although the CRRA
formulation of a utility function is one of the most commonly used in the life-cycle
literature, there seems to be no consensus regarding the ‘right’ size of the CRRA
parameter. This is to be expected, as under the parsimonious CRRA formulation,
a single parameter governs the elasticity of intertemporal substitution as well as the
risk aversion. Nonetheless, most available point estimates indicate θ > 1, while many
calibrated life-cycle models assume θ to exceed 2. Thus in relation to the qualitative
predictions of the model, the prevalence of inefficiently cheap savings products in the
market may be interpreted as a primary policy concern.18
18These point estimates regard an average or ‘representative’ household, but one can imagine
that the entire population has economic agents characterised by different magnitudes of the CRRA
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The above discussion also highlights the importance of interactions between ‘clas-
sical’ (θ) and ‘behavioural’ preference parameters (β̂) in generating predictions. This
issue has thus far received little attention from the literature (Kőszegi 2014). In most
cases, comparative statics regarding outcomes obtained by non-classical agents are
limited to analysing an isolated impact of a particular behavioural characteristic.
Proposition 1 suggests that in certain settings, meaningful interactions with other
parameters may also arise. In comparison, while in their seminal paper DellaVigna
and Malmendier (2004) already noted that the direction of exploitative distortions
to naifs’ contracts is equivocal, their setting did not provide an intuitive condition
or a mechanism that would determine it.
Due to this exploitative contract design, näıve agents obtain utility lower than
u. The resulting loss of consumer welfare is unambiguously increasing in the degree
of naiveté and arises from two distinct sources. Due to the ‘distributional effect’,
naifs tend to overpay for any given contract terms.19 Additionally, their contracts
are distorted away from the first-best by the provider, which results in the ‘efficiency
effect’.20 Finally, the provider’s profits are increasing in the agent’s naiveté.
2.2.1 Endogenous contracts and consumption paths
The above discussion focuses on the efficiency of outcomes and consumer welfare
obtained by different agent-types. However, it is also of interest to consider the con-
parameter. For a summary of the existing empirical evidence see Attanasio and Weber (2010). The
earliest attempts to estimate the size of the CRRA parameter are outlined in Deaton (1992) and
Romer (2006). Examples of calibration exercises that assume θ > 2 are Angeletos et al. (2001),
Scholz et al. (2006) and Winter et al. (2012). Moreover, some authors perform sensitivity analyses
by assuming θ to lie between 0.5 and 5.
19As will be shown, greater degrees of competition weaken the negative distributional effect.
Similarly for a case when the valuation of agent’s outside option is determined endogenously.
20Such distinction was first noted by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004). Moreover, note that
consistently with an established result, agent’s present bias reduces efficiency and diminishes con-
sumer welfare only when an agent is näıve about it (e.g. DellaVigna, Malmendier 2004; Gabaix,
Laibson 2006; Heidhues, Kőszegi 2010).
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sumption paths elicited by endogenous contracts.
Corollary 1 Naifs over-save relative to sophisticates independent of θ. However,
they do not necessarily over-accumulate pension wealth.
It follows directly from Proposition 1 that näıve present-biased agents over-save rel-
ative to sophisticated present-biased agents as a result of the exploitative contract
design, irrespective of the size of the CRRA parameter θ. Importantly, this does
not necessarily imply that naifs over-accumulate pension wealth. Under an arguably
more relevant case of θ > 1, näıve agents’ higher saving may be offset by an ineffi-
ciently low rate of return. As a result, exploitative contracts would induce naifs to
under-consume at both stages of the model.21
As a side remark, consider a potential intervention of educating individuals, turn-
ing all naifs into sophisticates. The above implies that such an intervention would
unambiguously lead to a decrease in aggregate saving, even though consumer welfare
and efficiency would improve.
2.2.2 A relevant empirical pattern - The design of default
options in workplace pensions
For the more relevant case of θ > 1, the prediction of the model may at first seem
counter-intuitive. Näıve agents, who overestimate how much they are going to save,
are offered inefficiently cheap (low-yield, low-fee) contracts. These exploitative con-
tracts are designed to magnify the difference between their forecasted and actual
savings behaviour. There is, however, a salient empirical pattern that is related to
21That is true even under a model that ignores the impact of fees paid to the provider on wealth
accumulation.
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this implication of the model.
Consider automatic enrolment into workplace pension schemes that has been
mandated in Italy, New Zealand, Turkey and the UK, and is encouraged by legisla-
tion in Canada and in the US (OECD 2017). Under automatic enrolment, eligible
workers are required to actively opt-out of a workplace pension scheme if they do
not wish to participate, rather than to actively opt-in. This change of the default
option, without affecting the economic incentives, has been shown by multiple stud-
ies to have a dramatic impact on an array of outcomes, from participation in the
scheme to contribution rates, asset allocations, and resulting variation in wealth ac-
cumulation across workers (see e.g. Benartzi, Thaler 2004, 2007; Beshears et al.
2009; Choi et al. 2004; Madrian, Shea 2001). Indeed, the prevalence of the default
option effects in the domain of retirement saving remains one of the most powerful
results in empirical behavioural economics.
Various demand-side explanations have been put forward to explain why indi-
viduals become so strongly anchored in the default savings options. These include
transaction costs, inattention, procrastination, and financial illiteracy.22 However,
I am not aware of a study that would account for the impact of the design of the
default option itself on the strength of the default option effect.23 As noted in the
literature, the typical default savings option combines moderate contribution rates
with a conservative asset allocation yielding low returns, such as a money market
fund. Whether by exploitative design or due to other factors (e.g. employer’s costs
of provision of a pension plan), the present model suggests that such low-yielding
22For example, models with present-biased preferences can predict low switching rates from
inferior default options despite low transaction costs (O’Donoghue, Rabin 1999a, 2001; Choi et al.
2003).
23Choi et al. (2003) and Carroll et al. (2009) consider a socially optimal choice of the default
savings rate when when workers have heterogeneous preferences over savings rates. However, these
analyses abstract from other characteristics of the default option, such as asset allocation and
expected returns, as well as from the incentives faced by the providers.
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default allocations only exacerbate the difference between individual’s expected and
actual savings behaviour, thereby strengthening the default option effect.24 Put dif-
ferently, the existing evidence on the default option effect should be interpreted as
conditional on particular parameters of the default.25
2.2.3 Alternative modelling assumptions
The baseline formulation of the model makes several modelling assumptions that
improve the clarity of exposition. While a separate section is devoted to extensions
of the model, the following discusses several important assumptions underpinning all
formulations of the model. These are assumptions about the contract space, agent’s
outside option and uncertainty.
Contingent contract terms. In the baseline model, the interest rate r and
the fee f are unconditional, i.e. independent of the agent’s actions (savings). Note
that in the above setting that is a genuine constraint. For example, under a richer
contract space, the sophisticated agents would opt for commitment contracts that
counteract the impact of their future present bias. On the other hand, in the case
of naifs, the unconditional contracts reduce the extent of exploitation and limit the
related welfare losses. If the contract parameters were contingent on future actions,
näıve agents would overvalue savings contracts to an even greater extent.26
24Although it may appear that there is no ambiguity regarding future saving levels once a con-
tribution rate is known, a näıve individual may nonetheless (incorrectly) expect to revise his saving
upwards by opting for a higher contribution rate in the future.
25In reality, employers play a role of an intermediary, who chooses a particular pension provider
on behalf of their employees. Under a stylised view, an employer would select a pension arrangement
that maximises employees’ utility subject to a restriction on fees, for example due to the shared
costs of provision. Analogously to the baseline model, an employer may well aim to maximise
employees’ perceived utility from a savings contract thereby maximising the perceived, rather than
the realised, value of the benefit. Then, the impact of employer’s intermediation would be equivalent
to the effect of introducing a ceiling on fees, which is discussed below. A potential discrepancy
between employer’s and employees’ preferences and/or beliefs posts a separate research question.
26A general result from the behavioural industrial organisation literature (e.g. DellaVigna, Mal-
mendier 2004; Spiegler 2014) states that under unconstrained contracting, sophisticated agents
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Endogenous outside options. The baseline model assumes exogenous and
type-independent valuation of the outside option u. Such an assumption is justified
when the utility from selecting the outside option does not depend on agent’s own
actions, for example when the outside option corresponds to reliance on a mandatory
system of public pension benefits. However, one can also imagine that the valuation
of an outside option is a function of the agent’s future actions, for example when the
outside option involves saving into an account offered by an external provider (e.g.
a bank). In contrast to the baseline model, suppose that the agent’s outside option
involves saving into a costless savings account offering a rate of return r. Then, the
valuation of the outside option becomes endogenous, u = V0(s(β̂, r), r). Although a
fuller treatment of this case is relegated to the appendix, it is evident that näıve
agents overestimate the value of their outside option, which affects their willingness
to pay for a savings contract. While this mechanism curbs the negative distributional
effect, it has no impact on the efficiency properties of the savings contracts offered
in equilibrium.27
Uncertainty. Uncertainty can be introduced into the model via several alterna-
tive channels. First, imagine that realisation of the present bias parameter β < 1 is
a chance event happening with probability p ∈ [0, 1]. Otherwise, there is no present
bias (i.e. β = 1 with probability (1 − p)). If an agent has a correct prior about p,
select perfect commitment contracts that induce them to act as if they were time-consistent. Fur-
thermore, the literature shows that restricting attention to two-part tariffs generates the same
outcome. However, this does not extend to the above setup, in which the two-attributed equilib-
rium contracts P ∗ = (r∗, f∗) for sophisticated agents do not provide perfect commitment. That is
because the action that is desired from a period-0 perspective is itself a function of the contract
parameter r. In other words, there is no parameter of the contract that would play the role of a
per-unit price p from the standard models. In those models, when the desired action (‘quantity
purchased’) is independent of p, the price can be selected so as to incentivise the agent’s future self
to take that action.
27More specifically, the negative distributional effect experienced by naifs is curbed for θ < 1
and even becomes positive for θ > 1. Under perfect competition, however, there is no role for the
distributional effect, and naifs are unambiguously worse off than sophisticates due to the prevalence
of the adverse efficiency effect. The case of competition is examined in section 2.4.
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but still underestimates the intensity of the present bias (i.e. β̂ ≥ β), such a model
is characterised by ‘magnitude naiveté’, but not ‘frequency naiveté’. Then, the qual-
itative properties of the exploitative contracts carry over from the baseline model,
but the quantitative impact is now weighted down by the corresponding probability
p. Magnitude naiveté combined with frequency naiveté, where p̂ ≤ p, would only
strengthen the exploitative motive. Second, uncertainty could relate to the realised
rate of return on the agent’s savings. If randomness was due to ‘nature’, that is the
provider bears a cost of generating the rate of return r while the realised rate of
return is r + ε where ε denotes a random component, the qualitative properties of
the exploitative savings contracts would carry over from the deterministic setting. A
case in which uncertainty about future returns reflects a direct choice of the provider
is covered by the extension ‘Financial (il)literacy’.
2.3 Policy interventions
Numerous reports highlight the need for appropriate regulation of markets for pen-
sion products (e.g. OECD 2016, 2017; Office of Fair Trading 2014). This section
briefly examines the effects of three widespread policy interventions: imposing a
ceiling on fees, regulating competition, and introducing a minimum savings require-
ment. Note that timing is crucial for predictions. It is assumed that the firm offers
a savings contract after the government has taken its respective action. In other
words, the firm is allowed to respond to the regulation.
The following examples highlight the challenges to policy making in this domain.
A lack of a simple and effective policy remedy is due to several factors. First, the
timing assumption. Second, the potential dependence of a welfare improving policy
on the size of the CRRA parameter θ, which is not only difficult to estimate, but
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most likely varies across individuals. Third, the fact that under any market con-
ditions naifs select the contracts that maximise their perceived, rather than actual
welfare.
A fuller treatment is presented in the appendix.
2.3.1 Ceiling on fees
The most popular regulations restrict types and amounts of fees that may be charged
by pension providers and are observed across many OECD countries (Dobronogov,
Murthi 2005; Tapia, Yermo 2008). Consider imposing a ceiling on fees, denoted f .
Then, the optimisation problem of the firm is subject to an additional constraint:
maxr,f π = f − c(r, s), s.t.:
1. s = s(β, r)
2. V̂0 − f ≥ u
3. f ≤ f
Lemma 2 characterises the impact of a ceiling on savings contracts offered in
equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Under an effective ceiling on fees:
• All interest rates are revised downwards.
• The efficiency of sophisticated agent’s contracts declines, but consumer welfare
is preserved.
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• Efficiency and consumer welfare attained by näıve agents improve for θ < 1,
but decline for θ > 1.
• Firm’s profits decrease.
An effective ceiling does not only mechanically reduce the transfer f between
an agent and the firm. It also distorts the equilibrium interest rates. Note that
under the baseline model, both fees charged by the firm as well as firm’s costs are
increasing in the interest rate. Thus after an imposition of an effective ceiling, the
profit-maximising interest rates are revised downwards. For sophisticated agents, if
they happen to be affected by the policy, such a shift implies no change in consumer
welfare, but it strictly decreases efficiency as outcomes are forced away from the first-
best. For näıve agents, on the other hand, the impact on both welfare and efficiency
crucially depends on the size of the CRRA parameter θ. In fact, the policy has a
detrimental effect for the case of θ > 1, when the exploitative contracts are ‘ineffi-
ciently cheap’ to start with. If a policymaker indeed suspects the savings contracts
to be inefficiently cheap, a regulation ‘opposite’ to the ceiling on fees is desirable,
such as enforcing return guarantees.28 Independent of the scenario, however, firm’s
profits shrink. Thus another undesired effect of such a policy is the possibility that
the provider would not be able to generate non-negative profits after an imposition
of too strict a ceiling.
28In practice, enforcing guarantees of generous rates of return may well be prohibitively costly
due to financial risk inherent in most investment strategies. Furthermore, such guarantees are not
easily implementable due to various administrative and institutional barriers (OECD 2011).
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2.3.2 Regulating competition
There are several ways in which policy may affect the degree of competition in the
market, for example by regulating entry or enabling individuals to switch providers
(see also the extensions that introduce perfect and imperfect competition more for-
mally). For instance, Tapia and Yermo (2008) discuss how differences in the regula-
tory framework across OECD countries influence competition and pricing of pension
products. Apart from playing a role of a regulator, government is also an additional
provider of pension benefits operating through a social security system. Recent
pension reforms in most OECD countries have substantially reduced the value of
state-funded benefits (OECD 2016). Intuitively, the generosity of public benefits is
likely to affect the agent’s willingness to sign a private pension contract and thus
influence the degree of price competition as well. Such interventions can be captured
by the model simply as an exogenous change in u. The following is a direct implica-
tion of the proof of Proposition 1.
Corollary 2 An increase in u lowers f ∗, but has no effect on r∗.
When an agent has access to a more attractive outside option, the firm charges
lower fees for every interest rate, which improves consumer welfare at the expense of
firm’s profits. However, there is no impact on the efficiency properties of equilibrium
contracts. That is because the exploitative savings contracts maximise the perceived
consumer surplus. In other words, an intervention that improves the agent’s outside
option will curb the negative distributional effect, but will have no impact on the
efficiency effect. Conversely, a decrease in u will result in higher fees, redistributing
the wealth from the agent to the firm.
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2.3.3 Minimum savings requirement
Government might also impose a lower bound on levels of saving by making private
pension contributions compulsory and specifying the minimum contribution rate.29
Examples of such policies come from Australia and the UK, where minimum con-
tributions into private pension schemes have been set to ensure adequate saving.
Suppose that the government introduces a minimum savings requirement s. Then,
the optimal contract offer solves the following:
maxr,f π = f − c(r, s), s.t.:
1. s = max {s(β, r), s}
2. V̂0 − f ≥ u
where ŝ = max {s(β̂, r), s}. Note an interesting possibility that the requirement is
in fact binding, while an agent does not realise this (i.e. s = s while ŝ > s). Lemma
3 describes the impact of the requirement on the equilibrium contract terms.
Lemma 3 The impact of a minimum savings requirement on interest rates offered
in market equilibrium is ambiguous in general. In the neighbourhood of β̂ = 1, how-
ever, the minimum savings requirement (weakly) exacerbates the exploitative contract
characteristics, which reduces efficiency and consumer welfare.
By offering varying interest rates, the provider effectively determines whether the
minimum savings requirement is binding and whether an agent realises this, as both
29A theoretical argument in favour of this policy is provided by Amador et al. (2006) who
study optimal commitment contracts in presence of random shocks. They show that the optimal
commitment devices always feature a restriction resembling the minimum savings requirement.
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actual and predicted savings are a function of r. Moreover, either contract design
strategy could be profit-maximising, depending on parameter values. For example,
a binding minimum savings requirement that is correctly acknowledged by an agent
eliminates firm’s profits due to naiveté, but at the same time it provides commitment
which increases the agent’s valuation of a savings contract. Therefore the impact a
minimum savings requirement on the contract design is ambiguous.
However, the model yields a more specific prediction for the case of (nearly) com-
plete naiveté, i.e. β̂ ≈ 1. Then, the minimum savings requirement results in offers of
(weakly) higher interest rates for θ < 1 and (weakly) lower interest rates for θ > 1,
which only exacerbates the original exploitative contract features. Recall that under
the baseline model, the exploitative contracts unambiguously induced ‘over-saving’
by naifs. Consequently, enforcing even higher levels of saving, without affecting the
beliefs guiding the valuation of a savings contract, cannot lead to improved market
outcomes.30
2.4 Extensions
The baseline model provides a clear illustration of the main mechanism behind the
exploitative design of saving contracts. These key results carry over, in qualitative
sense, to increasingly competitive environments, to a case when the provider charges
variable fees, and to a case when the agent may be financially unsophisticated and
therefore misinterpret the contract terms. I also discuss how imperfect observability
of the individual characteristics affects the optimal (profit-maximising) contract de-
30To illustrate the importance of the timing assumption, note that if the government set the
minimum savings requirement after the provider has offered the interest rate, it would optimally
enforce all agents to save as much as if they were time-consistent by setting s = s(1, r). Then, the
forecasting errors and welfare losses due to agents’ naiveté would not arise, and outcomes would be
equalised across different agent-types. However, this does not necessarily imply greater efficiency.
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sign. A fuller treatment of all extensions is provided in the appendix.
Perfect competition. Under perfect competition, many homogeneous providers
freely enter the market, which increases the (endogenous) value of the agent’s outside
option until each firm’s profits are zero at the optimum. Because the entire consumer
surplus is distributed to the individual, all agent-types are better off under perfect
competition, relative to the baseline case of monopoly, while the firm’s profits de-
cline. What is more, competition does away with the negative distributional effect,
due to which näıve agents were overpaying for their contract terms. As implied by
the zero-profit condition, the competitive fees cover the actual cost of the service and
are thus independent of the agent’s valuation of a contract. However, the inefficient
distortions to rates of return offered to näıve individuals persist despite competition,
and so does the negative efficiency effect. That is again because the exploitative
contract terms maximise the perceived consumer surplus. As a result, naifs remain
worse off than their sophisticated counterparts.31
Imperfect competition. In the appendix, I consider a Hotelling model of
competition between two homogeneous, spatially separated firms. A pure-strategy
equilibrium of the model is symmetric, involves both firms offering the same interest
rate as under monopoly and under perfect competition cases, and implies a common
fee that changes monotonically between the perfectly competitive and monopolistic
levels according to a single parameter of ‘distance aversion’. In a context of a market
for financial products, this parameter is more naturally interpreted as capturing the
agents’ tendency to prefer a ‘default’ provider.32
31As a side remark, note that in reality greater competition in a market for pension products does
not necessarily reduce the fees, as providers may incur additional marketing costs (Tapia, Yermo
2008).
32This modelling choice follows the approach in Heidhues, Kőszegi (2010). There are alternative
models which, depending on a parameter governing the degree of competition or the severity of
information (search) frictions, generate a distribution of prices for a homogeneous good that ranges
from the perfectly competitive to the monopolistic price. These include Butters (1977), Burdett and
Judd (1983), and Stahl (1989). Advantage of these models is perhaps a more natural interpretation
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Variable fees. Variable fees, proportional to total assets, contributions, or inter-
est earnings, are commonly observed in the pension industry (Dobronogov, Murthi
2005; Tapia, Yermo 2008). What is important, variable fees make the provider’s
incentives more aligned with the agent’s preferences. For example, with variable fees
proportional to the agent’s accumulated wealth, the firm has a greater incentive to
encourage high levels of saving and to provide high rates of return.33 Under the
baseline model, on the other hand, the firm would prefer to charge as high a fee as
possible while providing a service of little actual benefit. It is thus of interest to
extend the model to allow for a richer fee structure. Indeed, variable fees propor-
tional either to the agent’s savings or to the accumulated wealth affect the optimal
(profit-maximising) contract design in the expected way. However, the exploitative
distortions to the offered interest rates are qualitatively the same as under the model
with flat-rate fees only.
Financial (il)literacy. A growing body of empirical and theoretical work high-
lights the important role of financial literacy in economic decision-making and docu-
ments a pervasive lack thereof (Lusardi, Mitchell 2014; Lusardi et al. 2017). Indeed,
low levels of financial literacy combined with increasingly consequential and complex
financial decisions that individuals face appear to have adverse effects on a range of
outcomes, in particular on wealth accumulation (Jappelli 2010; Lusardi, Mitchell
2007; Van Rooij et al. 2012). What is more, some authors have argued that certain
financial products, such as credit cards or retail structured products, exhibit ex-
ploitative characteristics designed to take advantage of consumers’ limited financial
sophistication (Heidhues, Kőszegi 2010; Célérier, Vallée 2017). The appendix out-
of key parameters. However, their disadvantages, relative to the simple Hotelling formulation, are
the introduction of multiple free parameters, necessary reliance on mixed-strategy equilibria, and
potential multiplicity of equilibria.
33I am thankful to one of the managers at a big pension provider in the UK for a helpful
conversation and for pointing this out.
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lines a simple version of the model that allows for misinterpretation of the contract
terms by the individuals. More specifically, the firm advertises both a ‘headline’ and
an ‘actual’ fee (or a ‘headline’ and an ‘actual’ interest rate), and a financially näıve
agent overestimates the importance of those ‘headline’ contract parameters. Al-
though such financial naiveté affects the contract design in the predictable way (i.e.
the ‘headline’ contract parameters appear more attractive), the qualitative proper-
ties of the exploitative distortions due to individual’s naiveté about the present bias
carry over from the baseline model.
Imperfect observability with homogeneous beliefs. An important exten-
sion relaxes the assumption of perfect observability of the individual characteristics
by the firm. Consider a case when the firm serves two indistinguishable types of
agents with homogeneous beliefs about their present bias, but with different actual
magnitudes of the bias. Without loss of generality, suppose that a fraction λ ∈ [0, 1]
of agents is completely näıve (β < 1 and β̂ = 1) and that a fraction 1 − λ is time-
consistent (β = β̂ = 1).34 As the two types share their beliefs (β̂ = 1), the firm
cannot design screening contracts. That is because whichever contract is accepted
(preferred) by a time-consistent agent is also accepted (preferred) by a naif. Con-
sequently, such a market is characterised by pooling and no exclusion. The firm’s
optimal (profit-maximising) contract offer solves:
maxr,f E[π] = E[f − c(r, s)], s.t.:
1. s = s(β, r) with probability λ; s = s(1, r) with probability (1− λ)
2. V0(s(1, r), r)− f ≥ u
34The same qualitative results can be obtained for a more general case of two agent-types char-
acterised by the same β̂ ≤ 1, but various βL < βH = β̂.
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As a result of pooling, contracts for sophisticated, time-consistent individuals are
no longer efficient. However, due to their correct valuation of the contract offer,
the consumer welfare of sophisticates is preserved. Note that the loss of efficiency
of sophisticates’ contracts is not necessarily compensated for by an improvement in
the efficiency of naifs’ contracts. Under pooling, näıve present-biased individuals
may either obtain more efficient savings contracts (and be better off) or obtain even
less efficient contracts (and be worse off), depending on the direction of the original
exploitative distortion and a cross-partial derivative of the firm’s cost function. For
example, if it is increasingly expensive to offer a high rate of return for high savers
(e.g. due to limits to arbitrage), a pooling contract will be ‘cheaper’ relative to the
exploitative contract offered to naifs in isolation. This counteracts the exploitative
distortion for θ < 1, when the exploitative contract is inefficiently ‘expensive’, but
only worsens it for θ > 1.35 36
Imperfect observability with heterogeneous beliefs. Alternatively, assume
that a market for savings products is populated by two indistinguishable types of
agents characterised by the same magnitude of their present bias, but different beliefs
about the bias. Without loss of generality, consider a population consisting of a
fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of näıve present-biased agents (β < 1 and β̂ = 1) and a fraction 1−
35More precisely, when d
2c(r,s)
ds dr < 0 (e.g. due to scale effects or a greater bargaining power of a
pension fund with a large portfolio), naifs are offered higher interest rates than in isolation, which
counteracts the exploitative distortion for θ > 1, but only exacerbates it for θ < 1. Sophisticates
are offered lower interest rates than in isolation, which unambiguously diminishes efficiency while
preserving consumer welfare. When d
2c(r,s)
ds dr > 0 (e.g. due to limits to arbitrage or liquidity risk),
naifs are offered lower interest rates than in isolation, which counteracts the exploitative distortion
for θ < 1, but only exacerbates it for θ > 1. Sophisticates are offered higher interest rates than in
isolation, which unambiguously diminishes efficiency while preserving consumer welfare.
36For completeness, note that the potential concern about a lack of equilibrium under competition
and imperfect observability, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), does not apply in this case. With
homogeneous beliefs β̂, the two agent-types have identical preferences over contracts. In other
words, there is no profitable deviation from the equilibrium pooling contract that attracts just one
of the types.
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λ of sophisticated present-biased agents (β = β̂ < 1).37 Distinctly from the preceding
case with homogeneous beliefs, a monopolistic provider may, but does not need
to, differentiate the contract offers in order to separate the two agent types. For
illustration, consider the optimal design of a screening contract. In addition to the
constraints introduced earlier, such a contract must be incentive compatible in the
sense that neither of the agent-types has an incentive to mimic the other type. The
firm’s problem becomes:
maxrN ,rS ,fN ,fS E[π] = λ{fN − c(rN , sN)}+ (1− λ){fS − c(rS, sS)}, s.t.:
1. sN = s(β, rN)
2. sS = s(β, rS)
3. V0(s(1, r
N), rN)− fN ≥ u
4. V0(s(β, r
S), rS)− fS ≥ u
5. V0(s(1, r
N), rN)− fN ≥ V0(s(1, rS), rS)− fS
6. V0(s(β, r
S), rS)− fS ≥ V0(s(β, rN), rN)− fN
where superscripts N and S refer to naifs and sophisticates respectively. While con-
straints 1-4 are the same as under the baseline problem, constraints 5 and 6 assure
that no agent-type prefers a contract designed for the other type (‘no mimicking’).
In the appendix I demonstrate that while constraint 5 is binding, constraint 6 is
slack. Intuitively, only naifs may have an incentive to prefer the contract offered to
sophisticated individuals as sophisticates do not overpay for their contracts. More-
over, at the optimum, the rate of return for näıve agents (rN) is the same as under
37The same qualitative results can be obtained for a more general case of two agent-types char-
acterised by the same β ≤ 1, but various β̂H > β̂L ≥ β.
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isolation, while the rate of return for sophisticates (rS) is distorted away from the
first-best. Naifs do pay lower fees than under perfect observability, however, in order
to satisfy the no-mimicking constraint 5.
In addition, the firm may also design its offer in order to serve näıve individuals
only (exclusion of sophisticates) or serve both agent-types without separating them
(a pooling contract). Depending on the parametrisation of the model (in particular,
the population composition as given by λ and the magnitude of the present bias β),
either of the three contract design strategies may maximise profits. What is impor-
tant, however, is the fact that independently of the contract design strategy, naifs
are (weakly) better off relative to perfect observability, while sophisticates obtain
(weakly) less efficient savings contracts but retain their utility. Thus the impact of
imperfect observability on welfare attained by näıve individuals crucially depends on
the particular population composition. While naifs can be made worse off by pooling
them with time-consistent agents, they are unambiguously better off as members of
the uniformly present-biased population.38
2.5 Conclusion
Chapters 2 and 3 study the interaction between a present-biased individual and a
private pension provider. A simple baseline model indicates that ‘sophisticates’, that
is agents who are fully aware of their present bias, receive efficient contract offers,
while ‘naifs’, who are at least partially unaware of their present bias, receive ex-
38As a final remark, note that for this population composition, competitive equilibrium consists
of two zero-profit contracts, one of which maximises sophisticates’ perceived utility and another
maximises naifs’ perceived utility. These are the same contracts as offered in isolated markets under
perfect competition. Again, the potential issue of a lack of competitive equilibrium does not apply.
That is because the difference in agents’ β̂ should be interpreted as difference in ‘tastes’ rather than
‘risks’ (costs) to the providers. In other words, there is no adverse selection under the zero-profit
contracts.
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ploitative contract offers. The agent’s naiveté about the present bias is exploited by
offering contract terms that appear attractive as long as the individual saves a lot.
This is achieved by distorting the interest rate downwards when the income effect of
an interest rate change dominates in the agent’s utility function, and upwards when
the substitution effect dominates. Because the central properties of the exploitative
savings contracts depend on the curvature of the utility function, which is not only
difficult to estimate but is also likely to vary across individuals, certain well-intended
policy interventions, such as ceilings on fees or minimum savings requirements, might
decrease both efficiency and consumer welfare. Moreover, since under any market
conditions the exploitative contracts maximise the perceived consumer-firm surplus,
the issue of inefficiency is more difficult to resolve than concerns associated with the
distribution of wealth.
Regarding future research directions, the model might be extended in a number
of ways in order to provide additional insight and to address remaining policy ques-
tions. First, what if the interactions between a firm and a consumer are repeated,
and an individual is allowed to either renegotiate contract terms or sign multiple
contracts? Then, the firm’s optimal strategy should take into account both profits
from a single interaction and gains from extending the existing relationship with
an individual. In such a dynamic setting, what is the optimal timing of a contract
offer? A second interesting extension might include the possibility to learn about
the present bias. Does exploitation survive in the long run? Third, regarding the
increasingly important workplace pension arrangements, what is the role of an inter-
mediation by an employer if her preferences do not necessarily coincide with those
of her workers? All these questions call for further research.
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Appendix
Quasi-linearity of the utility function
For several reasons, the utility function assumed in the baseline model is linear in
transfer f between an agent and a firm. First, that makes the interest rate r the
single parameter of the contract that affects the agent’s intertemporal trade-off. In
a context of life-cycle saving, this assumption does not seem overly restrictive. As a
result, the interest rate is chosen by the provider in order to maximise the perceived
consumer surplus, while the fee is used to extract the surplus from the agent. Second,
the assumption of quasi-linearity results in a clear efficiency criterion, which is not
affected by the size of a transfer between the agent and the firm (‘money changing
hands’). Put differently, the resulting efficiency criterion would be an objective
function of an agent who has access to the firm’s technology of converting savings
into future wealth, akin a Robinson economy. Third, the analysis is simplified, which
is achieved without significant loss of insight as long as the impact of the fee on the
intertemporal trade-off remains ‘small’ (see below). Lastly, such an approach appears
to be standard in the behavioural contracting literature (e.g. Eliaz, Spiegler 2006;
Gabaix Laibson 2006; Grubb 2009).
For illustration, consider an alternative formulation of the model which relaxes
the assumption of quasi-linearity:
U1 = u(c1) + βu(c2),
where c1 = Y − s− f and c2 = (1 + r)s. Agent’s saving s = s(β, r, f) that maximises
U1, is affected by the fee f in the same way as by any exogenous shock to the level
of income Y :






× [Y − f ]
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Thus as long as f  Y , the difference s(β, r, f)− s(β, r, 0) will be quantitatively
‘small’, or d s(β,r,f)
d f
≈ 0.39 In that case, the solution to the firm’s problem of con-
tract design would be characterised by the same qualitative properties as under the
baseline model. That is because the interest rate r is selected by the provider to
maximise the agent’s perceived surplus, while the fee f extracts the surplus.
In a model in which the provider charges fees f1 and f2 in periods 1 and 2 respec-
tively, and f1 6= f2 is allowed, one can imagine a contract design under which the fee
schedule effectively acts as a commitment device (e.g. f1 > 0 and f2 < 0). However,
modelling the provision of commitment devices is not subject of the present work.
Neither do fees for financial services typically play that role.
Lemma 1
A consumption schedule (c1, c2), where c1 = Y − s and c2 = (1 + r)s, that maximises
U0 satisfies the following first order condition:
u′(Y − s) = (1 + r) u′((1 + r)s)
The expected saving ŝ, on the other hand, maximises U1 parametrised by β̂, and
thus satisfies the following condition:
u′(Y − ŝ) = (1 + r) β̂ u′((1 + r)ŝ)
It follows that naifs overestimate their future saving ŝ ≡ s(β̂, r) for a concave u(·),
i.e. dŝ
dβ̂
> 0. Consequently, naifs overvalue any savings contract P = (r, f). The











for β̂ ≤ 1. Moreover, the first term is strictly positive for β̂ < 1.
39The same remarks apply to savings behaviour ŝ = ŝ(β̂, r, f) predicted in period 0.
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Proposition 1
Recall the firm’s problem of optimal contract design in a monopolistic market with
perfect observability:
maxr,f π = f − c(r, s), s.t.:
1. s = s(β, r)
2. V̂0 − f ≥ u
The second constraint also holds as equality since dπ
df
> 0. Then, the first state-
ment in Proposition 1 follows directly from Lemma 1 and from the fact that d V̂0
d r
> 0
around θ = 1.40
Substituting for both constraints reduces the problem to:
maxr V0(s(β̂, r), r)− u− c(r, s(β, r))
Define the efficiency criterion as:
SS(P ) = U0(P ) + π(P ) = V0(s(β, r), r)− f + f − c(r, s(β, r)) =
= V0(s(β, r), r)− c(r, s(β, r))













d r and the sign of
the second term changes around θ = 1.
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while under the assumption of quasi-linear preferences, efficiency is invariant to the
transfer f between an agent and the firm.
For a sophisticated agent, β̂ = β and thus the firm’s optimal contract solves:
maxr V0(s(β, r), r)− u− c(r, s(β, r))
the solution of which coincides with the efficiency criterion. This demonstrates that
sophisticated present-biased agents obtain contracts that are efficient, conditional on
β.
For a näıve agent, on the other hand, β̂ > β and the optimal contract solves:










































In the above, the inequalities follow from the derivation of Lemma 1.
Under the CRRA utility formulation ŝ does have a closed form solution, which
satisfies the following first order condition:
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u′(Y − ŝ) = (1 + r) β̂ u′((1 + r)ŝ)
where u(x) = x
1−θ−1














> 0 for θ < 1,
= 0 for θ = 1
< 0 for θ > 1
in line with the main body discussion regarding relative strength of the substitution
and income effects and the size of the CRRA parameter θ.
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> 0 for θ < 1,
= 0 for θ = 1
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d β̂︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0 for θ < 1







d β̂︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0 for θ < 1





dβ̂ dr︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0 for θ < 1
< 0 for θ > 1
Importantly, for every parameter constellation that has β̂ ≤ 1,
|∂2 V̂0
∂ŝ ∂r









> 0 for θ < 1
= 0 for θ = 1
< 0 for θ > 1
Intuitively, the above determines the direction of changes to the interest rate that
exacerbate the overvaluation of a savings contract by a näıve agent d V0(s(β̂,r),r)
d β̂
. This
condition combined with Assumption 1 implies the main result regarding the direc-




Regarding efficiency, it is evident that while savings contract for sophisticated
agents maximise social surplus, the contracts for näıve agents are inefficiently dis-
torted, and the more so the greater the degree of naiveté. Thus social surplus is
decreasing in β̂, holding β fixed.
At the optimum, the utility obtained by an agent is:
U0(P
∗) = V0(s(β, r
∗), r∗)− f ∗ = V0(s(β, r∗), r∗)− V0(s(β̂, r∗), r∗) + u
where the starred variables refer to the contract terms offered in equilibrium. For
sophisticated agents, β̂ = β and thus U0(P
∗) = u due to the provider’s monopolistic
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d β̂︸ ︷︷ ︸
the ‘efficiency effect’
Referring to the regularities derived above, both effects have a negative impact on
the attained utility.
Finally, it is straightforward to notice that the firm’s profits are also increasing
in β̂, as f ∗ =
= [V0(s(β̂, r), r)− u] is increasing in β̂ for every r. The firm’s optimal choice of
(exploitative) r∗ only adds to this effect.
Endogenous valuation of the outside option
In the baseline model, the valuation of the agent’s outside option is assumed to be
exogenous and type-independent, and therefore the ‘individual rationality constraint’
in the firm’s problem of contract design takes the following form:
V0(s(β̂, r), r)− f ≥ u,
where the first element is also denoted V̂0 for brevity. Then, taking into account the
other constraint s = s(β̂, r), the firm’s problem can be written concisely as:
maxr V0(s(β̂, r), r)− u− c(r, s(β, r))
as in the derivation of Proposition 1.
In contrast to this baseline case, suppose that the agent’s outside option involves
saving into a costless savings account with a rate of return r, e.g. offered by a bank.
Then the valuation of the outside option becomes type-dependent:
u = V0(s(β̂, r), r)− 0
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It follows immediately from Lemma 1 that naifs overvalue their outside option, just
as any other savings contract. Furthermore, the firm’s problem of contract design
takes the following form:
maxr V0(s(β̂, r), r)− V0(s(β̂, r), r)− c(r, s(β, r))
Note the following. First, as d V̂0
d r
> 0, the provider may charge a positive fee only if he
offers r > r.41 Second, the firm’s choice of the optimal rate of return r is independent
of the ‘individual rationality constraint’, which determines the agent’s willingness to
pay. Consequently, the efficiency properties of the exploitative contracts are the same
as predicted by the baseline model. Third, regarding the agent’s welfare, the negative
efficiency effect prevails under the endogenous valuation of the outside option, but
the negative distributional effect is mitigated. In equilibrium, the utility obtained
by the agent is:
U0(P
∗) = V0(s(β, r
∗), r∗)− f ∗ = V0(s(β, r∗), r∗)− V0(s(β̂, r∗), r∗)+
+V0(s(β̂, r), r)
While sophisticated agents again obtain the same utility as from their outside option,
the impact of naiveté on the attained welfare is derived using total differentiation.









d β̂︸ ︷︷ ︸
the ‘original’ distributional effect
+ {∂ V0(s(β, r
∗), r∗)
∂r∗





d β̂︸ ︷︷ ︸
the ‘original’ efficiency effect
+
41 d V̂0
d r > 0 holds in the neighbourhood of θ = 1. Naturally,
∂ V̂0
∂ r > 0 everywhere, but bear in mind






d r and the sign of the second term changes around θ = 1.
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+
∂ V0(s(β̂, r), r)
∂s(β̂, r)
d s(β̂, r)
d β̂︸ ︷︷ ︸
the mitigating distributional effect due to overvaluation of u
Moreover, the total distributional effect for näıve agents is positive for θ > 1. Due to
the overvaluation of their outside option, naifs do not overpay for their savings con-
tracts, but actually require lower fees than sophisticates in order to satisfy their ‘in-
dividual rationality constraint’. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Recall




In that case, naifs’ overvaluation of the ‘cheap’ outside option u = V0(s(β̂, r), r) is of
greater magnitude than the overvaluation of the savings contract P ∗. As a result,
the total distributional effect due to naiveté turns positive.
However, note that under competitive environments there is no role for the dis-
tributional effect. Then, naifs are strictly worse off than sophisticates as only the
negative efficiency effect prevails.
Policy interventions
Ceiling on fees
Consider the firm’s problem of contract design after an imposition of a ceiling on
fees f :
maxr,f π = f − c(r, s), s.t.:
1. s = s(β, r)
2. V̂0 − f ≥ u
3. f ≤ f
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The additional constraint affects the optimal contracts by making them (weakly)
‘cheaper’. That is because the modified problem of the firm is:
maxr V0(s(β̂, r), r)− u− c(r, s(β, r)), s.t.:
1. V0(s(β̂, r), r)− u ≤ f
and Lemma 2 follows from the fact that d V̂0
d r
> 0 (in the neighbourhood of θ = 1)
combined with the derivation of Proposition 1.
Lemma 2 Under an effective ceiling on fees:
• All interest rates are revised downwards.
• The efficiency of sophisticated agent’s contracts declines, but consumer welfare
is preserved.
• Efficiency and consumer welfare attained by näıve agents improve for θ < 1,
but decline for θ > 1.
• Firm’s profits decrease.
Therefore a binding ceiling forces the contracts for sophisticated agents away
from the first-best. As a result, efficiency decreases, but the consumer welfare is
retained as sophisticates obtain their reservation utility u. For näıve agents, on the
other hand, a decrease in r∗ mitigates the adverse efficiency effect, but only for θ < 1.
For θ > 1, the exploitative contracts are inefficiently cheap in the first place and an
imposition of a ceiling further worsens their efficiency properties as well as makes
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naifs worse off compared to the baseline case of no ceiling.
Lastly, note that the presence of the additional constraint lowers firm’s profits at
the optimum.
Minimum savings requirement
Under a minimum savings requirement s, the agent’s actual saving is given by
s = max {s(β, r), s}, while his expected saving is given by ŝ = max {s(β̂, r), s}. Note
that this still implies ŝ ≥ s. As a result, there will exist values for r such that s = s,
while ŝ > s. In such situations, the minimum savings requirement is binding, but
the agent does not realise it and treats s as inconsequential.
The firm’s problem of contract design is written as:
maxr,f π = f − c(r, s), s.t.:
1. s = max {s(β, r), s}
2. V̂0 − f ≥ u
Whether or not the requirement is binding in equilibrium, and whether the agent
realises this, depends on r∗. So how does the imposition of s affect the firm’s choice










is bounded from above by the original marginal cost function. That is because
d s
d r
> 0 and the second component of the above disappears in the region for r where
the requirement binds. Similarly, the marginal cost is bounded from below by the
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original marginal cost function for θ > 1.









and the above expression is bounded from above (below) by the original marginal
benefit function for θ < 1 (θ > 1). Taken together, this implies that in general the
introduction of the minimum savings requirement has an ambiguous impact on the
firm’s choice of the interest rate.
However, as β̂ → 1, ∂ V̂0
∂ ŝ
→ 0 because the agent’s period-1 self is believed to be
taking the optimal savings decision (from the perspective of period 0). Then, the
introduction of the minimum savings requirement does not shift the marginal ben-
efit curve.42 Thus in the neighbourhood of β̂ = 1 a more specific prediction can be
made. The prevailing shift in the marginal cost curve implies that the offered inter-
est rates are (weakly) higher under the minimum savings requirement for θ < 1 and
(weakly) lower for θ > 1. Consequently, the introduction of the minimum savings
requirement only makes the extent of exploitation of näıve agents worse. Recall that
in the baseline case, the exploitative contracts unambiguously induced over-saving
by naifs (relative to sophisticated present-biased agents). Therefore enforcing even
higher levels of saving, without affecting the beliefs, cannot lead to improved market
outcomes. The above is summarised in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 The impact of a minimum savings requirement on optimal interest rates
is ambiguous in general. In the neighbourhood of β̂ = 1, however, the minimum sav-
ings requirement (weakly) exacerbates the exploitative contract characteristics, which
reduces efficiency and consumer welfare.
42That is true provided that the policy does not force the agents to save ‘too much’, i.e. more




Predictions of the baseline model are derived for a special case of monopoly. Consider
another extreme example, namely perfect competition. Under perfect competition,
many homogeneous providers freely enter the market, increasing the (endogenous)
value of the agent’s outside option until each firm’s profits are zero at the optimum.
The firm’s problem of contract design can be thus written as:
maxr,f π = f − c(r, s), s.t.:
1. s = s(β, r)
2. V̂0 − f ≥ u
with the zero-profit condition π∗ = 0 (ZP) holding in equilibrium. Notice that
conditional on the first constraint, the second constraint implies
f ≤ V̂0 − u
for any r, while ZP implies:
f ∗ = c(r∗, s(β, r∗))
in market equilibrium. In a sense, the second constraint determines an upper bound
for the fee f , while ZP gives a lower bound, which is binding under the assumption
of perfect competition.
Suppose that the firm’s profits under monopoly were strictly positive. This im-
plies that under perfect competition the second constraint is slack, while ZP is bind-
ing. Then, the equilibrium contracts for each agent-type solve the following problem:
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maxr V0(s(β̂, r), r)− c(r, s(β, r))
As opposed to the case of monopoly, this is not an immediate observation. First, due
to ZP all equilibrium contracts make zero profits, so fees are necessarily set equal
to c(r, s(β, r)). Then, the above expression gives the agent’s perceived utility from
a contract offer characterised by a particular interest rate r and a corresponding
zero-profit fee. A savings contract that does not maximise the above will not be
offered in equilibrium, as a competing firm could offer contract terms that improve
the agent’s utility while holding the profits constant (at zero).
This has a couple of implications. Importantly, the qualitative nature of inef-
ficient distortions to naifs’ contract terms is the same as under monopoly. While
sophisticated agents obtain efficient contracts, the direction of the distortions to
contracts for näıve agents is again captured by d
2V̂0
dβ̂ dr
. That is because, just as in the










Thus the equilibrium interest rates r∗ are not affected by the introduction of free en-
try into the market. However, under perfect competition all agent-types pay strictly
lower fees f ∗, which makes them better off at the expense of lower profits of the
providers.
What is more, since naifs’ fees are set so as to cover the actual cost of the service
c(r, s(β, r)), näıve agents no longer overpay for their contract terms. In sum, compe-
tition does away with the negative distributional effect, but not with the efficiency




∗) = V0(s(β, r
∗), r∗)− f ∗ = V0(s(β, r∗), r∗)− c(r, s(β, r∗))
The above expression is strictly greater than u for all agent-types under the assump-
tion of strictly positive monopoly profits. The impact of naiveté on obtained welfare











which does include the negative efficiency effect, but not the distributional effect.
The fact that this expression is negative follows from the direction of the distortions
to r∗ and the fact that d V0
d r
is decreasing in r (in the neighbourhood of θ = 1).
Imperfect competition
As noted above, only the fee levels differentiate the equilibrium contracts arising in
monopolistic and perfectly competitive environments, while the optimal interest rates
are unaffected by the degree of competition. One may thus expect that a model of
imperfect competition would generate the same optimal rate of return combined with
an intermediate fee. Following Heidhues and Kőszegi (2010), consider a Hotelling-
style model, which introduces one additional free parameter.
Assume that there are two identical firms, denoted A and B, located at the
endpoints of a unit interval. The firms simultaneously choose both parameters of the
offered savings contracts, that is the interest rate ri and the fee f i where i ∈ {A,B},
so as to maximise their expected profits. There is a unit mass of identical agents
distributed uniformly along the interval, or, equivalently, a single agent who is ex
ante equally likely to find himself located at any point along the interval. Agents sign
at most one savings contract. An agent located at x ∈ [0, 1] evaluates the contract
offers according to:
ÛA0 = V0(s(β̂, r
A), rA)− fA − ξx
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ÛB0 = V0(s(β̂, r
B), rB)− fB − ξ(1− x)
where ξ ≥ 0 is a parameter capturing the agent’s ‘distance aversion’. In the context
of a choice of a financial product, ξ is perhaps more naturally interpreted as capturing
the individual’s tendency to prefer a ‘default’ provider.
In case the agent rejects both contract offers, he obtains reservation utility υ.
The intuition that both firms will optimally offer the same rate of return r∗ as
would be offered under monopoly and perfect competition does indeed extend to
this setting. Taking the perspective of firm A, the agent’s ‘individual rationality
constraint’ is:
ÛA0 = V0(s(β̂, r
A), rA)− fA − ξx ≥ u
where u = max {ÛB0 ; υ} is endogenous and determined by the competitors contract
offer
PB = (rB, fB), the parameters of which firm A takes as given. Let πAx denote the
firm A’s profits from interacting with the agent located at x ∈ [0, 1], conditional on
the above constraint being satisfied:
πAx = f





> 0, the ‘individual rationality constraint’ binds at the optimum. This
implies that the firm’s optimal contract offer solves the following:
maxrA V0(s(β̂, r
A), rA)− ξx− u− c(rA, s(β, rA))
which implies the same r∗ as under monopoly and perfect competition, independent
of the agent’s location x and the parameter ξ. This is also true for the optimal choice
of rB by firm B. As a result, V0(s(β̂, r
∗), r∗) is common for both contract offers.
Given the fees charged by both firms, the indifferent agent is located at x∗ ∈ [0, 1],
where x∗ solves:
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−fA − ξx∗ = −fB − ξ(1− x∗)
or x∗ = f
B−fA+ξ
2ξ
. This means that individuals located at x ∈ [0, x∗] obtain greater
utility from selecting firm’s A offer, and thus the firm attracts a mass x∗ of agents
when charging fA. Conditional on fB, firm A will choose a fee that maximises
expected profits:
E πA = { fA − c(r∗, s(β, r∗)) } × fB−fA+ξ
2ξ
The above is maximised by fA∗ = f
B+ξ+c(r∗,s(β,r∗))
2
. Symmetry of the problem implies
that fA∗ = fB∗ (or, equivalently, x∗ = 1
2
). Thus in equilibrium both firms charge:
f ∗ =

ξ + c(r∗, s(β, r∗)) for ξ ∈ [0, fM − c(r∗, s(β, r∗))]
fM for ξ > fM − c(r∗, s(β, r∗))
where fM = fM(υ) denotes the fee charged by a monopolistic provider. When the
agents are not at all ‘distance averse’ (i.e. ξ = 0), the Hotelling model induces
Bertrand competition and thus competitive pricing. The larger ξ, the greater the
monopolistic powers enjoyed by the providers. The equilibrium fees are therefore
monotonically increasing in ξ. For high enough ξ, the firms charge monopolistic
prices.
Variable fees
Variable fee on savings
Suppose that in addition to the flat-rate fee f , the provider is allowed to charge a
variable fee t proportional to the agent’s savings. The fee is calculated based on the
agent’s actual savings behaviour. The modified problem of contract design is then:
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maxr,f,t π = f + ts− c(r, s), s.t.:
1. s = s(β, r, t)
2. V0(s(β̂, r, t), r, t)− f ≥ u
where














It is straightforward to observe:
d s(β,r,t)
d t














The second equation above implies that the presence of variable fees (t > 0) reduces
the agent’s valuation of the contract not only due to the direct effect, but also because
variable fees unambiguously reduce his future saving.
After substitution of the binding constraints into the firm’s problem, the optimal
interest rate satisfies the first order condition:
d V0(s(β̂,r,t),r,t)
dr




An immediate observation is that the agent’s naiveté about his present bias, captured
by parameter β̂, affects the optimal interest rate only via d V0(s(β̂,r,t),r,t)
dr
. That implies
that the qualitative properties of the exploitative distortions to contract terms carry
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over from the baseline model. In addition, the presence of the variable fee t shifts the





> 0 for θ < 1
= 0 for θ = 1
< 0 for θ > 1
Intuitively, when the provider charges proportionally to the agent’s savings, there is
an additional incentive to induce higher savings.
As for the optimal choice of the variable fee, t∗ satisfies:
d V0(s(β̂,r,t),r,t)
dt






This condition implies the existence of inefficient distortions to t∗ due to the agent’s
naiveté. However, in order to determine the sign of d
2V̂0
dβ̂ dt
, and thus the direction of
these distortions, one would need to impose additional assumptions on parameters,
in particular on ∂ c(r,s(β,r,t))
∂s(β,r,t)
and β̂. Nonetheless, I conjecture that the direction of
such distortions would be independent of the size of the CRRA parameter θ as the
expression d V0(s(β̂,r,t),r,t)
dt
has a negative sign for all values of t, r, and β̂.
Variable fee on accumulated wealth
In contrast, suppose that the provider is allowed to charge a variable fee t pro-
portional to the agent’s accumulated wealth (1 + r)× s. Then, the firm’s problem
becomes:
maxr,f,t π = f + t(1 + r)s− c(r, s), s.t.:
1. s = s(β, ř)
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2. V0(s(β̂, ř), ř)− f ≥ u
where ř = r − t approximates the effective net interest rate, (1 + r)(1− t)− 1, and





For simplicity, the above formulation of the problem ignores the discounting of future
revenues by the firm. Following substitution, the optimal interest rate r∗ satisfies
the following first order condition:
d V0(s(β̂,ř),ř)
dr
+ t{s(β, ř) + (1 + r)d s(β,ř)
d r
} = d c(r,s(β,ř))
dr
As an immediate observation, note that the qualitative properties of the distortions




. Moreover, in the neighbourhood of θ = 1, the additional term on the left
hand side is positive irrespective of θ ≶ 1. Consistent with the intuition, the gross
interest rates are higher when the provider charges proportionally to the size of the
agent’s pension pot (1 + r)× s.
The optimal variable fee t∗ satisfies:
(1 + r)× s(β, ř)− d V0(s(β̂,ř),ř)
dř






which after plugging in the condition for r∗ simplifies to:
s(β, ř)× (1 + r + t) = ∂ c(r,s(β,ř))
∂r
For the optimally chosen r, the provider’s choice of the variable fee t is not directly
affected by the degree of the agent’s naiveté β̂.
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Financial (il)literacy
‘Headline’ and ‘actual’ fees
Consider the following extension that introduces the possibility of ‘financial illiteracy’
of the agent, albeit in a somewhat crude way. In contrast to naiveté about the present
bias (and one’s own behaviour), financially unsophisticated agents misinterpret the
contract terms offered by the provider. Suppose that the provider posts a ‘headline’
fee f and an ‘actual’ fee f̄ . An agent believes that the realised fee will be f with
probability p̂ ∈ [0, 1], and f̄ with residual probability (1− p̂). Without loss of insight,
suppose that the realised fee is f̄ with probability 1. Thus p̂ can be interpreted as a
measure of the agent’s financial illiteracy.43 The firm’s problem of contract design is
then:
maxr,f,f π = f̄ − c(r, s) s.t.:
1. s = s(β, r)
2. V0(s(β̂, r), r)− p̂f − (1− p̂)f̄ ≥ u
Following substitution, the problem takes the following form:
maxr,f
1
(1−p̂){V0(s(β̂, r), r)− p̂f − u} − c(r, s(β, r)) ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ maxr,f V0(s(β̂,r),r)−u(1−p̂) −
p̂
(1−p̂)f − c(r, s(β, r))
It is clear that the headline fee f takes the lowest possible value, for instance f = 0
due to a likely non-negativity constraint. An offer of a very attractive headline fee
43An example of a more sophisticated model of this kind is Gabaix & Laibson (2006).
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allows the provider to charge an accordingly higher actual fee f̄ . The optimal interest







Under financial illiteracy (p̂ > 0), the offered interest rates increase. That is because
the provider is able to charge a higher actual fee for any interest rate. Note that
these deviations from what would be the optimal contract terms under p̂ = 0 should
also be interpreted as inefficient. However, the qualitative nature of the exploitative




over from the baseline model.
‘Headline’ and ‘actual’ rates of return
Consider an alternative notion of financial illiteracy under which an agent is overly
optimistic about the offered rates of return. This could be the case either due to igno-
rance of any implicit fees or due to optimism about future ‘states of the world’. This
is exactly the kind of flaws that seems to underpin the design of increasingly popular
structured retail products (Célérier & Vallée 2017). Suppose that the provider posts
a ‘headline’ rate of return r̄ and an ‘actual’ rate of return r. The agent believes that
the realised rate will be r̄ with probability p̂ ∈ [0, 1], and r with residual probabil-
ity (1 − p̂). Without loss of insight, suppose that the realised rate of return is r
with probability 1. Thus p̂ can be interpreted as a measure of the agent’s financial
illiteracy. The firm’s problem of contract design is:
maxr̄,r,f π = f − c(r, s) s.t.:
1. s = s(β, r)
2. (1− p̂)V0(s(β̂, r), r) + p̂V0(s(β̂, r̄), r̄)− f ≥ u
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The above formulation makes two important implicit assumptions. First, when sav-
ing in period 1, the agent is no longer financially unsophisticated, i.e. he takes into
account the correct rate of return. As a result, financial illiteracy affects the prob-
lem only at the contracting stage. This assumption improves clarity, but is relaxed
below. Second, posting two rates of return profits the firm only to the extent that
it lowers the cost of the service relative to the collected fees. There is no additional
revenue, e.g. due to implicit (but ignored) fees.
Following substitution of the constraints, the problem becomes:
maxr̄,r (1− p̂)V0(s(β̂, r), r) + p̂V0(s(β̂, r̄), r̄)− u− c(r, s(β, r))
Naturally, r̄ takes the highest permitted value. This allows the provider to charge
higher fees for any actual rate of return r. The first order condition regarding the
optimal choice of r is:




Under this formulation of the model, financial illiteracy (i.e. p̂ > 0) distorts the
equilibrium rates of return downwards, relative to the case of p̂ = 0. This (inefficient)
distortion arises from the fact that the valuation of the contract is now function of
the actual, but costly, rate r and the costless, but fictitious, rate r̄. However, the
qualitative nature of the exploitative distortions due to agent’s naiveté about the
present bias, captured by d
2V̂0
dβ̂ dr
, carries over from the baseline model.
For completeness, consider a slight modification of the model under which the
agent is financially unsophisticated (or equally uncertain about the realised interest
rate) in both periods 0 and 1. The firm’s problem of contract design takes the
following form:
maxr̄,r,f π = f − c(r, s) s.t.:
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1. s = s(β, r̄, r, p̂)
2. (1− p̂)V0(s(β̂, r̄, r, p̂), r) + p̂V0(s(β̂, r̄, r, p̂), r̄)− f ≥ u





1−θ + (1− p̂)
[(1+r)s]1−θ−1
1−θ }
Even though there is no closed-form solution for s(β, r̄, r, p̂), the maximisation con-
dition implies that it is continuous in p̂ ∈ [0, 1], ranging from s(β, r) to s(β, r̄).
Analogously for s(β̂, r̄, r, p̂). Following substitution of the constraints, the problem
reduces to:
maxr̄,r (1− p̂)V0(s(β̂, r̄, r, p̂), r) + p̂V0(s(β̂, r̄, r, p̂), r̄)− u− c(r, s(β, r̄, r, p̂))
Because the headline rate of return now affects the agent’s savings, it is no longer
true that r̄ takes the highest possible value at the optimum. The associated first
order condition is:










Nevertheless, it is still true that r̄∗ is optimally higher than if it was costly to gen-













The first order condition associated with the actual rate of return r is:
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(1− p̂)× d V0(s(β̂,r̄,r,p̂),r)
dr






As earlier, the possibility of financial illiteracy (i.e. p̂ > 0) puts a downward pressure













Importantly, the qualitative impact of naiveté about the present bias on the contract
terms carries over from the baseline model (in the neighbourhood of θ = 1).
Imperfect observability with homogeneous beliefs
Consider a mixed population of two indistinguishable agent-types characterised by
the same beliefs β̂. Suppose that share λ ∈ [0, 1] of the agents are present-biased
naifs (β < 1, but β̂ = 1), while share (1 − λ) are time-consistent sophisticates
(β = β̂ = 1). As the two types share their beliefs β̂, the firm cannot design a
separating contract and thus a pooling contract is offered in such a market. The
firm’s problem of contract design is:
maxr,f Eπ = E [f − c(r, s)], s.t.:
1. s = s(β, r) with probability λ; s = s(1, r) with probability (1− λ)
2. V0(s(1, r), r)− f ≥ u
which, following substitution of the constraints, simplifies to:
maxr V0(s(1, r), r)− u− λ× c(r, s(β, r))− (1− λ)× c(r, s(1, r))






+ (1− λ)d c(r,s(1,r))
dr
Note that the comparison with the baseline case of perfect observability (isolation),
depends on the sign of d
2c(r,s)
ds dr
. The sign determines whether the provider’s marginal





< 0, for example due to the scale effects or a greater bargaining power
of a pension fund with a larger portfolio, naifs are offered higher interest rates
than in isolation. This counteracts the exploitative distortion and improves
efficiency and consumer welfare for θ > 1, but only exacerbates the distortion
for θ < 1. Sophisticates are offered lower interest rates than in isolation, which
unambiguously diminishes efficiency while preserving consumer welfare. That





= 0, then the equilibrium savings contract is as (in)efficient as under




> 0, for example due to limits to arbitrage or the liquidity risk, naifs
are offered lower interest rates than in isolation, which counteracts the exploita-
tive distortion for θ < 1, but only exacerbates it for θ > 1. Sophisticates are
offered higher interest rates than in isolation, which unambiguously diminishes
efficiency while preserving consumer welfare.
Imperfect observability with heterogeneous beliefs
In turn, consider a mixed population of two indistinguishable agent-types charac-
terised by different beliefs β̂. Suppose that share λ ∈ [0, 1] of the agents are present-
biased naifs (β < 1, but β̂ = 1), while share (1− λ) are present-biased sophisticates
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(β = β̂ < 1). The two agent-types are characterised by the same magnitude of
the present-bias β. Since the types differ by their beliefs, the firm may design a
screening contract. However, depending on the parameter values, it might also be
profit-maximising to offer a pooling contract or to exclude the sophisticated agents
from the market.
The optimal pooling contract solves the following problem:
maxr,f π = f − c(r, s), s.t.:
1. s = s(β, r)
2. V0(s(1, r), r)− f ≥ u
3. V0(s(β, r), r)− f ≥ u
Since d V̂0
d β̂
≥ 0, constraint 2 (the ‘individual rationality constraint’ for naifs) is slack,
while constraint 3 (the ‘individual rationality constraint’ for sophisticates) binds at
the optimum. Thus the problem simplifies to:
maxr V0(s(β, r), r)− u− c(r, s(β, r))
Notice that the above describes the optimal contract offered to the sophisticated
agents in an isolated market. Such a contract is efficient by Proposition 1, and thus
pooling improves both efficiency of naifs’ contract terms as well as their consumer
welfare, curbing the negative efficiency and distributional effects. Welfare and effi-
ciency properties of sophisticates’ contracts are the same as under isolation.
A screening contract is a menu P = {(rN , fN); (rS, fS)}, which solves:
maxrN ,rS ,fN ,fS E π = λ{fN − c(rN , sN)}+ (1− λ){fS − c(rS, sS)}, s.t.:
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1. sN = s(β, rN)
2. sS = s(β, rS)
3. V0(s(1, r
N), rN)− fN ≥ u
4. V0(s(β, r
S), rS)− fS ≥ u
5. V0(s(1, r
N), rN)− fN ≥ V0(s(1, rS), rS)− fS
6. V0(s(β, r
S), rS)− fS ≥ V0(s(β, rN), rN)− fN
where superscripts N and S refer to naifs and sophisticates respectively. While
constraints 1-4 are standard constraints from the baseline problem, constraints 5
and 6 assure that no agent-type prefers contract terms designed for the other type
(‘no mimicking’).
Fist, notice that the contract terms offered to each agent-type in an isolated
market do not solve the above problem. Because d V̂0
d β̂
≥ 0, constraint 5 would be
violated. As sophisticates do not overpay for their savings contracts, naifs would
switch. Conversely, sophisticates would not want to mimic naifs when constraint 3
binds. These observations reduce the problem to:
maxrN ,rS ,fN ,fS E π = λ{fN − c(rN , s(β, rN))}+ (1− λ){fS − c(rS, s(β, rS)}, s.t.:
1. V0(s(1, r
N), rN)− fN ≥ V0(s(1, rS), rS)− fS
2. V0(s(β, r
S), rS)− fS ≥ u
Both of the constraints above bind at the optimum. The firm would like to leave as
little rent as possible to naifs, subject to them not mimicking sophisticates. Similarly,
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the firm would like to leave as little rent as possible to sophisticates, subject to them
accepting the contract offer. Thus constraint 2 implies:
fS = V0(s(β, r
S), rS)− u
and constraint 1 implies:
fN = V0(s(1, r
N), rN)− V0(s(1, rS), rS) + fS =
= V0(s(1, r
N), rN)− V0(s(1, rS), rS) + V0(s(β, rS), rS)− u
Substitution reduces the problem to:
maxrN ,rS λ{V0(s(1, rN), rN)− u− c(rN , s(β, rN)} +
+ λ{V0(s(β, rS), rS)− V0(s(1, rS), rS)} +
+ (1− λ){V0(s(β, rS), rS)− u− c(rS, s(β, rS)}
This formulation implies the following. First, despite screening, naifs are offered the
same interest rate as under isolation. Thus imperfect observability does not improve
efficiency of their outcomes.44 However, due to the no mimicking constraint, naifs pay
a lower fee, which improves consumer welfare by curbing the negative distributional
effect. Second, the interest rate offered to sophisticated agents is distorted away
from the first-best in order to reduce the rent for näıve agents. Thus the efficiency
of sophisticates’ outcomes deteriorates. However, consumer welfare is preserved.
Lastly, consider the case in which the firm decides to exclude sophisticated agents
44This could be interpreted as a version of the well-known ‘no distortion at the top’ result.
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from the market by offering contract terms that violate their ‘individual rational-
ity constraint’, while still satisfying the constraint for naifs. The optimal of such
contracts is the one that is offered to näıve agents in an isolated market. Such a
contract maximises the firm’s profits from interacting with naifs, but it makes the
sophisticated agents select their outside option. In this case, naifs’ outcomes are not
affected by imperfect observability, but there is an efficiency loss due to the exclusion
of sophisticates from the market. Sophisticated agents, however, retain their welfare.
Pooling, screening and exclusion result in the following equilibrium profits for the
provider:
πpooling = πS
πscreening = λπ̌N + (1− λ)π̌S
πexclusion = λπN
where πS (πN) denotes the equilibrium profits in an isolated market populated by
sophisticates (naifs). π̌N and π̌S denote the profits from interacting with naifs and
sophisticates respectively under a separating contract. Noting the following:
πS ≤ πN , π̌S ≤ πS, π̌N ≤ πN
shows that either of the three contract design strategies may be profit-maximising,
depending on the parameters of the model. In particular, the population composition
(λ) and the severity of the present bias (β).
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Chapter 3. Savings Contracts for
Näıve Agents: Life-cycle model
with price competition
In Chapter 3, I extend the analysis of Chapter 2 by embedding the interaction with
a pension provider in a numerical life-cycle framework with hyperbolic discounting.
Under the benchmark calibration, the equilibrium contract is Pareto inefficient, low-
ers the agent’s wealth at retirement by 10%, and generates a small, but non-trivial
loss of consumer welfare of 0.17% per annum.
3.1 Introduction
The results outlined in Chapter 2 are derived within a simple model that allows for
analytical tractability. In Chapter 3, I analyse the impact of exploitative contracting
in a more realistic and complex setting by embedding the firm’s problem of contract
design in a rich life-cycle model with hyperbolic discounting. The theoretical foun-
dation combines the existing work on dynamic choice under present bias with an
original model of the supply side of a market for pension products. At the beginning
of a life cycle, financial providers simultaneously offer contracts that specify the rate
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of return on retirement savings as well as the associated fees. An agent evaluates
the contract offers by predicting the resulting consumption and wealth accumulation
paths conditional on the contract parameters and his beliefs about the present bias.
The Hotelling model of imperfect competition predicts inefficient distortions to the
interest rates offered to näıve hyperbolic agents. That is because the contracts that
prevail in market equilibrium maximise the perceived consumer-firm surplus, rather
than the actual surplus. Moreover, the Hotelling model generates a market price
that ranges from the perfectly competitive to the monopolistic level according to a
single parameter.
To simulate household behaviour, I adopt and modify the numerical life cycle
framework of Laibson, Maxted, Repetto and Tobacman (2017).1 I calibrate the firm
side of the model by matching several regularities reported by the empirical literature
on operation of pension funds (Bateman, Mitchell 2004; Bikker, de Dreu 2009; Bauer
et al. 2010; Bikker et al. 2012; Basu, Andrews 2014; FCA 2017; OECD 2017). The
analysis reveals substantial magnitude of the forecasting errors about future saving
made by a näıve agent. At the beginning of the life cycle, the agent expects to retire
with wealth holdings over twice as large as the actual average wealth holdings. These
forecasting errors are reflected in the design of the savings contract offered in market
equilibrium. My preferred measure of efficiency is the Pareto criterion which asks
whether there exist alternative contract parameters that would improve the agent’s
welfare, conditional on the magnitude of the present bias and the agent’s naiveté,
while retaining the profits earned by the firm. Under the benchmark calibration,
the equilibrium contract is indeed inefficiently ‘cheap’, which is consistent with the
theoretical prediction. The inefficiency in contract design lowers the agent’s wealth
1As a benchmark case, I use the estimates of the preference parameters that produce the best fit
to the US data on wealth accumulation and borrowing, i.e. the short-run discount factor β = 0.505,
the long-run discount factor δ = 0.987, and the CRRA parameter θ = 1.255. These estimates are
obtained under the assumption of complete naiveté, i.e. β̂ = 1 (Laibson et al. 2017).
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at retirement by 10% and generates a consumption-equivalent welfare loss of 0.17%,
or $173, per annum. This loss of consumer welfare is small, but non-trivial. Its size
reflects the conservative efficiency criterion and the fact that the efficient contract in-
creases consumption in retirement, which is heavily discounted in the lifetime utility
function. However, note that this result is derived under a constrained contracting
space and for a single exploitative contract, constituting a cautious estimate.
Following the calibration of the model, I examine the efficiency and distributional
consequences of three common policy interventions - imposing ceilings on fees, reg-
ulating the degree of competition, and changing the liquidity of retirement savings.
What is noteworthy, interventions that increase the degree of price competition in the
market improve efficiency and redistribute wealth from the firm to the agent, while
imposing ceilings on charges only diminishes consumer welfare. That is again due to
the fact that a binding ceiling precludes the market from providing higher-yielding
savings contracts. In addition, while increasing the flexibility of retirement savings
exacerbates the overvaluation of savings contracts by a näıve agent, his willingness
to pay increases sufficiently for the agent to select the efficient, ‘expensive’ contract
offered by the provider.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic
life-cycle model with price competition, the calibration strategy, and the quantitative
results, including policy counterfactuals. Section 3 concludes. Derivation of Propo-
sition 2 as well as a full set of the numerical results are relegated to the appendix.
3.2 Life-cycle model with price competition
The baseline model provides a tractable framework within which interactions be-
tween a providing firm and a present-biased individual can be studied analytically.
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This is a useful first-step exercise as it allows to understand the underlying trade-
offs, develop some intuition, and explicitly introduce a range of policy interventions
and extensions. However, the consumption-saving choices, and particularly those
related to financial preparation for retirement, are more realistically made within
a dynamic, complex setting of a life cycle. What is more, developing a numerical
life-cycle model with price competition between financial providers allows to evaluate
the quantitative implications of the exploitative contract design studied in Chapter
2.
The extended model developed in this section consists of two main building
blocks. First, the household side, which is largely based on the existing work on
dynamic decision-making under hyperbolic discounting, both theoretical and nu-
merical (Laibson 1994, 1997; Laibson et al. 2000; Harris, Laibson 2001; Diamond,
Kőszegi 2003; Laibson et al. 2017; Cao, Werning 2018). Second, the firm side, which
constitutes the main contribution of work presented in Chapters 2 and 3. My mod-
elling of the financial providers is guided by the empirical literature on operation of
pension funds (Bateman, Mitchell 2004; Bikker, de Dreu 2009; Bauer et al. 2010;
Bikker et al. 2012; Basu, Andrews 2014).
This section first sets up a multiperiod model of an interaction between a finan-
cial provider and a present-biased agent (household). This formulation of the model
constitutes a theoretical foundation for the numerical exercise. Following calibra-
tion, I discuss the magnitude of the agent’s forecasting errors and the properties of
the savings contracts offered in market equilibrium. The forecasting errors deserve
attention, as they determine the extent to which the financial providers may exploit
the agent’s naiveté. Subsequently, the central part of the quantitative analysis re-
gards the impact of contractual design and choice on efficiency, consumer welfare,
and savings outcomes. Finally, I consider the impact of three policy interventions
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on efficiency of market outcomes and distribution of wealth.
3.2.1 Theoretical foundations
Consider the following model of a market for savings products in a context of a life
cycle. Competing financial providers offer savings contracts characterising the key
features of the agent’s pension asset - the rate of return on accumulated wealth and
the underlying fee (price). This is captured by the Hotelling model of competition
which, as an equilibrium result, spans all degrees of price competition according to
a single parameter.
Regarding the household side of the model, the setup follows the life-cycle frame-
work of Laibson et al. (2017). Consider an economic agent who is alive for a maxi-
mum of T periods. Let Yt for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T} denote the agent’s disposable income in
period t. Each period, the agent chooses his current consumption as well as holdings
of illiquid and liquid assets. The illiquid (pension) asset Z is characterised by a con-
stant rate of appreciation RZ , a (negative) income flow of a fixed value illustrating
the fee, and a schedule of time-dependent withdrawal penalties.2 The agent is not
allowed to borrow against the illiquid asset. The liquid asset X imposes no charges
or withdrawal penalties. The agent may hold negative amounts of X up to a certain
limit, which illustrates (credit card) borrowing. Consequently, the appreciation rate
of the liquid asset depends on whether its holdings are positive or negative. Positive
holdings earn a rate of return RX , while negative holdings generate borrowing costs
of RCC . The size of the agent’s household changes deterministically throughout the
life cycle.
Income and survival are uncertain, and the agent derives utility from leaving a
2The penalty schedule is exogenously given and identical across providers. The modelling of
commitment devices constitutes a separate research question (e.g. Amador et al. 2006; Beshears
et al. 2014; Bryan et al. 2010).
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bequest. In period t, the agent chooses his current consumption and net investments
into both assets in order to maximise the expected discounted lifetime utility:














1−θ with θ > 0 is the instantaneous CRRA utility function which accounts
for the household size, denoted nt. Using the standard notation, β ∈ (0, 1] is a short-
run discount factor (the present-bias parameter) and δ ∈ (0, 1] is a long-run discount
factor. For β = 1, the decision simplifies to the standard life-cycle optimisation prob-
lem with exponential discounting. The expectation operator is taken with respect
the stochastic outcomes, i.e. survival and labour income.
No borrowing on the illiquid asset is captured by the constraint Zt ≥ 0, ∀t ∈
{1, 2, ..., T}. The borrowing limit on the liquid asset proportional to the average
income at age t is captured by Xt ≥ −λȲt for λ > 0. Let I it denote the agent’s net
investment into asset i. Then, the dynamic budget constraint associated with the
illiquid asset is Zt+1 = (1 +R
Z)(Zt + I
Z
t ). The dynamic budget constraint associated
with the liquid asset is Xt+1 = (1 +R)(Xt + I
X
t ), where R = R
X if Xt + I
X
t ≥ 0, and
R = RCC otherwise. Let κt denote the withdrawal penalty associated with the illiq-
uid asset. Then, the static budget constraint is Ct = Yt − IZt − IXt + κt min(IZt , 0).
In a dynamic setting, present bias generates a strategic conflict between subse-
quent decision-makers, usually referred to as different ‘selves’ of an economic agent.
The conflict arises because of the time-inconsistency inherent to hyperbolic discount
functions. The decision-maker in period t discounts utilities in two far-away periods,
e.g. t+ s and t+ s+ 1, by a long-run discount factor δ. However, when period t+ s
comes, the decision-maker discounts those utilities by a factor of βδ, which is strictly
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smaller when β < 1. Note that such strategic conflict is missing from the simple
model presented in Chapter 2, because the model features only one period of saving
and because there is no possibility to commit at the contracting stage. Given the
time-inconsistency of preferences, the standard equilibrium concept employed by the
literature is a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium. The corresponding equi-
librium strategies can be solved for by backward induction and necessarily depend
on beliefs regarding behaviour of future selves (Laibson 1994, 1997; Harris, Laibson
2001; Cao, Werning 2018). The following discussion focuses on contrasting two ex-
treme, but illustrative cases - an entirely sophisticated agent (β̂ = β) who correctly
predicts his future counterparts to be present-biased, and a completely näıve agent
(β̂ = 1) who expects his future selves to discount exponentially.
A known issue with the sophisticated dynamic model with hyperbolic discounting
is that such a model usually has multiple equilibria. Even though some refinement
criteria might ensure uniqueness, the equilibrium consumption functions may be dis-
continuous due to strategic interactions between various selves (Laibson 1994, 1997).
Moreover, standard dynamic programming techniques cannot be used in order to
formulate the solution recursively due to the time-inconsistency of the agent’s pref-
erences (Laibson et al. 2000). To sidestep these difficulties and be able to develop
some intuition, refer to the approximate solution to the dynamic model derived by
Harris and Laibson (2001).3 Harris and Laibson show that for β ≈ 1, consump-
tion functions of a sophisticated agent are continuous, in which case the equilibrium









3Cao and Werning (2018) propose an alternative approach by deriving qualitative predictions
about the savings behaviour that hold in the whole set of equilibria. What is more, this is achieved
without referring to the relevant marginality conditions. However, their results hold only under the
case of a stationary infinite-horizon problem. Such approach also cannot deliver similarly robust
predictions about consumption.
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which is dubbed the (Strong) Hyperbolic Euler Equation. The Hyperbolic Euler
Equation differs from the standard Euler Equation by the ‘effective discount factor’
∂Ct+1
∂Zt+1
βδ + (1− ∂Ct+1
∂Zt+1
)δ. The effective discount factor is a weighted average of an
immediate discount factor βδ and a long-run discount factor δ, where the weights
depend on future marginal propensity to consume out of accumulated wealth.4 The
Hyperbolic Euler Equation holds as an inequality when the borrowing constraint is
binding, just as in a standard case of exponential discounting. The above formula
is derived for a special case of a single asset with a constant rate of return, no
borrowing, and infinite horizon. However, the results of Harris and Laibson (2001)
generalise to the case of multiple state variables, including liquid and illiquid assets
as well as finite horizon.
On the other hand, strategic interactions do not affect the näıve agent’s decision-
making. Since a naif believes that his future selves will act consistently with his




(1 +RZ) βδ u′(Ct+1)
]
while the naif erroneously predicts future selves to act as dictated by:
u′(Ct+s) ≥ Et+s
[
(1 +RZ) δ u′(Ct+s+1)
]
4Future self over-consumes relative to self-t preferences. The effective discount factor thus has
the following intuitive interpretation. The lower future MPC, the greater (i.e. closer to δ) the
effective discount factor. That is, self-t endows his future self with more wealth when future
behaviour diverges from his preference only to a limited extent.
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Note the following regularities which underlie the forecasting errors about future
behaviour made by näıve individuals at the contract evaluation stage. First, while
sophisticated agents correctly predict their future wealth accumulation path, naifs
are overly optimistic about their future saving as they underestimate their future
propensity to spend. Second, within any single period, savings of a sophisticated
agent constitute an upper bound for naif’s savings. In sum, näıve agents are overop-
timistic about their utilisation of a savings contract not only because they ignore the
impact of the present bias on future choices, but also because their current strategies
are suboptimal given the prevalence of the bias.5
As for the firm side of the model, the financial product underlying the accu-
mulation of the illiquid asset Z is assumed to be provided by a pension fund. As
mentioned in the introduction, private pension assets held in the OECD countries
have reached the value of $38 trillion in 2016. Importantly, a major proportion of
these assets is managed by pension funds. Pension funds manage 59% of all private
pension assets in the US, and this fraction is even higher in other countries with
substantial private pension wealth (OECD 2017).6 Thus focusing on pension funds
allows to study the incentives faced by important and universal managers of pen-
sion wealth, who are able to offer tailor-made financial products via retail markets as
well as workplace schemes. Note that the characteristics of contractual arrangements
between these providers and savers are a crucial determinant of future incomes in
retirement. Moreover, as markets for pension products tend to be heavily regulated
and the institutional framework varies substantially across countries, the policy im-
5Furthermore, with multiple asset classes, the income and substitution effects of the interest
rate on optimal savings are not as straightforward. The changes in the rates of return affect also
the proportions of total wealth held in illiquid and liquid assets. Moreover, in a dynamic setting,
the interest rate affects the timing of the savings decisions. For example, it is possible that under
θ < 1 and a higher rate of return, the agent starts saving for retirement earlier in his life cycle.
Then, the total (cumulative) amount saved is not necessarily increasing in the interest rate.
6Pension funds manage 54% of all private pension assets in Canada, 100% in the UK, 97% in
Australia, 61% in Japan, and 100% in the Netherlands.
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plications of the following numerical analysis should be of special interest.
Given the increasing role of private pensions in determining incomes in retire-
ment, the empirical evidence on operational costs of pension funds is somewhat
limited (Bateman, Mitchell 2004; Bikker, de Dreu 2009; Bauer et al. 2010; Bikker
et al. 2012; Basu, Andrews 2014). The existing literature typically divides the total
costs of pension funds into administrative and investment costs.7 Findings regarding
the administrative cost component appear to be consistent across studies. There are
significant scale effects. After controlling for the number of participants in a pension
plan, the associated administrative costs increase in the size of assets under man-
agement, albeit less than proportionately. The estimated elasticity of administrative
costs with respect to assets varies from 0.19 to 0.87.8 The evidence regarding invest-
ment costs is not as clear. Naturally, that is largely due to the inability to equalise
ex post realised returns of a pension fund with ex ante costly effort. Nonetheless,
expenses of pension funds have been shown to increase in factors that are typically
associated with a higher expected rate of return, i.e. the number of available invest-
ment options, the ‘complexity’ of a pension plan, the proportion of assets invested in
stocks, and the proportion of actively managed assets (Basu, Andrews 2014; Bauer
et al. 2010; Bikker et al. 2012). The finance literature offers arguments in favour and
against scale effects in investment costs (with respect to assets under management).
The former include fixed costs and greater bargaining power of larger pension funds,
while the latter invoke limits to arbitrage and the liquidity risk. To account for these
regularities, assume the following per-period cost function of the financial provider:
7For example, Bikker and de Dreu (2009) define investment costs as directly related to asset
management (e.g. wages of portfolio managers and analysts, trading costs). Administrative costs
include all other operational expenses related to record-keeping, communication with participants,
marketing, and compliance with existing legal requirements (e.g. wages, rent).
8The large discrepancy arises not only as a result of cross-country differences in the setup of
markets for pension products, but it also reflects the differences in data quality and definitions of
administrative costs across studies.
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where c1, γ1, c2, γ2 > 0. In the above cost function, the first term corresponds to
administrative costs borne by pension funds, which are increasing in the accumulated
assets. The second term corresponds to investment costs, which are increasing in
the difference between the offered rate of return RZ and a ‘risk-free’ rate of return
RX on the liquid asset, which the agent (and supposedly the financial provider) may
access costlessly.9
Collected fee f constitutes the firm’s revenue, and thus the per-period profit is:
πt = f − c (RZ , Zt)
What would be an appropriate way to model market competition in this context?
The empirical literature (Bateman, Mitchell 2004; Dobronogov, Murthi 2005; Tapia,
Yermo 2008; Bikker, de Dreu 2009; Bauer et al. 2010; Bikker et al. 2012; Basu,
Andrews 2014) makes no attempt to explicitly evaluate the degree of competition in
the analysed markets for pension products. That is perhaps due to the fact that a
range of factors besides the number of competing firms seem to determine the ob-
served pricing. On the one hand, the available industry reports suggest a low degree
of market concentration. For example, the 10 largest pension funds held 8.5% of all
private pension assets in the US in 2016, and the 20 largest pension funds in the
9The quantitative model presented below simulates an interaction between the household and a
‘representative’ financial provider offering a stylised savings contract. From an empirical perspec-
tive, however, this approach is hindered by a couple of limitations. First, it ignores the fact that
pension providers operating in seemingly competitive markets differ substantially from one another
in terms of cost levels, fees charged, resulting profits margins, and details of the services provided.
Indeed, a large within-country heterogeneity among pension providers, and the details of private
pension arrangements they offer, is one of the prevalent findings documented by this literature.
Second, the characteristics of offered pensions plans tend to vary substantially across countries,
reflecting the differences in institutional framework and market maturity. These issues should be
carefully addressed in future work.
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world managed 17% of all assets (Willis Towers Watson 2017). On the other hand,
markets for pension products are not necessarily characterised by competitive pric-
ing, despite no major barriers to entry and an increasing number of providers. This
is mainly because of a weak competitive pressure on prices coming from the demand
side. The complexity of available products, complicated pricing structures, and in-
ertia in pension choices all contribute to this effect (Office of Fair Trading 2014).10
In addition, the charged fees reflect the details of a particular regulatory framework,
which may include price controls and discourage switching between providers. Given
these caveats, I analyse a Hotelling model of market competition which, as an equi-
librium result, spans all degrees of price competition according to a single parameter.
Consider a Hotelling model of spatial competition. Two firms, called A and B,
are located at endpoints of a unit interval. The firms are otherwise identical. There
is a measure 1 of consumers distributed uniformly along the interval. (Equivalently:
there is a single consumer who is ex ante equally likely to find himself at any point
along the interval.) The firms make their contract offers simultaneously and the
agents evaluate them at time t = 0, that is before the beginning of the life cycle.
The savings contracts specify the parameters of the illiquid asset Z - the rate of
return on the agent’s pension wealth and the fee charged for the service. The con-
tracts are not renegotiable and the parameters bind throughout the entire life cycle.
Finally, each consumer signs at most one savings contract.11 An agent located at
x ∈ [0, 1] derives the following perceived utilities from signing a contract P with firm
A and firm B, respectively:
10In fact, the cross-country analysis of Tapia and Yermo (2008) links greater competition, as
measured by the number of providers, to higher prices. This is driven by the additional marketing
expenses which are reflected in the fees.
11Admittedly, optimal timing of the contract offer, the possibility of renegotiation, and extensions
to richer contracting spaces all constitute interesting directions for future research.
135
Û0(PA) = V0(C(β̂, R
Z
A, fA))− ξx
Û0(PB) = V0(C(β̂, R
Z
B, fB))− ξ(1− x),
where Û0(P ) is computed by plugging in the expected life-cycle consumption path
C =
= (C1(β̂, R






As in Chapter 2, and most of the literature, the ‘unbiased’ utility function constitutes
the normative welfare benchmark. The expected consumption path C depends on
the agent’s savings behaviour and as such is a function of the rate of return RZ
associated with the pension asset as well as the present bias parameter β̂. However,
for computational feasibility, I maintain the assumption of a negligible impact of fees
on the savings behaviour, i.e. dCt
d f
= 0.12 Parameter ξ measures the agent’s ‘distance
aversion’. In the context of a market for financial products, this is perhaps more
naturally interpreted as the agent’s tendency to select a ‘default’ provider. If an
agent rejects contract offers of both firms, he obtains reservation utility υ.
The firms design their contracts in order to maximise expected profits. Firm’s i
expected profits from an accepted contract are given by:
12This avoids re-simulating the behaviour over an entire life cycle for each fee level. In one of the
robustness checks, I show that this simplifying assumption has a minimal impact on the optimal
consumption paths, both expected and actual.
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where the expectation operator is taken with respect to the agent’s survival and
income, as the (unconditional) contract terms are binding throughout his life cycle.
It is assumed that the firms discount future profits using the risk-free rate RX .
The optimisation problem of firm i is:
maxRZi ,fi P × E0 πi s.t.:
1. Zt = Zt(β,R
Z
i )
2. P = P(Û0(Pi) ≥ u)
3. E0 πi ≥ 0
The first constraint, as before, says that when computing the agent’s actual wealth
accumulation path, which determines the cost of the service, the firm takes into
account the true present bias parameter β and the offered rate of return RZi . The
second constraint is a version of the ‘individual rationality constraint’, which regards
the probability of the agent accepting firm’s i offer given his realised location x. In
the above, u = max {Û0(P−i), υ} is dependent on the contract parameters offered by
a competitor, which firm i takes as given. The third constraint assures that the firm
only enters the market when it earns non-negative profits on average.
The following summarises the predictions of such multiperiod Hotelling model.
Proposition 2 In a multiperiod Hotelling model of market competition:
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1. Both firms offer the same interest rate RZ∗, which maximises the perceived
consumer-firm surplus and is independent of ξ.
2. Both firms charge the same fee f ∗. The equilibrium fee is monotonically in-
creasing in ξ, ranging from perfectly competitive pricing to monopolistic pricing.
The derivation is relegated to the appendix. As for an intuitive interpretation of
this result, one might think of the parameter ξ as capturing the extent of each firm’s
monopolistic power. For low values of ξ, the agent’s ‘distance aversion’ is of sec-
ondary importance when comparing the contract offers, and he is therefore selecting
the more attractive contract terms independently of provider’s location. From the
firms’ perspective, that implies that lowering (raising) the price has a large positive
(negative) impact on each firm’s market share. For low values of ξ, this induces
Bertrand competition and competitive pricing. For greater values of ξ, on the other
hand, the agent is more likely to select an offer of his default provider so as to avoid
‘travelling’. Once the agent becomes extremely distance-averse, the firms can charge
as if they were monopolists. Thus, as an equilibrium result, parameter ξ determines
the degree of price competition in the market.
Similarly to the baseline model, the degree of competition does not affect the
choice of the interest rate RZ∗. Both firms select the interest rate that maximises
the perceived consumer-firm surplus, rather than the actual surplus.
Note that the above Hotelling formulation is chosen primarily for the sake of
tractability. There is a single parameter corresponding to the degree of price com-
petition, and a single equilibrium price. Thus the Hotelling model is my preferred
foundation for the numerical application, in which the household interacts with a
138
‘representative’ financial provider. However, given the substantial and persistent
price dispersion in markets for pension products, future work should consider mod-
els that are capable of generating a distribution of market prices.13 Notice also that
the above formulation of the model no longer assumes quasi-linearity of the utility
function. This has a non-trivial impact on the notion of ‘efficiency’. The simplifying
assumption of quasi-linearity, made by a majority of standard models, implies the
existence of a common measure of ‘social surplus’, which both the firm and the agent
would wish to maximise. However, under a setup in which the agent’s preferences
are concave in the fees paid (as all kinds of wealth are implicitly assumed to be
fully fungible), any chosen measure of ‘social surplus’ would be affected by the size
of the transfer from the agent to the risk neutral firm. In other words, defining an
efficiency criterion without the assumption quasi-linearity usually requires the mod-
eller to specify the relative weights that the criterion attaches to the agent’s utility
and the firm’s profits. Lastly, compared to the textbook formulations of a model of
spatial competition (Tirole 1989), in the above the two firms are not able to select
their locations, but choose a ‘product quality’ instead.
3.2.2 Calibration
To model the agent’s expected and actual behaviour, I modify and extend a rich life-
cycle framework with hyperbolic discounting developed by Laibson, Maxted, Repetto
and Tobacman (2017), henceforth LMRT.14 The setup of the numerical framework
13In the present context, models of costly consumer search may be particularly useful. The
classical contributions to this literature (Butters 1977; Burdett, Judd 1983; Stahl 1989) analyse
models in which price dispersion arises in a market for a homogeneous good. Hortacsu and Syverson
(2004) use one variant of such models in order to explain price dispersion in a market for index
funds in the US, which are, by definition, homogeneous. There are also behavioural models that
predict price dispersion in absence of products differentiation or complicated pricing. Examples
includes models of sampling-based reasoning and models with status quo bias (Spiegler 2014).
14The numerical model of Laibson et al. (2017) is the most recent iteration of earlier models of
Laibson et al. (2000) and Angeletos et al. (2001).
139
follows the model of a present-biased household outlined in section 3.2.1. Survival
and income processes are stochastic and calibrated to the relevant data for the US.
Time-varying household size and retirement age are deterministic, and also cali-
brated to the US data. I adopt the specifications for survival and income processes,
household size, and retirement age that are calibrated by LMRT.15
Households hold two kinds of wealth - liquid and illiquid assets. I follow the
benchmark parametrisation of the liquid asset X in LMRT. The positive holdings of
X generate returns of RX = 2.79%, while the negative holdings generate borrowing
costs of RCC = 11.52%.16 However, I modify the way in which the illiquid asset is
modelled so that it resembles pension wealth more closely. Under the benchmark
assumptions of LMRT, the illiquid asset generates no capital earnings, but provides
a proportional consumption flow of 5%. The associated liquidation costs decrease
monotonically with age. LMRT acknowledge that under these assumptions, the
illiquid asset shares some features with housing as well as with pension wealth. In
contrast, I model the illiquid asset Z that appreciates over time at a rate RZ , but
generates no additional consumption flow. I also modify the specification of the
liquidation costs so that they are high during the agent’s working life, but decrease
sharply at retirement.17
LMRT develop the structural model in order to estimate the discount factors and
the CRRA parameter by matching the data on wealth accumulation and credit card
15In particular, the disposable income process is defined as a sum of a polynomial in age, an
AR(1), and a random shock. The parameters of the income process are estimated using the PSID
data. Retirement occurs exogenously at the age of 64.
16RX is equal to a long-run average of real yields on AAA bonds. The choice of RCC reflects the
average quarterly interest rate reported by the Fed, bankruptcy rate, and inflation.





at the value of 0.5 at young age and then decreases monotonically. Compared to the original




, these liquidation costs start decreasing closer to the
retirement age, but decrease more sharply. The crossing point of the two functions coincides with
the calibrated timing of the agent’s retirement (age of 64).
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borrowing among US households using the Method of Simulated Moments (Gourin-
chas, Parker 2002).18 For their benchmark specification, the best match to the data
is achieved by setting β = 0.505, δ = 0.987, and θ = 1.255. Due to greater numerical
stability, the calculations are performed under the assumption of (complete) naiveté
of a hyperbolic household, i.e. β̂ = 1. However, LMRT point out that the quan-
titative results remain similar for the case of sophistication, see also the discussion
in Angeletos et al. (2001). I set the household preference parameters equal to the
values estimated by LMRT, which allows to generate realistic wealth accumulation
paths that are consistent with the US data. The adoption of these parameters is
justified by the fact that I modify the economic environment only to a limited extent
relative to the original framework, by changing certain features of the illiquid asset
but maintaining all other assumptions. To model the (erroneously) expected wealth
accumulation paths, I maintain the assumption of complete naiveté and simulate an
otherwise identically parametrised household with β = 1.
Introduction and calibration of the firm side of the model are the main contri-
butions of the following numerical exercise. I take parameter γ1, the elasticity of
administrative costs, directly from the empirical literature. The remaining four free
parameters of the firm side of the model (c1, c2, γ2, ξ) are calibrated jointly to meet
the numerical targets regarding cost-to-assets ratio, share of administrative costs in
the total cost, and firm’s markup, and to target the interest rate offered in the equi-
librium. As a benchmark case, I target the cost-to-assets ratio of 0.005, the share of
administrative costs of 0.50, the markup of 0.20, and the equilibrium interest rate of
5%. Parameter γ1, the elasticity of administrative costs, is set equal to 0.5 (Bateman,
Mitchell 2004; Bauer et al. 2010; Bikker, de Dreu 2009; Bikker et al. 2012; FCA
18The data used by LMRT comes from the Surveys of Consumer Finances (1989-2013). The
targeted moments are the fraction of households borrowing on their credit card, borrowing relative
to income, and wealth relative to income, by 10-year age categories.
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2017; OECD 2017). The choice of these target values is discussed in more detail in
the appendix. Where applicable, all numerical values are calculated at the means.
The market equilibrium is found numerically in the following way. I allow the firm
to offer a range of rates of return from a grid centred around the target value RZ∗.
Specifically, I consider a grid of nine, equally spaced values RZ ∈ {4%, 4.25%, ...,
5.75%, 6%}, as the benchmark target is RZ∗ = 5%. The grid is somewhat narrow,
but, as noted by LMRT, the estimates of the household preference parameters are
sensitive to the calibration of the economic environment. Analysing household be-
haviour for a wider grid of values may well generate unrealistic wealth accumulation
paths. For each constellation of parameters which satisfies the costs and the markup
targets at RZ∗, I check whether there exist any contract offers with alternative in-
terest rates (and fees) that increase the agent’s perceived utility while holding firm’s
profits at least constant. If there are no such ‘mutually preferable deviations’, RZ∗
is indeed offered in market equilibrium. Otherwise, a different level of the interest
rate would prevail in the market.
Intuitively, while parameters c2 and γ2 jointly determine the cost-to-assets ratio,
parameter c1 is calibrated to match the share of administrative costs and parameter
ξ allows to match the requested markup (the greater ξ, the greater the firm’s mo-
nopolistic power and the equilibrium fees). To rule out preferable deviations, the
cost function needs to be steep (convex) enough. Thus the condition for the market
interest rate RZ∗ determines γ2.
Table 3.2.1 reports the values of jointly calibrated parameters, corresponding
target moments, and the set parameters. For illustration, note that the resulting
equilibrium fee is equal to 36% of a monopolistic fee that would extract the entire
perceived consumer surplus.
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Table 3.2.1: Calibrated parameters
Jointly calibrated parameters Value Target moment Moment
value
Admin cost multiplier c1 1.3797 Share of admin costs 0.50
Investment cost elasticity γ2 5.75 Market interest rate 5%
Investment cost multiplier c2 2.19× 1012 Cost-to-assets ratio 0.005
Hotelling parameter ξ 0.0808 Markup 0.20
Set parameters Value Source
Admin cost elasticity γ1 0.5 Bateman, Mitchell 2004;
Bikker et al. 2012
CRRA parameter θ 1.255 Laibson et al. 2017
Short-run discount factor β 0.505 Laibson et al. 2017
Long-run discount factor δ 0.987 Laibson et al. 2017
Beliefs about present bias β̂ 1 Laibson et al. 2017
Risk-free interest rate RX 2.79% Laibson et al. 2017
Non-targeted moments
The numerical model replicates well some non-targeted regularities reported by the
empirical literature. The equilibrium fee is equal to 0.6% of assets, measured at the
mean. This is well within the range of fee levels observed in the pension industry,
which are typically between 0.5% and 1.7% (Dobronogov, Murthi 2005; OECD 2017;
Tapia, Yermo 2008). The absolute (dollar) value of the calibrated administrative
costs, which is equal to $1250 on average, is somewhat high, but it lies close to the
upper end of a range of values reported in the literature.19 The cost-to-assets ratio,
which is calibrated to a value of 0.005 at the means, varies from 0.0035 to 0.0326
over the life cycle, with an average of 0.01, which also falls within the typical range
observed across studies (Bateman, Mitchell 2004; Bauer et al. 2010; Bikker, de Dreu
19Bikker and de Dreu (2009) note a substantial heterogeneity in administrative costs of the Dutch
pension funds, which vary from $53 to $1509. These bounds are slightly narrower for a sample of
larger pension funds from four countries in Bikker et al. (2012), ranging from $30 to $674. For the
US, Bateman and Mitchell (2004) report the range from $105 to $897.
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2009; Bikker et al. 2012; OECD 2017).
3.2.3 Quantitative results
Magnitude of the forecasting errors
The forecasting errors regarding future saving enable the exploitation of näıve agents
by the financial providers. Furthermore, the magnitude of these errors and the
impact of the interest rate thereon, determine the extent of exploitation and the
characteristics of the savings contracts offered in market equilibrium. Figure 3.2.1
plots actual and expected wealth holdings over the life cycle, averaged over the
income shocks and conditional on survival. The illustrated forecasting errors are
interpreted as made by a hyperbolic household at the contract evaluation stage at
the beginning of a life cycle.






















×106 Wealth accumulation over the life cycle (β = 0.505, δ = 0.987, θ = 1.255, R
Z = 5%)
Total wealth - expected
Illiquid wealth - expected
Total wealth - actual
Illiquid wealth - actual
Figure 3.2.1: Benchmark wealth accumulation paths (expected and actual)
Source: Author’s calculations
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Several immediate observations can be made. Firstly, the magnitude of the fore-
casting errors regarding future wealth holdings is huge. At retirement at the age
of 64, the expected holdings of total as well as illiquid wealth are over two times
as high as the actual average wealth holdings. Secondly, and not surprisingly, the
period-by-period forecasting errors of a näıve household compound. As a result, the
total error increases over time. Thirdly, the composition of total wealth also differs
substantially. While a näıve household accumulates virtually all its wealth in a form
of the illiquid asset, it erroneously expects to hold some liquid wealth as well. What
is more, there are periods early in the life cycle when the value of the illiquid asset
exceeds the value of naif’s total wealth. That is because a hyperbolic household
simultaneously accumulates illiquid wealth and borrows on its credit card.
Recall that the qualitative implications of the baseline theoretical model rely on
the impact of the interest rate on the forecasting errors made by näıve agents. A
profit-maximising provider chooses the contract terms that magnify the difference
between the agent’s forecasted and actual saving behaviour, as such a design leads to
a greater overvaluation of a contract by naifs. In the simple setting, this is achieved
by offering inefficiently high interest rates when the substitution effect dominates the
agent’s utility function, and inefficiently low interest rates otherwise. This under-
lying mechanism appears to extend to a multiperiod model. Under the benchmark
value of θ = 1.255, the forecasting errors regarding future saving are indeed decreas-
ing in the interest rate associated with the illiquid asset for RZ ∈ [4%, 6%].20 As an
example, Figure 3.2.2 plots the expected and actual retirement saving over the life
20There are several definitions of a ‘forecasting error’ that one could assume in this context. In
order to correct for differences in the timing of savings decisions (e.g. under higher interest rates,
the agents tend to start saving for their retirement earlier on in the life cycle) and to provide a
measure that corresponds closely to the variable s from the baseline theoretical model, I define an
average forecasting error as a difference between the expected cumulative retirement savings and
the actual cumulative retirement savings. This is equivalent to analysing a difference between the
average per-period retirement savings.
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cycle. The forecasting errors of a näıve household are, on average, larger under the
lower interest rate of 4.25%, because the expected saving increases more strongly
than the actual saving.

























×104 Retirement saving over the life cycle (β = 0.505, δ = 0.987, θ = 1.255)
Retirement saving (expected), RZ = 4.25%
Retirement saving (actual), RZ = 4.25%
Retirement saving (expected), RZ = 5%
Retirement saving (actual), RZ = 5%
Figure 3.2.2: Retirement saving over the life cycle (expected and actual)
Source: Author’s calculations
For an alternative household parametrisation with θ = 2.0, the same pattern
holds, i.e. the forecasting errors are decreasing in RZ . For θ = 0.5, on the other
hand, the pattern reverses and the forecasting errors are increasing in RZ as long as
the cumulative savings are increasing as well.21
21These two alternative values for the CRRA parameter are used by LMRT to check the robust-
ness of their main results. In order to generate realistic wealth accumulation paths, the remaining
preference parameters of the household are recalibrated. The estimated δ increases monotonically
in θ, and the estimated β decreases monotonically. Moreover, an important caveat applies to the
case of θ = 0.5. In a dynamic setting, the interest rate influences not only the amounts saved every
period, but also the timing of savings decisions. For values of RZ higher than 4.5%, the agent starts
saving for retirement at earlier ages and as a result does not necessarily save more over the course
of the life cycle when RZ increases. The forecasting errors of a näıve household are increasing in
the interest rate as long as the cumulative savings are increasing as well.
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Properties of the equilibrium contract
According to the target, the savings contract offered in market equilibrium is char-
acterised by a rate of return RZ∗ = 5%. Having calibrated the firm’s cost function,
one can examine whether there exist any alternative Pareto-improving contracts.
This is performed in the following way. For alternative interest rates, I calculate fees
that would preserve the provider’s profits at the current (equilibrium) level. If any
of such alternative, profit-preserving contracts improves the agent’s actual welfare
relative to the equilibrium contract, I call it a Pareto improvement. The only reason
why there may ever exist Pareto-improving contracts which are not provided by the
market are the agent’s forecasting errors regarding his future savings behaviour and
the resulting wealth accumulation path. Under sophistication, the construction of
the market equilibrium would rule out the existence of Pareto improvements.
As the firm’s profits are preserved, the Pareto criterion constitutes a conservative
efficiency benchmark. More precisely, any other efficiency benchmark that aggre-
gates the agent’s utility and the firm’s profits with positive relative weights would
indicate the existence of inefficiency as long as there exists a Pareto improvement,
but not the way around. The advantage of the chosen efficiency benchmark is that
the Pareto criterion avoids attaching arbitrary weights to the agent’s and the firm’s
outcomes.
For the benchmark calibration of the model, the Pareto-efficient contract would
offer a higher rate of return than the market contract, i.e. RZ = 5.25%. The profit-
maximising contract is in fact inefficiently cheap, consistently with the qualitative
prediction of the simple baseline model. Recall that the calibration of the household
has θ > 1 and thus the income effect dominates.22
22Why is the difference between the efficient and the equilibrium interest rates so small despite
substantial forecasting errors made by a näıve household? First, I employ a conservative efficiency
criterion. Second, the calibration has θ close to 1, which limits the quantitative impact of the
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As a result of selecting a cheap savings contract, the size of the agent’s savings
pot at retirement is 10% smaller than under the efficient contract. That reflects not
only the compounding of the corresponding interest rates, but also the different con-
sumption and wealth accumulation paths induced by the two contracts.23 As shown
in Figure 3.2.3, while the Pareto-efficient contract lowers consumption at the stage
of accumulation of pension wealth, it allows higher consumption in retirement. How-
ever, it needs to be stressed that the prevalence of the inefficient contract terms in
the market is not due to preference for immediate consumption, but due to a wrong
forecast of future behaviour used as an input into a bias-free contract evaluation.

































×104 Consumption path over the life cycle (c1 = 1.3797, γ1 = 0.5, c2 = 2.192× 10
12, γ2 = 5.75)
Total consumption under the Pareto-efficient contract (RZ = 5.25%)
Total consumption under the profit-maximising contract (RZ = 5%)
Figure 3.2.3: Savings contracts and consumption paths
Source: Author’s calculations
A consumption-equivalent loss of consumer welfare arising from an inefficient
interest rate on the extent of overvaluation of a contract.
23A simple calculation shows that every dollar saved at the age of 40 earning an interest of 5.25%
p.a. yields 5.9% higher total returns at the age of 64 when compared to an interest of 5% p.a.
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contractual choice is equal to 0.17% per annum. In order words, to be compensated
for choosing an inefficient savings contract, the agent’s consumption would need to
increase by 0.17% in every period of the model. This corresponds to $173 of foregone
consumption annually, which does not increase the provider’s profits. Arguably, this
estimated loss of consumer welfare arising from exploitative contracting is small, but
non-trivial. The modest size of the loss reflects the conservative efficiency criterion,
the fact that the CRRA parameter θ is close to 1, and the fact the the efficient
contract provides higher consumption in retirement, which is heavily discounted in
the lifetime utility function.24 However, note that the estimate of 0.17% is derived
for a single contract under a limited contracting space. Multiple financial contracts
with contingent parameters would result in more exploitation.25
Policy interventions
Taking the calibrated parameters of the model, this section analyses the impact of
three common regulatory policies, similar to those discussed in Chapter 2. Specif-
ically, I consider efficiency and distributional consequences of introducing a ceiling
on fees as well as changing the degree of competition and the flexibility of retirement
savings.
Ceiling on fees. Suppose that the regulation allows the providing firm to charge
only up to a given fraction of the calibrated equilibrium fee, no matter what the of-
fered rate of return. This constraint implies that the firm never offers the rate of
24An alternative efficiency benchmark that is sometimes used in macroeconomic applications
would ask which contract maximises the agent’s welfare under the assumption that the firm’s
profits are redistributed back to the agent. For this benchmark, the efficient contract would again
be characterised by RZ = 5.25%. The associated consumption-equivalent loss of consumer welfare
is 0.21%. Note that this alternative criterion necessarily coincides with the Pareto criterion only
for the case of perfect competition.
25For comparison, Lucas (1987) derives a formula according to which consumption-equivalent
losses of consumer welfare associated with the existence of business cycles lie within a range of
0.05%− 0.15%. See also Otrok (2001).
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return above the benchmark market rate of 5%. Such an offer would increase the
costs of the provider while not generating additional revenue. Thus a ceiling on
fees cannot result in a ‘more expensive’ efficient contract with RZ = 5.25% being
provided by the market. On the contrary, the stricter the ceiling, the lower the equi-
librium interest rate. For a given level of competition, the firms retain their profits
by offering low-yielding contracts with fees equal to the ceiling. As a result, the
entire loss of efficiency is passed onto the agents. Table 3.2.2 presents breakpoints
at which gradually lower interest rates are offered in equilibrium.






1.0 5% - -
0.95 4.75% −0.63% -
0.75 4.50% −1.47% -
0.60 4.25% −2.39% -
0.50 4% −3.18% −1%
0.45 4% −3.00% −19%
0.40 4% −2.83% −37%
These results are consistent with the theoretical prediction of the simple model
from Chapter 2. Naturally, an effective ceiling on fees cannot resolve the issue of ‘inef-
ficiently cheap’ exploitative contracts. Moreover, under fairly competitive conditions
when the firms are charging below the agent’s willingness to pay, the intervention
does not even achieve redistribution of wealth from the firms to the agents. The firms
are able to retain their equilibrium profits by offering progressively lower-yielding
contracts and charging the maximum allowed fee. Without a binding ceiling, such
contracts would not prevail in equilibrium. A ceiling on fees enforces redistribution
only when the firms are already offering the minimum interest rate of 4%.
Regulating competition. The policymaker may control the degree of price
150
competition observed in the market by affecting the attractiveness of the agent’s
outside option. This includes removing barriers to entry, explicitly regulating the
number of firms, or enabling consumers to switch between providers. Consider an in-
tervention that affects the underlying parameter ξ, changing the markup observable
at the benchmark interest rate of 5%. The implications are markedly different from
the case of a ceiling on fees. When the firms’ markups are cut down, the market pro-
vides a more expensive savings contract. Thus a higher degree of price competition
improves efficiency as well as redistributes the firm’s profits to the agent, see Table
3.2.3.
Table 3.2.3: Regulating competition
Markup Market RZ Consumer
welfare (CE)
Firm’s profits
0 5.25% +0.77% −59%
0.05 5.25% +0.63% −44%
0.10 5.25% +0.49% −30%
0.15 5.25% +0.35% −15%
0.20 5% - -
0.25 5% −0.1% +10%
0.30 5% −0.24% +25%
0.35 5% −0.39% +39%
0.40 5% −0.53% +54%
While the redistributive consequences of implementing higher degrees of compe-
tition are the same as implied by the simple model from Chapter 2, the efficiency
consequences are different. Recall that the simple model was solved under the as-
sumption of quasi-linear preferences. When the agent’s preferences are linear in
the fee, the interest rate offered in market equilibrium is independent of the degree
of price competition. That is because the agent’s additional willingness to pay for
a higher-yielding contract (e.g. RZ = 5.25%), relative to a lower-yielding contract
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(e.g. RZ = 5%), is independent of the baseline fee level. In contrast, this is no longer
true under the extended model, where the agent’s preferences are concave in prices.
When fees are lower in general, the agent may agree to pay a required premium for
a higher-yielding contract.
Liquidity of retirement savings. To proxy for a minimum savings require-
ment (during the working life) and to consider an additional factor determining the
agent’s valuation of a savings contract, suppose that the policymaker affects the
liquidity of retirement savings by increasing or reducing penalties for early with-
drawals. On the one hand, the penalties act as a commitment device against early
withdrawals for individuals with self-control problems. On the other hand, flexibility
of retirement savings allows to react to (income) shocks in a stochastic setting of a
life cycle. A social planner who is able to choose the penalties, would consider this
tradeoff between commitment and flexibility and, in a typical case, decide against
full flexibility (see Amador et al. 2006). A profit-maximising provider, in contrast,
recognises that a completely näıve agent has no taste for commitment, and thus
offers fully flexible savings contracts. In other words, private market would under-
provide commitment if free to do so. Such contracts, relative to the benchmark case
with withdrawal penalties, would increase the agent’s valuation and thus exacerbate
exploitation. This concern is not limited to a special case of completely näıve agents.
Partially näıve individuals would choose insufficient, but costly, commitment, which
could also result in more exploitation (Heidhues, Kőszegi 2009).26
Those concerns are reflected in the actual regulatory policies, which seem to dic-
tate the minimum level of commitment. OECD (2016) proposes use of tax incentives
to promote saving over long horizons and discourage early withdrawals from private
26In a survey paper, Bryan et al. (2010) discuss other reasons why private markets would not
provide sufficient commitment. Importantly, conditions that warrant flexibility may not be ob-
servable to the firms and thus contractable upon. See also John (2018) and Schilbach (2018) for
empirical evidence on costly under-commitment.
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pensions. In the UK, for example, private pension providers have some freedom in
determining the withdrawal age, but all withdrawals made before the age of 55 are
nonetheless taxed at a rate of 55%. It thus seems reasonable to treat the withdrawal
penalty schedule as (exogenously) determined by the policymaker.
Suppose that the shape of the withdrawal penalty schedule over the life cycle is
maintained, i.e. the penalties are high during the working life and decrease sharply
at retirement, but the level changes as a result of the policy intervention. After the
change, the market will provide savings contracts which maximise the consumer’s
perceived welfare while retaining the firm’s profits which are not competed away.
Following from the above discussion, the näıve agent’s willingness to pay for a con-
tract increases when the savings are made more flexible. That is because naifs have
no preference for commitment. Perhaps counter-intuitively, when the agent is over-
valuing the contracts to an even greater extent, he purchases the more expensive
(efficient) option and the actual consumer welfare improves, see Table 3.2.4.
Table 3.2.4: Liquidity of retirement savings
Withdrawal
penalty
Market RZ Efficient RZ Consumer
welfare (CE)
Firm’s profits
0.50 5.25% 5.25% +1.47% -
0.75 5.25% 5.25% +0.76% -
1.0 5% 5.25% - -
1.25 5% 5.25% −0.33% -
This outcome requires an additional commentary. When the retirement savings
are made more flexible, the näıve present-biased agent expects to accumulate more
of asset Z, since liquidation is not as costly, but ends up accumulating less than in
the benchmark case. This mechanism explains the greater extent of overvaluation of
savings contracts with more flexibility. As the agent’s willingness to pay increases, he
prefers to purchase a more expensive contract, which is now provided by the market.
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There is also another reason why an increase in flexibility has a positive impact on
the agent’s actual welfare. When retirement savings are flexible, the present-biased
individual no longer simultaneously saves into an illiquid asset and borrows as much
against the liquid asset (credit card), which is detrimental to welfare because of
the substantial difference in the interest rates. As a final remark, note that the
benchmark penalty schedule was not necessarily socially optimal, which could also
contribute to improving the consumer welfare.
Robustness checks
The benchmark calibration is performed under a particular set of modelling assump-
tions. This section discusses, in turn, the sensitivity to target moments and the
impact of the provider’s cost function, market structure, and household parametri-
sation on the calibration. Both qualitative as well as quantitative implications of
the model appear robust to these tests. In addition, I demonstrate that the optimal
consumption paths are not affected by the simplifying assumption of the negligible
impact of fees on the consumption-saving tradeoff. A more detailed discussion and
a complete set of numerical results are provided in the appendix.
The benchmark results are not affected by changing the target values and the
assumed elasticity of administrative costs γ1.
The assumed cost function of the financial provider is indeed a very specific one.
I consider two alternative specifications:
cost(t) = k + c(RZ −RX)γ
and
cost(t) = k + c[(RZ −RX)Z(t)]γ
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The first alternative replaces the administrative cost component which depends on
assets under management with a simple fixed cost. The second formulation main-
tains the assumption of fixed administrative costs, but allows the investment cost
to be a function of the agent’s total capital earnings (in excess of the ‘risk-free’ rate
RX). Thus the investment cost is dependent on both the offered rate of return as
well as the agent’s assets. The calibration strategy and target values are the same
as under the benchmark case. Implications of the numerical model regarding the
contract design and the impact of contractual choice are unchanged under these al-
ternative specifications.
To test the impact of assuming a perfectly competitive environment, I perform
the calibration under a sufficiently low target value for the average markup. The
implications of the model are not affected by this modification. Rates of return asso-
ciated with the market and Pareto-efficient contracts as well as the magnitude of the
associated consumer welfare losses are the same as under the benchmark marukp of
0.20. Under the assumption of monopoly, in contrast to competitive environments,
a savings contract that is offered in equilibrium is simply the one that maximises
firm’s profits subject to all contract terms (RZ ’s) extracting the entire perceived con-
sumer surplus. For such a calibrated model, an agent would be better off paying a
monopolistic fee for a contract with RZ = 6% rather than for the profit-maximising
contract with RZ = 5%. The associated consumption-equivalent loss of consumer
welfare is much larger at 0.95%. However, in this case, moving from an ‘inefficiently
cheap’ to a ‘more expensive’ savings contract is not a Pareto improvement, because
the firm makes strictly higher profits from the exploitative contract.
There is little agreement in the empirical literature on household finance about
the ‘correct’ size of the CRRA parameter θ (e.g. Attanasio, Weber 2010; Laibson
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et al. 2017). As a robustness check, LMRT re-estimate their life-cycle model under
two arbitrary values of θ = 0.5 and θ = 2.0. The estimated short-run discount factor
β is monotonically decreasing in the assumed size of the CRRA parameter θ, while
the estimated long-run discount factor δ increases. However, the goodness of fit of
the two constrained models is substantially worse than that of the unconstrained
model which has θ = 1.255. Similarly, I re-calibrate the supply side of the market
for pension products under the two alternative specifications of the household side.
When the timing effects are taken into account, the inefficient distortions to contract
terms go in the predicted direction. However, the magnitude of the associated losses
of consumer welfare is indeed sensitive to the household calibration. Under θ = 0.5,
the exploitative contract generates a consumption-equivalent welfare loss of 0.03%,
while under θ = 2.0 this estimate equals 0.16%, more in line with the benchmark
calibration. For illustration, I additionally show that a monopolist interacting with
a household parametrised by θ = 0.5 does offer an ‘inefficiently expensive’ contract,
while a monopolist interacting with a household parametrised by θ = 2.0 offers an
‘inefficiently cheap’ contract, consistently with the main prediction of the baseline
theoretical model.
Finally, for computational feasibility, the calibrated model assumes that the im-
pact of fees on the agent’s savings behaviour is negligible. I test the validity of
this simplifying assumption by re-simulating household behaviour, both actual and
expected, given the fee level observed in the benchmark market equilibrium. Al-
lowing for re-optimisation essentially does not affect the consumption and wealth
accumulation paths. For instance, while the mean absolute deviation of the ex-




Chapters 2 and 3 study the interaction between a present-biased individual and a pri-
vate pension provider. By embedding the provider’s problem of contract design in a
rich life-cycle framework with hyperbolic discounting, in Chapter 3 I attempt to eval-
uate the quantitative impact of exploitative contracting on efficiency and consumer
welfare. Under the benchmark calibration, the savings contract offered in market
equilibrium is Pareto-inefficient, i.e. there exists an alternative contract that would
increase the agent’s utility while retaining the firm’s profits. Consistently with the
theoretical prediction of the simple model, the equilibrium contract is ‘inefficiently
cheap’. The prevalence of the exploitative contract terms lowers the agent’s wealth at
retirement by 10% and generates a consumption-equivalent loss of consumer welfare
of 0.17% p.a. This corresponds to $173 of forgone consumption annually. I argue
that this estimated welfare loss arising from exploitative contracting is small, but
non-trivial. The calibrated model is subsequently used to examine the quantitative
impact of common policy interventions in markets for pension products. I find that
interventions which increase the degree of price competition in the market improve
efficiency and redistribute wealth from the firm to the agent, while imposing ceilings
on charges is detrimental to consumer welfare. What is interesting, while increasing
the flexibility of retirement savings exacerbates the overvaluation of all savings con-
tracts by a näıve agent, his willingness to pay increases sufficiently for the agent to
select the efficient ‘expensive’ contract, now provided by the market.
Extending the numerical model to account for a richer contracting space and to
allow for dynamic contracting constitute a promising research direction that may be




Solve the problem from the perspective of firm A:
maxRZA,fA P × E πA s.t.:
1. Zt = Zt(β,R
Z
A)
2. P = P(U0(RZA, fA, β̂) ≥ u)
3. E πA ≥ 0
which can be written more concisely as:
maxRZA,fA P(U0(R
Z
A, fA, β̂) ≥ u)× E πA(RZA, fA, β)
provided that E πA ≥ 0 in solution of the above.
In a first step, fix any p ∈ [0, 1]. Conditional on u, for every RZA there is fA(RZA)
such that
P(U0(RZA, fA(RZA), β̂) ≥ u) = p. It follows that fA(RZA) is a function of the agent’s
belief β̂. Then, the optimal interest rate RZ∗A maximises:
E πA(RZA, fA(RZA), β)



























And similarly for firm B. The second line in the above explicitly distinguishes be-
tween the firm’s revenue and costs which capture the total impact of RZ on profits.
The above condition has three important implications. First, both firms optimally
offer the same interest rate RZ∗A = R
Z∗
B = R
Z∗. Second, RZ∗ is independent of ξ.
Third, RZ∗ maximises the perceived consumer-firm surplus, as fA(R
Z
A), which cap-
tures the agent’s willingness to pay for a contract, is a function of β̂ and not β. This
proves the first statement of Proposition 2.
The optimal choice of p = P(U0(RZ∗, fA, β̂) ≥ u), or equivalently fA, maximises
the expected profits given the profitability of a single interaction:
maxfA P(U0(RZ∗, fA, β̂) ≥ u)× E πA(RZ∗, fA, β)
where
P[U0(RZ∗, fA, β̂) ≥ u] = P[U0(RZ∗, fA, β̂) ≥ U0(RZ∗, fB, β̂)] =
= P[V0(C(β̂, RZ∗, fA))− ξx ≥ V0(C(β̂, RZ∗, fB))− ξ(1− x)] =




= 0.5 + V0(C(β̂,R
Z∗,fA))−V0(C(β̂,RZ∗,fB))
2ξ
The last line uses the assumption that x is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. The
above makes clear that the strength of the motive to lower the price fA in order to
increase the probability of an interaction (or a market share) P depends on the size





















The above condition implies that the equilibrium fee f ∗A is monotonically increasing in
ξ, ranging from competitive pricing to monopolistic pricing. The competitive price is
determined by the non-negativity constraint E πA ≥ 0, while the monopolistic price
is a function of the agent’s outside option υ. This formula highlights the trade-off
between profits from a single interaction and a market share. Notice that parameter
ξ determines sensitivity of firm’s A market share to its price. For low values of ξ,
firm A has more incentives to post a low fee and substantially increase its market
share, while this motive is not as strong for higher values of ξ.




and the indifferent consumer is located at x = 0.5. This proves the second statement
of Proposition 2.
Benchmark targets
As a benchmark case, the numerical model is calibrated to match the cost-to-assets
ratio of 0.005, the share of administrative costs of 0.50, the markup of 0.20, and the
equilibrium interest rate of 5%. All numerical values are calculated at the means for
computational convenience. Parameter γ1, the elasticity of administrative costs, is
set equal to 0.5. This section discusses the choice these values in turn.
Operational costs expressed as a fraction of assets under management (the cost-
to-assets ratio) is a usual metric used by the empirical literature on expenses of
pension funds. The observed cost-to-assets ratio tends to vary considerably across
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firms and countries, but typical values lie within a range of [0.1%, 1.2%], with US
pension funds reporting costs towards a lower end of the scale (Bateman, Mitchell
2004; Bauer et al. 2010; Bikker, de Dreu 2009; Bikker et al. 2012; OECD 2017).
Only the analysis of Bikker and de Dreu (2009) allows to directly compare the
relative importance of administrative and investment costs in determining the to-
tal costs of pension funds. On average, administrative costs are 50% greater than
investment costs, but there is much more heterogeneity in the distribution of adminis-
trative costs. Moreover, investment costs tend to be under-reported. In comparison,
Bikker et al. (2012) remark only that administrative costs constitute “a very large
proportion” of the total cost.
There is little reliable data on markups of pension funds, although a few papers
stress the need to distinguish between costs and charges in the pension industry due
to imperfect price competition (e.g. Bikker et al. 2012; OECD 2017). According to
the report by the Financial Conduct Authority (2017), an average profit margin in
asset management industry in the UK was as high as 36%. I interpret this as an
upper bound for markups in the pension industry.
Typical annual rates of return of pension funds lie within a range of from 3%
to 7% in real terms (Bauer et al. 2010; OECD 2017), although there is consider-
able variation across time and across countries. In addition, setting RZ∗ = 5% as
a benchmark target reflects the return on the illiquid asset assumed by Laibson et
al. (2017). This is an important point of consideration, as the estimates of the
household preference parameters strongly depend on a calibration of the economic
environment. As two extreme alternatives, Laibson et al. consider rates of return of
3.38% and 6.59%.
Bateman and Mitchell (2004) find that the elasticity of administrative costs of
Australian pension funds with respect to assets under management is 0.46, and 0.87
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for a subset of retail funds. Bikker et al. (2012), who use a less inclusive definition of
administrative costs, estimate the elasticity of 0.19 for a sample of Australian, Cana-
dian, Dutch and American pension funds. For a subset of the US pension funds, the
estimate equals 0.23.
Sensitivity analysis
Table 3.3.1 presents the sensitivity of the numerical results to changes in the target
values and the assumed elasticity of administrative costs γ1.










Benchmark c1 = 1.3797
γ1 = 0.5





γ1 = 0.35 c1 = 8.9469
γ1 = 0.35




γ1 = 0.65 c1 = 0.2100
γ1 = 0.65







































Markup 0.15 c1 = 1.3797
γ1 = 0.5




Markup 0.25 c1 = 1.3797
γ1 = 0.5





RZ∗ = 4.75% c1 = 1.2760
γ1 = 0.5




RZ∗ = 5.25% c1 = 1.4717
γ1 = 0.5




The sensitivity analysis shows that the quantitative implications of the model are
robust to distorting the target values. Notice that the above also makes apparent
the underlying mechanics of the numerical model. First, equilibria characterised
by higher markups require greater monopolistic power of the provider and thus the
calibrated ξ takes greater values. Second, recall that the cost conditions jointly
determine parameters c2 and γ2 and that is why higher values of c2 are associated
with higher values of γ2. Third, the total cost function needs to be ‘steep enough’
(convex) in order to generate an interior RZ∗. That is why calibrations that assume
higher γ1 require lower γ2 and calibrations with a greater share of administrative
costs require higher γ2.
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Robustness checks
Table 3.3.2 presents the numerical results for a battery of robustness checks.










Benchmark c1 = 1.3797
γ1 = 0.5




























Monopoly c1 = 1.3797
γ1 = 0.5











































These results require additional explanation. First, robustness checks regarding func-
tional form of the firm’s cost function are performed under the benchmark target
values. Second, robustness checks imposing an arbitrary degree of competition use
the same target values, save for the provider’s markup. The case of perfect competi-
tion targets an average markup of −0.13, under which the discounted expected value
of the firm’s profits is non-negative. It becomes negative for an average markup of
−0.14. The case of monopoly has a provider offering a savings contract that max-
imises profits subject to fees associated with different rates of return extracting the
entire perceived consumer surplus. An agent would be better off paying a monopolis-
tic fee for a more expensive savings contract with RZ = 6%, however the movement
from RZ = 5% can no longer be interpreted as a Pareto improvement. That is be-
cause the firm strictly prefers to offer an inefficiently cheap savings contracts.
An alternative parametrisation of the household with θ = 0.5 again produces an
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inefficiently cheap contract in market equilibrium. That is because in a dynamic set-
ting the timing effects can dominate the standard relationship between the interest
rate and optimal savings, conditional on the size of the CRRA parameter. For this
parametrisation and for the rates of return exceeding 4.5%, the household starts sav-
ing for retirement earlier on in the life cycle when the interest rate increases and thus
the total amounts saved are decreasing in RZ despite θ < 1. As a result, the firm in-
creases its profit at the margin by offering an inefficiently cheap savings contract. In
contrast, a monopolist interacting with the household parametrised by θ = 0.5 offers
an ‘inefficiently expensive’ contract, as predicted by the stylised model. Because of a
high intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the contract terms have a huge impact
on the agent’s savings. On the other hand, a parametrisation with θ = 2.0 produces
inefficiently cheap savings contracts in market equilibria, both under a competitive
environment and under a monopoly.























×105 Consumption over the life cycle (β = 0.505, δ = 0.987, θ = 1.255, R
Z = 5%)
Expected consumption - household re-optimises
Expected consumption - no re-optimisation
Actual consumption - household re-optimises
Actual consumption - no re-optimisation
Figure 3.3.1: Consumption paths (expected and actual)
Source: Author’s calculations
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For computational feasibility, the benchmark numerical model assumes that the
agent’s saving decisions are independent of fees charged by the provider. I check that
this is not an overly restrictive assumption by simulating behaviour of a household
that re-optimises their consumption and wealth accumulation paths given the fees
charged in equilibrium of the benchmark model. As Figure 3.3.1 above demonstrates,
the resulting consumption paths do not deviate significantly from the benchmark,
constrained-optimised paths. The mean absolute deviation of the actual re-optimised
consumption path is only 0.38%, while for the expected consumption paths the mean
absolute difference is 0.5%. The re-optimised model predicts a slightly higher actual
accumulation of asset X and a slightly lower accumulation of asset Z. However, the
difference in holdings of the illiquid wealth at retirement is not large at 2.8%.
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Heidhues, P. & Kőszegi, B. (2010), “Exploiting naivete about Self-Control in the
Credit Market”, American Economic Review, vol. 100, pages 2279-2303.
Hortacsu, A. & Syverson, C. (2004), “Product Differentiation, Search Costs, and
Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: A Case Study of S&P 500 Index Funds”,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 119 (2), pages 403-456.
Jappelli, T. (2010), “Economic Literacy: An International Comparison”, The Eco-
nomic Journal, vol. 120, pages 429-451.
John, A. (2018), “When Commitment Fails - Evidence from a Field Experiment”,
Management Science (forthcoming).
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